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ABSTRACT 
 
COGNITIVE MALLEABILITY: DOES DISGUST ACT AS A “STOP” SIGNAL ON 
CURRENTLY ACCESSIBLE COGNITIVE PROCESSING STYLES IN 
PERCEPTUAL AND CONCEPTUAL TASKS? 
SEPTEMBER 2014 
ELICIA CHELSEY LAIR, B.A., COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY 
M.A., COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Linda M. Isbell 
Much of the research on feeling and thought supports the notion of a fixed relationship 
between affect and cognition, specifically that particular affective experiences promote 
particular ways of thinking (i.e., information processing styles). Surprisingly, little is 
known about the relationship between disgust and cognition, and this dissertation sought 
to rectify this omission. The recently proposed Cognitive Malleability approach (Clore, et 
al., 2001; Huntsinger & Clore, 2007; Isbell, 2010; Isbell, Lair, & Rovenpor, 2013) calls 
the fixed nature of the affect-cognition relationship into question, and instead argues that 
affect confers value on whatever information processing style is currently dominant. This 
new approach suggests that contrary to the current view of a fixed relationship between 
affect and cognition, this relationship is instead highly malleable. This dissertation had 
three primary research goals: (1) to determine whether disgust interacts with initial 
cognitive processing styles, (2) to investigate if a malleable relationship between disgust 
and cognition exists for both basic cognition (perceptual tasks) and upper-level cognition 
(conceptual tasks), and (3) to determine if disgust and cognition interact in low-disgust 
!vi!
relevant contexts (neutral stimuli, social judgments) and high-disgust relevant contexts 
(disgusting stimuli, moral judgments). Results reveal that disgust acts as a stop signal on 
currently dominant information processing styles to influence visual attention to 
emotional stimuli (Study 2), impression formation in a social context (Study 3), and 
impression formation in a moral context (Study 4). Results from Study 1, which 
investigated how disgust and initial processing styles interact to influence visual attention 
to neutral stimuli, were inconclusive. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Affect and cognition are entwined processes that influence a vast array of daily 
experiences (Isbell & Lair, 2013). With each decade, emotion and cognition researchers 
have discovered new interactive pathways between what were once thought to be distinct 
processes. Although researchers now agree on the existence of a relationship between 
affect and cognition, there is still debate about why this relationship exists, and if there 
are limits on the extent to which these processes interact. The current research builds on 
the recent Cognitive Malleability approach (Clore et al., 2001; Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; 
Isbell, 2013; Isbell, Lair, & Rovenpor, 2013) to examine disgust, an important human 
experience that is infrequently explored. In doing so, the current work expands the affect 
and processing literature by systematically investigating the impact of disgust on 
cognitive processing in both perceptual (Studies 1-2) and conceptual (Studies 3-4) tasks. 
Further, this work extends research on disgust in the moral judgment domain (Study 4).    
 First, by drawing heavily on the affect-as-information approach (AAI, Schwarz & 
Clore, 1983, 2007), the current research examines the relationship between disgust and 
cognitive processing styles – that is, the impact of disgust on the extent to which people 
process information in a global (i.e., abstract, broad, top-down, peripheral, heuristic, big-
picture) versus local (i.e., concrete, narrow, bottom-up, central, systematic, detailed) 
manner (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Kimchi & Palmer, 1982; Köhler, 1929; Navon, 1977; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). There is a broad consensus among psychological researchers 
that these are two fundamental ways in which people process information (Chaiken, 
1980), and these differences in processing styles exert influence on a great deal of 
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processes or behaviors that are studied in social psychology (i.e., stereotyping, 
persuasion, attention, perception, judgments, for a complete review see Isbell & Lair, 
2013). I propose that the experience of disgust, like other affective experiences, provides 
individuals with information about whatever processing style is currently accessible. 
Based on recent theorizing, I expect that disgust will act as a “stop” signal leading to the 
inhibition of the currently accessible cognitive processing style. Thus, when one is 
processing information in a global manner, disgust is likely to inhibit this processing style 
in favor of more local processing. Likewise, if local processing is dominant, disgust 
should inhibit this processing style in favor of a more global processing style. The current 
research empirically tests these predictions to establish whether disgust interacts with 
cognitive processing styles in the way that other emotions do. If support is obtained, such 
findings will provide compelling evidence for the cognitive malleability approach in a 
new domain. 
 Second, to provide a thorough and systematic examination of how disgust impacts 
cognitive processing, I tested the Cognitive Malleability framework in both perceptual 
(i.e., visual) and conceptual (i.e., impression formation) tasks, as well as in tasks for 
which the experience of disgust is either low or high in relevance. This later factor is 
important to consider because emotional influences on judgments and processing are 
sometimes limited by their relevance to the task at hand, as I will describe in more detail 
in a later section. Given that disgust has not yet been widely researched, this dissertation 
sheds light on the interaction between disgust and cognition in a variety of contexts.   
Third, while researchers studying moral judgments have recently begun to 
examine disgust, they have not yet examined this alongside cognitive information 
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processing styles. Yet moral judgments reflect complex processes that typically include 
an emotional component. Thus, testing and extending the cognitive malleability approach 
to the role of disgust in moral judgments represents a natural and important research 
direction. Moral judgments, like other judgments, can be influenced by either big-picture, 
gestalt-based information, or by specific, detailed information. Recent research has begun 
to examine these thinking styles in relation to moral judgments (Agerström, Björklund, & 
Carlsson, 2009; Eyal, Liberman, & Trope, 2008; Libby, Shaeffer, & Eibach, 2009), 
specifically by focusing on how construal level (first vs. third person point of view, Trope 
& Liberman, 2010) influences moral judgment, but this research has not yet examined 
how affect influences these construals. This dissertation therefore bridges the theoretical 
gaps between the affect, cognitive information processing styles, and morality literatures. 
 The first two studies examined how disgust interacts with cognition to influence 
visual perception tasks and specifically tested whether feeling disgusted produces an 
attentional bias for local stimuli (Studies 1 and 2) and disgusting stimuli (Study 2). 
Although fear and anxiety have often been studied in relation to visual attention, disgust 
has only been sparingly examined and therefore a more systematic test of disgust’s 
influence on visual attention is necessary. The next set of studies (Studies 3 and 4) 
examined how disgust and cognitive processing interact to influence processing in more 
conceptual tasks, such as impression formation and moral judgment tasks. This set of 
studies provides a comprehensive examination of how disgust and cognition interact, and 
also significantly contributes to the social cognition literature. Finally, exploring this 
interaction in different domains was expected to reveal that the cognitive malleability 
effect, particularly when examined through disgust, is robust and generalizable. 
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In what follows, I first provide some useful definitions when discussing affect and 
cognitive processing, followed by evidence demonstrating the relationship between affect 
and cognition. Next, I describe and provide evidence for the Cognitive Malleability 
approach, and then describe the current findings on disgust and moral judgments. Finally, 
I describe four studies that test if disgust interacts with cognition in a manner consistent 
with the cognitive malleability approach. 
Background Information 
Affect, Moods, Emotions 
Since psychology’s infancy, researchers have often asked, “What is an emotion?” 
(James, 1890). Despite many attempts to provide clarity on this issue, this seemingly 
simple question has yet to be definitively answered. Over many years, researchers have 
proposed a number of definitional themes that have yielded a general, descriptive 
consensus. Most readily, researchers agree that valence (i.e., positivity or negativity; 
Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Russell, 2003), and the duration or intensity of the 
experience are central elements to any affective experience (Isbell & Burns, 2007; 
Morris, 1989; see Keltner & Lerner, 2010 for a review).   
This dissertation will use terms that are consistent with the current emotion 
literature, and will refer to affect, moods, and emotions. Affect or an affective experience 
are generalized, umbrella terms that encapsulate moods and emotions. Moods are feelings 
that are low-intensity, long-lasting and do not have an accessible eliciting cause. 
Emotions, on the other hand, are feelings that are more discrete than moods, and are of 
shorter duration and greater intensity than moods. Unlike moods, emotions are tied to a 
specific and accessible eliciting cause (Morris, 1989). In general, moods and emotions 
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are those affective experiences that are brought to mind when people think of “feelings.” 
My dissertation examines specifically how particular emotions interact with cognition.  
Cognitive Processing 
Cognition is broadly defined as mental processes that relate to comprehension and 
learning, and consists of many psychological subdomains (e.g., memory, learning, 
attention, categorization, language, judgment, decision-making, perception, Neisser, 
1976). Cognitive processing refers to the ways in which people incorporate information 
about their environment, and is an important factor to consider in social psychology, as 
different processing styles tend to produce different decisions, judgments, or actions 
(Chaiken, 1980; Köhler, 1929; Navon, 1977). There are two different processing styles 
that dominate the literature. Broadly speaking, these processing styles have been 
described with many different labels, but these labels generally overlap conceptually. For 
instance, the term global processing refers to heuristic, top-down, holistic, distal, and 
broadened processing, whereas the term local processing typically refers to systematic, 
bottom-up, central, detailed, proximal, and narrowed processing (Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken 
& Trope, 1999; Förster & Dannenberg, 2010; Kimchi & Palmer, 1982; Köhler, 1929; 
Navon, 1977; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Notably, these processing styles are always 
active, with global processing generally considered to be the default (Bruner, 1957; 
Kimchi & Palmer, 1982; Navon, 1977), but these styles can vary in their dominance 
depending on individual and contextual factors.  
Generally, people processing globally, as compared to those processing locally, 
have a greater likelihood of using stereotypes, peripheral cues, or other mental “short-
cuts” when making judgments or decisions, as their attention is drawn to these types of 
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information (Isbell & Lair, 2013). The outcomes produced by global and local processing 
are usually meaningfully different, which make these distinct processing styles one of 
high interest to social psychologists (Fiske & Taylor, 2008). For example, global 
processing may increase the reliance on stereotypes whereas local processing may reduce 
this reliance (Bodenhausen, 1993). This dissertation focuses exclusively on how discrete 
emotions interact with global and local cognitive processing styles to influence 
perceptions and judgments. 
The Affect as Information (AAI) Approach 
The AAI approach maintains that people use affect as a source of information 
when making judgments and when processing information (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; 
Wyer & Carlston, 1979). According to this and many other views, affect can impact both 
what we think, as well as how we think. For example, in a classic study, Schwarz and 
Clore (1983) demonstrated that people judged their life satisfaction more favorably when 
responding on sunny days as compared to rainy days. Although the sunshine was only 
episodic, the authors argued that the positive mood associated with a sunny day became 
absorbed into people’s judgments of their general life-satisfaction. Importantly, the 
difference between rainy and sunny days was eliminated when people were reminded 
about the weather before answering. Thus, when people were given a reason for their 
heightened or depressed mood (the weather), they discounted this information when 
judging their life satisfaction. This research demonstrates that people use affect as a 
source of information when making judgments, except when individuals are led to 
discount their affect prior to making their judgment. Such effects, which are plentiful in 
the literature (Schwarz, 2002; Keltner, Locke, & Audrain, 1993, Wegener & Petty, 1997; 
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Wilson & Brekke, 1994; Strack & Hannover, 1996, Isbell & Wyer, 1999; Ottati & Isbell, 
1996, Siemer & Reisenzein, 1998, Raghunathan & Pham, 1999), demonstrate that affect 
can influence what we think and can have a direct effect on judgments. 
A separate line of work, which is the main focus of this dissertation, demonstrates 
that affect may instead influence how we think, that is the extent to which we process 
information in global, abstract ways versus local, concrete ones, as defined earlier. In this 
way, affect directs cognitive processing (Clore, 1992; Frijda, 1988; Schwarz, 1990; 
Wyer, Clore, & Isbell, 1999).  According to this view, positive moods and emotions 
generally increase the likelihood of reliance on global processing (Bless, 2000, 2001; 
Bless & Schwarz, 1999; Bodenhausen, 1993; Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994; 
Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Isbell, 2004; Isbell, Burns, & Haar, 2005; 
Isbell, Ottati, & Burns, 2006; Isen, 2002; Frederickson, 2001; Fredrickson & Branigan, 
2005; Gasper & Clore, 2002) because such moods signal to the perceiver that the current 
environment is safe and benign (Schwarz & Clore, 2007). In contrast, negative moods 
and emotions tend to encourage local processing because, according to the AAI model, 
such affect signals to perceivers the presence of a problem in the environment 
(Bodenhausen, Sheppard, et al., 1994; Isbell et al., 2005; Isbell, et al., 2013; Lambert, 
Khan, Lickel, & Fricke, 1997; Park & Banaji, 2000; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). When 
presented with problems, a more detailed processing is typically useful in resolving them. 
Thus, our affective experiences are both functional and adaptive (Darwin, 1872/1965; 
Tooby & Cosmides, 2000; Damasio, 1994; Ekman, 1992; LeDoux, 1994; Mesquita & 
Frijda, 1992; Ortony & Turner, 1990). 
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Notably, negative affect tends to be more varied than positive affect in the ways 
that it can influence cognition. For example, anger encourages global processing, whereas 
disgust and fear tend to encourage local processing (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, et al., 1994; 
Lambert, Khan, Lickel, & Fricke, 1997; Park & Banaji, 2000; Parker & Isbell, 2010; 
Tiedens & Linton, 2001; Wyer et al., 1999). For example, anger is associated with an 
increased reliance on stereotypic information (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, et al., 1994), 
heuristic processing (Ask & Granhag, 2007; Small & Lerner, 2008), reliance on 
accessible scripts (Tiedens, 2001), and peripheral cues in persuasive argument contexts 
(Bodenhausen, Sheppard, et al., 1994; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Therefore, anger seems 
to be a unique case of how emotion interacts with cognition and demonstrates that the 
informational influences of affective experiences on cognition depend on more than just 
affective valence. 
Although affective valence is important, emotion and cognition researchers agree 
that affect is associated with a variety of cognitive constructs, such as cognitive 
appraisals (e.g., pleasantness, certainty, and situational control, (Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985; Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993), action tendencies (e.g., Frijda, Kuipers, & 
ter Schure, 1989; Scherer, 1984), and motivations (e.g., approach or avoidance, Carver & 
Harmon-Jones, 2009; Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010b) that are also useful in explaining 
the relationship between affect and cognitive processing styles. Using cognitive 
appraisals as an example, when people feel fear it is usually the combination of a 
physiological response and the cognitive appraisals about the environment (e.g., 
uncertainty, threat, or unpleasantness) that serve to inform individuals that what they are 
feeling is fear (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Ortony et al., 1988). These cognitive 
!9!
appraisals and the affective experiences that they produce become intertwined to such a 
degree that when a person feels fear, the cognitive constructs associated with fear are also 
activated, even in a situation where these appraisals, action tendencies, or motivations 
might not apply. Importantly, in these types of situations, affect activates these apprasial 
constructs, which can then serve to direct cognitive processing and influence downstream 
judgments (Frijda,1986; Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2011; Harmon-Jones, Price, & Gable, 
2012; Keltner, Ellsworth, et al., 1993; Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998; Lerner & 
Keltner, 2000, 2001; Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein, 2004; Tiedens & Linton, 2001).   
Although the interaction between emotion and cognition has been well-
established (for a complete review see Isbell & Lair, 2013), a recent theoretical approach 
suggests that the dedicated link between specific emotions and processing styles may not 
in fact exist at all. The cognitive malleability approach contends that affect can actually 
serve as a source of information about cognitive processing styles (Clore, et al., 2001; 
Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Hunsinger, Isbell, & Clore, 2012; Huntsinger, 2012; 
Huntsinger, Isbell, & Clore, in press; Isbell, et al., 2013). In particular, this approach 
argues that some emotions and moods convey certainty (e.g., happiness, anger, Clore & 
Huntsinger, 2009; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Tiedens & Linton, 2006; Roseman, 1984) and 
therefore make people more likely to use whatever cognitive processing style is currently 
accessible at the moment, whereas other emotions and moods convey uncertainty (e.g., 
fear, sadness, Ortony et al., 1988; Roseman, 1984), which therefore make people less 
likely to use whatever cognitive processing style is currently accessible.  In the section 
below, I present evidence for this new perspective of how emotion interacts with 
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cognition. This dissertation further exposes the cognitive malleability approach to 
rigorous empirical tests by extending the research to examine feelings of disgust.   
The Cognitive Malleability Approach 
The cognitive malleability approach extends the AAI model by positing that 
affective cues act as a “stop” or “go” signal that can either maintain or redirect an 
individual’s currently dominant cognitive processing style (Clore et al., 2001; Clore & 
Huntsinger, 2007, 2009; Hunsinger et al., 2012; Huntsinger, et al., in press; Isbell, 2010; 
Isbell, et al., 2013). This new theoretical approach suggests that affect provides 
information about whatever cognitive processing style is currently active. Unlike existing 
theoretical conceptualizations of affect and cognition, this approach explicitly states that 
there is no dedicated link between certain emotions and specific processing styles. 
Instead, whether happiness, fear, disgust, or any other emotion leads to either global or 
local processing depends on what processing style is currently dominant.  Thus, for 
example, fear does not always produce a local processing style, nor does happiness 
always produce a global one, but rather the relationship between affect and cognition is 
highly malleable and easily changed in response to situational factors (Clore et al., 2001; 
Isbell, 2010; Isbell, et al., 2013). 
Direct evidence for this perspective is very recent and limited, but has already 
been found in a variety of contexts and domains. For instance, research examining group 
categorization processes demonstrated that happy moods led individuals to perceive 
outgroup members to be more homogeneous than did sad moods; however, this was only 
true when global processing was primed. When local processing was primed, the opposite 
pattern emerged (Isbell, Lair, & Rovenpor, under review). Likewise, in research 
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examining the self-concept, individuals primed with global processing who then felt 
anger (vs. fear) were more likely to generate global, abstract (vs. local, concrete) self-
descriptive statements. As predicted by the cognitive malleability account, these effects 
reversed under local processing conditions (Isbell, Rovenpor, & Lair, under review). 
Cognitive malleability also emerges for more basic cognitive processes, such as visual 
attention. For example, happy individuals primed with global processing displayed a 
wider attentional scope in a subsequent flanker task (see Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) than 
did individuals in sad moods. Importantly, these effects reversed when local processing 
was primed (Huntsinger, 2012).  
Cognitive malleability has also been demonstrated in impression formation tasks 
using novel situations to prime processing, such as prompting participants to think about 
their current, local psychological state (or not), or when their environment heightened 
their local awareness (or not) by using a neutral but unfamiliar odor. In one study 
(Hunsinger, et al., 2012), participants were asked to form an impression of “Carol”, and 
were provided with categorical information about Carol (that she is either an introverted 
librarian or extroverted sales representative) as well as detailed, behavioral information 
about Carol’s recent experiences – information that was mixed in its implication for 
introversion and extroversion. Participants who wrote about a happy (vs. sad) life 
experience were more likely to rely on the categorical, global trait information when 
forming impressions of Carol, but this effect reversed when they were exposed to primes 
that activated local processing. 
Taken together, this new evidence sheds serious doubt on the notion that there is a 
dedicated link between particular emotions and particular cognitive processing styles, and 
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instead suggests that this relationship is highly malleable. Furthermore, this new 
approach does not contradict previous findings, but rather incorporates them into a new 
understanding of how affect influences cognition. Thus previous research is simply 
incomplete because it fails to manipulate processing styles. Therefore, this dissertation 
extends current research by systematically manipulating both processing styles and 
affect, and by examining disgust, an emotion which is thought by many researchers to 
have strong, dedicated path to local processing (Rozin & Fallon, 1987; Gable & Harmon-
Jones, 2010a). 
Disgust 
Disgust has been defined as an intensely evocative emotion that produces a 
visceral, revulsion response (Olatunji & Sawchuk, 2005; Rozin & Fallon, 1987).  This 
reaction can be felt in response to a variety of stimuli, such as human excrement, as well 
as morally wrong actions – both of which can elicit similarly disgusted reactions 
(Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009).  
Much of the social cognition literature has focused on how happiness, sadness, 
anger, anxiety, or fear influence cognition, but disgust has rarely been examined.  What 
little research exists has found that disgust leads to detailed processing and narrowed 
attention (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010a; Wyer, et al., 1999). For example, Gable and 
Harmon-Jones (2010a) found that participants completing a task that assesses global or 
local focus (Navon, 1977) were faster to respond to local (vs. global) trials when 
preceded by disgusting (vs. neutral) photos. These findings are explained by the cognitive 
malleability approach, as such findings may simply reflect the powerful stop signal 
provided by disgust on the naturally dominant global processing style (Navon, 1977). 
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That is, according to the cognitive malleability view, disgust should act as a “stop” 
signal, which would result in the inhibition of whatever cognitive processing style is 
currently dominant. Thus, it should be possible to reverse such effects by altering the 
dominant processing style from a global to a local one.  
Disgust may, however, be a unique emotion that only conveys highly specific 
information to an individual concerning contamination or threat. If so, it is possible that 
disgust may not interact with cognitive processing styles in the manner predicted by the 
cognitive malleability perspective, but may instead have a highly specific and dedicated 
link to local processing. Consistent with this possibility, visual attention research has 
demonstrated that disgust induces a highly specific narrowed focus of attention: one that 
biases attention toward disgusting stimuli and makes it difficult to disengage attention 
and focus on a neutral task (Burke, Heuer, & Reisberg, 1992; Christianson, 1992; 
Carretié, Ruiz-Padial, López-Martín, & Albert, 2011; Krusemark & Li, 2011; Nobata, 
Hakoda, & Ninose, 2010).  Some of this research (Krusemark & Li, 2011) suggests that 
disgust produces an even stronger attentional bias than anxiety (Broadbent & Broadbent, 
1988; Easterbrook, 1959; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985). Although I expected disgust to 
act in a manner consistent with the cognitive malleability approach, this previous 
research makes it plausible that disgust may not. For this reason, I carefully designed the 
current studies to investigate this possibility. 
Moral Judgments 
Given my interest in examining disgust’s influence on cognitive processing, this 
dissertation also explores a domain in which disgust has most often been studied: moral 
judgments (Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada, 1997; Scherer, 1997; Wheatley & Haidt, 
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2005). Thus, the moral judgment domain is already established as highly disgust relevant, 
which provides an adequate test for the cognitive malleability approach. First, I briefly 
suggest ways in which processing styles might influence moral judgments, and then I 
review the limited literature found at the intersections of moral judgments, cognition, and 
disgust. In so doing, I argue why morality, in comparison to other domains, was chosen 
as the highly relevant context within which to study the cognitive malleability perspective 
for Study 4. 
Moral Cognition 
When people decide whether or not an action is moral, they consider information 
such as whether the behavior was intentional, caused harm, could have been avoided, and 
so on (Bartels, 2008). Sometimes people focus on the outcomes of actions 
(Consequentialism/Utilitarianism, Pettit, 1993;), whereas other times, people focus on the 
actions themselves and whether or not they meet a set of rules (Deontology, Darwall, 
2003; Davis, 1993). These considerations require people to process information regarding 
actions, outcomes, rule compliance, and degree of harm; all of which would necessitate 
the activation of a detail-oriented cognitive processing style. For instance, the cognitive 
processes associated with category inclusion (e.g., whether a desk is a piece of furniture, 
Isen, 1987; Isen & Daubman, 1984) would be central when judging if actions meet a set 
of rules, which shows the potential importance of cognitive processing in moral 
cognition. 
In support of this notion, researchers have recently begun examining the role of 
construal level (distance, point-of-view, abstraction) on moral judgments, and they have 
generally found that abstract thinking leads to more harsh judgments (e.g., Agerström & 
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Björklund, 2009; Eyal, et al., 2008; Libby, et al., 2009). Likewise, another recent 
approach situates moral judgments within a social cognitive framework (Cushman & 
Young, 2011). This approach takes a social cognitive perspective on the common 
philosophical and legal constructs that are often referred to in moral judgment research 
(e.g., action/omission, means/side-effect, and personal/impersonal distinctions, Hauser, 
Cushman, Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007; Ritov & Baron, 1990; Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 
1991), and provides evidence that these legal constructs are simply different labels for 
social cognitive mechanisms (e.g., causal or attribution cognitions, Heider, 1958). Thus, 
taken together, these new perspectives in the moral domain demonstrate that cognitive 
processing is an important aspect of moral judgments, but has typically been 
understudied, especially in conjunction with affect. For these reasons, the moral domain a 
good candidate for investigating the cognitive malleability approach and disgust.  
Moral Emotions 
Many researchers contend that emotional reactions are an important aspect of 
moral judgments (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Nichols & 
Mallon, 2006), but there is disagreement about how these emotional reactions, 
particularly disgust, contribute to moral judgment. Disgust has often been referred to as a 
moral emotion (Haidt, 2003; Rozin & Fallon, 1987; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 1999), as 
it reflects cognitive appraisals of purity and justice (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001). Yet 
others have questioned if this causal, direct link between disgust and moral judgments 
actually exists (David & Olatunji, 2011; Pizarro, Inbar, & Helion, 2011). For many 
decades, those interested in moral judgments thought that rational deliberation indicated 
an inhibition of affective responses (see Haidt, 2001 for a review), but more recently, 
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research has included emotion as an important aspect in moral deliberation (Cushman & 
Greene, 2011; Haidt, 2003; Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, & Zahn, 2008; see Haidt & Kesebir, 
2010 for a review). Affect researchers have known for some time that affect and 
cognition interact in complex ways, and it therefore seems unlikely that these processes 
would not interact for moral judgments as well. Study 4 in this dissertation bridges the 
current gap in the morality literature, and brings a social cognitive nd cognitive 
malleability approach to moral judgments. 
Although affective reactions have long been discussed and theorized by 
philosophers and psychologists interested in moral judgments, this area of research only 
began systematic manipulations of disgust in 2005 (Wheatley & Haidt). In this initial 
study, participants were post-hypnotically primed whereby a particular word was 
subliminally paired with a disgusting word, and participants then read a story that either 
included or excluded the disgust-conditioned word.  Participants who read the stories 
including this word were harsher in their moral judgments of the character in the story, as 
compared to those who read the story without the word. This finding has been 
corroborated by research that shows a more nuanced influence of disgust on moral 
judgments. For example, disgusted participants were more likely to make harsh moral 
judgments, but this effect was not moderated by individual disgust sensitivity, meaning 
greater feelings of disgust did not correspond to harsher judgments (David & Olatunji, 
2011). Additionally, disgust only led to harsher judgments of purity violations (not harm 
or justice violations, Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009), as well as personal (vs. 
impersonal) moral action scenarios (Ugazio, Lamm, & Singer, 2012). Other inductions of 
disgust, which included participants watching a disgusting video, sitting in a disgusting 
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room, remembering a disgusting experience, or smelling a disgusting odor, all led 
participants to judge morally ambiguous behaviors as more immoral than a control group 
(Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008). Therefore, it is clear that emotion has an 
influence on moral judgments, but it is not yet clear if this is a direct or indirect influence 
(Huebner, Dwyer, & Hauser, 2009), as few studies to date have systematically 
manipulated emotion, or considered the influence of processing style, which means that 
more research is needed in this area. 
The body of work described above demonstrates the intersections between moral 
judgments, cognition, and emotion, and suggests that the moral domain is ripe for further 
scrutiny regarding moral judgments, cognitive processing, and affect. Additionally, it 
seems as if the moral judgment domain is confronting a familiar problem in the affect and 
cognition literature, namely, that exceptions to the rules about how affect and cognition 
operate with regard to moral processes keep cropping up in new research. Although 
moral researchers have not yet begun to systematically investigate both cognitive 
processes and emotion, I argue that the current evidence suggests that both affect and 
cognition influence moral deliberation. Finally, disgust has been rarely investigated in the 
social cognitive literature, but many more researchers in the moral domain have 
investigated the effects of disgust. For all of these reasons, morality is the logical choice 
to investigate disgust for the cognitive malleability approach in Study 4. Although not the 
primary focus or contribution of this dissertation, expanding the social cognitive literature 
into the moral judgment domain will be a secondary benefit of the proposed research. 
Study Overview 
!18!
In the following four studies I provide a comprehensive examination of how 
disgust interacts with cognitive processing styles. These studies reflect three primary 
research goals. The first goal was to extend the cognitive malleability approach by 
examining whether disgust and initial processing styles interact, and also whether 
cognitive malleability exists in the domains of visual attention, impression formation, and 
moral judgments. The second goal of this research was to examine whether disgust 
influences cognition in basic cognitive tasks (i.e., visual attentional, Studies 1 & 2) and 
higher-level cognitive tasks (i.e., impression formation, Studies 3 & 4). The third goal of 
this work was to determine if, within these cognitive domains, disgust influences 
cognition in both low relevance contexts (Studies 1 & 3) and high relevance contexts 
(Studies 2 & 4).  
The first study establishes if incidental disgust (vs. happiness and sadness) 
interacts with cognition to influence the breadth of one’s attentional scope on an 
emotionally neutral visual perceptual task. The second study examines if similar effects 
emerge when employing emotionally evocative stimuli to elicit affect as part of the 
perceptual task. This combination of studies allows me to establish if disgust interacts 
with cognitive processing, and also provides an opportunity to investigate the alternative 
hypothesis that disgust causes an attentional bias.   
Studies 3 and 4 turn to the impact of disgust in conceptual tasks involving 
impression formation and moral assessment. Specifically, Study 3 establishes if disgust 
interacts with cognitive processing to influence impression formation even when the 
experience of disgust is irrelevant to the processing task at hand. Study 4 examines if 
disgust and cognitive processing interact to influence moral impression formation. 
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For all four studies, I hypothesized that happiness would act as a “go” signal that 
would promote the currently active processing style, leading participants to show effects 
that are consistent with the primed processing style. In contrast, I hypothesized that 
disgust and sadness would act as “stop” signals that will inhibit the currently active 
processing style leading participants to show effects that are consistent with the 
alternative processing style. Furthermore, I anticipated finding this interactive effect for 
tasks of both low and high relevance to disgust, as well as in both perceptual and 
conceptual domains. Thus, I hypothesized that those in the global prime and happy 
conditions would act similarly to those in the local prime and disgust/sad conditions, and 
likewise those in the local prime and happy conditions would act similarly to those in the 
global prime and disgust/sad conditions.  
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CHAPTER 2 
STUDY 1 
This experiment sought to extend the cognitive malleability literature by 
examining disgust (vs. happiness and sadness), and systematically investigating whether 
incidental disgust interacts with cognitive processing styles in an affectively neutral 
visual perceptual task. I hypothesized that disgust would act similarly to sadness (vs. 
happiness), and would lead to a rejection of currently accessible cognitive processing 
styles. Thus, when primed with global processing, I expected that disgust and sadness 
would narrow attentional scope compared to happiness; however, when primed with local 
processing, I expected that disgust and sadness would lead to broadened attention relative 
to happiness.   
This study was conducted twice, because initial data collection coincided with the 
Boston Marathon bombing and the four days that authorities searched for the perpetrators 
in April 2013. I not only had concerns about the participants’ affective states during that 
week and how those states would likely differ from the usual baseline, but I also was 
concerned that these states would interfere with one of the main goals of the study. 
Indeed, I manipulated affect by having participants write about a recent life event. 
Coding of the participants’ stories revealed that participants tended to write about this 
attack. In fact, I found that participants who wrote about the Boston Marathon bombing 
often wrote about feeling several emotions simultaneously: sadness, disgust, fear, anger, 
and even optimism (about how the people of Boston responded to the attack). Although 
this data is still useful from a research standpoint, I had concerns about relying on it to 
test the main hypothesis in this study. For this reason, I ran the study a second time, the 
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following semester. The methods for the two studies are identical and are reported in 
separate sections (1A and 1B). 
In this experiment, participants first completed a computerized cognitive 
processing style priming task in which they were asked to focus on either local or global 
elements of a letter display (Navon, 1977). Next, participants wrote a story to induce the 
target emotion (happiness, sadness, disgust) before completing a flanker task (Eriksen & 
Eriksen, 1974) followed by an optical illusion task, with the latter two tasks designed to 
assess participants’ attentional scope. Finally, participants completed an affective 
manipulation check and a short demographics questionnaire. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
 Study 1A. A total of 178 participants (80.3% female) from the psychology 
participant pool were recruited for Study 1A and received 1 research credit as 
compensation to be used as extra credit in their psychology course. The average age 
participants reported is 19.87 years (SD = 1.38) and the sample is 75.3% Caucasian, 5.6% 
African-American, 12.9% Asian, 2.2% Hispanic, 1.7% mixed race, 0.6% other race. An 
additional 1.7% of the participants chose not to report their race.  
 Study 1B. A total of 154 participants (72.1% female) from the psychology 
participant pool were recruited for Study 1B and received 1 research credit as 
compensation to be used as extra credit in their psychology course.  The average age 
participants reported is 20.02 years (SD = 1.41) and the sample is 76.6% Caucasian, 2.6% 
African-American, 11.7% Asian, 5.2% Hispanic, 1.9% mixed race. An additional 1.9% 
of the participants chose not to report their race.  
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Participants in Studies 1A and 1B were randomly assigned to one of six 
conditions in a 2 (global vs. local processing prime) x 3 (happy vs. sad vs. disgust) 
experimental design. 
Manipulations 
Cognitive processing prime. Global and local processing styles were primed 
using a letter identification task (Navon, 1977; procedure from Förster, Liberman, & 
Kuschel, 2008). In this task, participants were presented with a large image of a letter 
(e.g., “F”) that is comprised of a number of smaller letters (e.g., “H”s, see Figure 1).  
Participants in the global condition were asked to focus on and identify the large, global 
letter (e.g., “F”), whereas those in the local condition were asked to focus on and identify 
the small, local letters (e.g., “H”s). Participants who scored lower than 90% accuracy on 
this task were excluded from the analysis (Study 1A: n = 20; Study 1B: n = 16). 
Affect manipulation. Participants were prompted to write a story about a recent 
event in which they felt happy, sad, or physically disgusted (Life Event Inventory task, 
Bless et al., 1996; Schnall, et al., 2008). They were asked to write about this event for 5 
minutes using the instructions found in Appendix A. 
Attentional Scope Measures 
Flanker task. Participants completed a task in which they were instructed to 
identify the central letter in a row of letters. This task presents participants with either 
compatible trials in which all letters are the same letter as the central letter (e.g., 
HHHHH) or incompatible trials, in which the letters that flank the central letter are 
different (e.g., SSHSS, Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson, 2007). 
Generally, it takes participants longer to identify incompatible trials, but previous 
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research shows that this reaction time difference is more pronounced when individuals 
are processing globally, because their scope of attention is widened, leading the flanking 
letters to be more distracting (Navon, 1977; Huntsinger, 2012). In contrast, individuals 
processing locally tend to have a more narrowed scope of attention, leading incompatible 
trials to be identified more quickly, and even to have similar reaction times to the 
compatible trials. After completing seven practice trials, participants completed three 
blocks of 96 randomly presented trials each (with interstimulus interval = 200 
milliseconds). Trials also varied as a function of flanker spacing, with only 3 millimeters 
separating letters in the near trials, but 7 millimeters separating the letters in the far trials. 
Participants were informed of incorrect responses through a red error message displayed 
on the screen. In this task, participants were instructed to identify the central image as 
quickly as possible by pressing a button on the keyboard that corresponds to the central 
letter (e.g., H or S). 
As is typical with reaction time data (Huntsinger, 2012), I excluded trials in which 
participants made errors (4.3% of total trials) and trials in which reaction time exceeded 
1,000 milliseconds (0.47% of total trials). I then examined whether there are any main 
effects or interactions for the cognitive processing prime and affect manipulation for 
average reaction time and error rate, and no significant effects emerged (all Fs < 1). I 
then excluded participants who scored below 90% accuracy on the flanker task (Study 
1A: n = 8; Study 1B: n = 2).  
Reaction times for compatible and incompatible trials were compared in the 
analysis to provide an estimate for attentional scope. Incompatible trials with long 
reaction times relative to the reaction times for compatible trials indicate broadened 
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visual attention (consistent with global processing), whereas more similar reaction times 
on incompatible and compatible trials indicate narrowed visual attention (consistent with 
local processing). These measures and procedures are standard when examining flanker 
task reaction time data and they have been used in previous research (Huntsinger, 2012; 
Rowe et al., 2007).   
 Ebbinghaus illusion measure. Participants were next instructed to compare two 
figures for 10 seconds. These two figures are from a classic optical illusion (Ebbinguas 
illusion; Weintraub, 1979), in which identical circles are either surrounded by a set of 
smaller or larger circles (see Figure 2a). The mind is tricked by this illusion because the 
surrounding circles make the interior circle appear either larger or smaller than they 
actually are. After viewing the images for ten seconds, participants were asked to select 
the relative sizes of the two central circles from a 5-option visual scale that systematically 
altered the circles’ size difference (see Figure 2b). I expected that when participants 
processed information globally, they would also incorporate more of these surrounding 
circles into their perception of the central circles and subsequently view them as different 
sizes. In contrast, I expected that those processing locally would be more likely to ignore 
the surrounding circles, and instead view the two central circles as similar in size. Thus 
global processers were expected to be influenced more by context compared to local 
processors. I minimized the inclusion of participants who were familiar with the 
Ebbinghaus illusion by asking participants at the end of the experiment if they were 
familiar with the figures shown in this task (1- not familiar, 2- familiar, 3- not sure/can’t 
remember). An open-ended follow up question next asked them to explain what, if 
anything, they knew about the figure. Independent coders then rated these responses as 
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either revealing knowledge about the illusion, or not revealing relevant knowledge (Study 
1A: Kappa = .794, p < .001; Study 1B: Kappa = .812, p < .001). Thus, participants who 
were coded as having knowledge of the illusion were excluded from the analyses of this 
measure (Study 1A: n = 35, 19.6% of total; Study 1B: n = 18, 11.7% of total).   
Affect Manipulation Check 
Participants then indicated the extent to which they felt various emotions while 
they were writing their story on a 7-point scale (1-Not at all, 4- Moderately, 7-Extremely; 
i.e., happy, sad, disgusted, angry, afraid, anxious, bored, certain of their beliefs, cheerful, 
confident, confused, depressed, distracted, grossed out, observant, queasy, sickened, 
tense, thoughtful, tired, and upset). To create composite scales, happy, cheerful and 
amused were averaged together (Study 1A: Cronbach’s α = .886; Study 1B: Cronbach’s α 
= .850), as were sad, depressed, and upset (Study 1A: Cronbach’s α = .859; Study 1B: 
Cronbach’s r = .870), disgusted, queasy, sickened, and grossed out (Study 1A: 
Cronbach’s α = .864; Study 1B: Cronbach’s α = .874), and anxious, tense, and afraid 
(Study 1A: Cronbach’s α = .776; Study 1B: Cronbach’s α = .740). I planned to compare 
these composite scales to a single item measure for anger.  
Finally, participants answered a short demographics questionnaire, which asked 
them to report their gender, race, and age. 
Results for Study 1A 
Affect Manipulation Check 
 When examining reports of happiness, sadness, disgust, anger, and fear while 
participants were writing their stories, the expected interaction emerged between emotion 
rating and affect condition, F(8,576) = 90.15, p < .001, ηp2 = .556. However, only the 
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happy and sad condition participants reported affect ratings in the predicted directions. 
Table 1 shows that the affect manipulations for the happy and sad conditions was 
successful, however, participants in the disgust condition reported feeling equal levels of 
disgust and sadness, and greater levels of anger than disgust. When I excluded the 
participants who wrote about the Boston Marathon attack, the affect manipulation check 
results for disgust do not improve. The wide variation in how people felt when writing 
their story also made selecting statistical outliers difficult, as the outlier analysis for the 
disgust condition did not show any affective responses out of the norm. Further, if I rely 
on independent coder ratings of the stories to exclude people who did not write 
exclusively about their randomly assigned target emotion (e.g., a story from the disgust 
condition that coders rated as containing elements of disgust, anger, and sadness rather 
than only disgust), the participant number dropped well below what is needed for 
sufficient statistical power.   
Attentional Scope 
 First, to determine if the presentation block or flanker trial spacing influenced 
reaction times on the flanker task, I conducted a mixed analysis comparing block, flanker 
spacing, trial type, affect, and processing prime. No differences emerged as a function of 
block or flanker spacing (all Fs < 1), so these two factors were removed from subsequent 
analyses. To determine if the processing primes and affect manipulations influenced 
reaction time differences between compatible and incompatible trials on the flanker task, 
I conducted a 2 (incompatible vs. compatible trial reaction time) x 2 (global vs. local 
processing prime) x 3 (happy vs. sad vs. disgust) repeated measure ANOVA. An overall 
difference between incompatible and compatible trials emerged, F(1,144) = 615.33, p < 
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.001, ηp2 = .810, and this was in the expected direction such that participants took longer 
to identify the central letter in incompatible trials (M = 322.15 ms, SD = 49.58 ms) than 
in compatible ones (M = 283.85 ms, SD = 43.81 ms). The reaction time difference 
between trial type did not vary as a function of processing style, F(1,144) = .56, p = .46, 
affect manipulation, F(2,144) = .237, p = .790, or their interaction, F(2,144) = .67, p = 
.513.  Additionally, no between-subjects main effects or interactions emerged (all ps > 
.26). Similarly, when analyzing the results of the Ebbinghaus illusion task, no significant 
main effects or interaction emerged (all ps > .30). 
Results for Study 1B 
Affect Manipulation Check 
 When examining reports of happiness, sadness, disgust, anger, and fear while 
participants were writing their stories, the expected interaction emerged between emotion 
rating and affect condition, F(8,524) = 76.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .540. As the means in Table 
1 show, the happy and sad manipulations were successful, but the disgust condition was 
not, with participants feeling sad, disgust, and anger to a similar extent. Just as in Study 
1A, the wide variation in how people felt when writing their stories also made selecting 
statistical outliers difficult, as the outlier analysis for the disgust condition did not reveal 
any participants responses outside of the normal range. Likewise, if I rely on independent 
coder ratings of the stories to exclude people who did not write exclusively about their 
target emotion (e.g., a story from the disgust condition that coders rated as having 
disgust, anger, and sadness instead of only disgust), the participant number drops below 
what is needed for sufficient statistical power. 
Attentional Scope 
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 First, to determine if the presentation block or flanker trial spacing influenced 
reaction times on the flanker task, I conducted a mixed analysis comparing block, flanker 
spacing, trial type, affect, and processing prime. No differences emerged as a function of 
block or flanker spacing (all Fs < 1), so these two factors were removed from subsequent 
analyses. To determine if the processing primes and affect manipulations influenced 
reaction time differences between compatible and incompatible trials, I conducted a 2 
(incompatible vs. compatible trial reaction time) x 2 (global vs. local processing prime) x 
3 (happy vs. sad vs. disgust) repeated measure ANOVA. There was an overall difference 
between incompatible and compatible trials, F(1,131) = 419.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .762, and 
this was in the expected direction such that participants took longer to identify the central 
letter in incompatible trials (M = 327.71 ms, SD = 49.66 ms) than compatible trials (M = 
299.01 ms, SD = 53.04 ms). The reaction time difference between trial type did not vary 
as a function of processing style, F(1,131) = .17, p = .68, affect manipulation, F(2,131) = 
.53, p = .59, nor their interaction, F(2,131) = 1.62, p = .20. Additionally, no between-
subjects main effects or interactions emerged, all ps > .08. These results remain the same 
when examining reaction time differences across the three different presentation blocks 
as a repeated measure factor, and when examining reaction time differences for near or 
far flanker distance (which was randomly varied throughout the flanker task). Similarly, 
when analyzing the results of the Ebbinghaus illusion task, no significant main effects or 
interactions emerged (all ps > .32). 
Studies 1A and 1B Combined Analysis 
 When analyzing the data from both studies together, the flanker task results 
remain the same, with a main effect showing that incompatible trials were identified more 
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slowly than compatible trials, F(1,235) = 927.31, p < .001, ηp2 = .798, but no other 
effects or interactions emerged, all ps > .17. Likewise, this joint analysis produced no 
changes in the Ebbinghaus illusion task responses, all ps > .19. 
 Given that the affect manipulation for happy and sad were relatively successful, if 
I exclude the disgust conditions from the analysis, I find similar effects for the flanker 
task as those reported above, with the incompatible trials identified slower than the 
compatible trials, F(1,191) = 781.11, p < .001, ηp2 = .804, but no other significant effects 
emerged (all ps > .07). In contrast, when analyzing the Ebbinghaus illusion measure for 
attentional scope, there is a marginally significant interaction between the affect 
manipulation and processing prime, F(1,161) = 3.65, p = .058, ηp2 = .022, and in the 
predicted manner (see Figure 3), such that those individuals feeling happy and globally 
primed were relatively more fooled by the illusion (M = 2.48, SD = 1.40), as were those 
feeling sad and locally primed (M = 2.77, SD = 1.55). In contrast, those individuals 
feeling happy and locally primed were relatively less fooled by the illusion (M = 2.88, SD 
= 1.47), as were those feeling sad and globally primed (M = 3.24, SD = 1.51).  
Discussion 
 The affect manipulation for the disgust condition was not successful for either 
study.  Comparing my procedure to the previously published procedures in which disgust 
was induced through writing a story (Schnall, et al., 2008), the instructions used in 
Studies 1A and 1B differed slightly from previous instructions. In previous work, 
participants were asked to write about a “specific event that made them feel physically 
disgusted or sick to their stomach” (emphasis mine). Due to concerns about confounding 
the disgust manipulation instructions with global and local context, I avoided concrete 
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language in the instructions, and instead instructed participants to write their stories using 
the language provided in Appendix A. Further, I used the same writing task procedure 
used in this study to manipulate disgust successfully in Study 3 (to be described later) but 
the sample in Study 3 was larger, and perhaps was more robust to the individual variance 
in response to the affective manipulation. 
 Due to unexpected problems manipulating disgust in the current studies, I cannot 
draw any conclusions about the nature of disgust on neutral visual attention tasks. 
Further, even when comparing happy and sad conditions, the flanker task effect did not 
replicate previous research (Huntsinger, 2012). It is unclear why the flanker task did not 
work as predicted, nor as previous research would suggest. One difference between my 
procedure for Study 1 and the previously successful study is that I manipulated affect by 
having participants write about a life event, whereas Huntsinger (2012) manipulated 
affect through emotional music that played throughout the flanker task. The flanker task 
is a fairly boring and tedious task, therefore, it is possible that my affective manipulation 
wore off very quickly once the flanker task began, whereas Huntsinger’s simultaneous 
manipulation served to prevent the flanker task from interfering with the affective 
manipulation.  
Additionally, even when examining a novel attentional scope measure (i.e., 
Ebbinghaus illusion), only a marginal interaction emerged. Notably, this is in the 
predicted direction and supports the cognitive malleability hypothesis– but this analysis 
excludes disgust. Unfortunately, despite the multiple attempts to conduct this experiment, 
the fickle nature of the disgust manipulation and the temporal issues related to collecting 
data during the week of the Boston Marathon attack, the results of Study 1A and Study 
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1B do not contribute any potential answers to the research questions of this dissertation, 
especially when compared to the remaining three studies, which do provide evidence 
related to the primary research questions. 
Although the results from Studies 1A and 1B are inconclusive, especially 
regarding the influence of disgust and initially active processing styles on a neutral visual 
attention task, Study 2 instead induces affect during the visual attention task (by using 
emotional stimuli), so I did not anticipate that the same affect manipulation problems 
would occur when conducting Study 2. Further, Study 2 is designed to not only examine 
attentional scope, but also attentional preferences for emotional and neutral stimuli.  
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CHAPTER 3 
STUDY 2 
Study 2 investigates the extent to which feelings of disgust that are elicited during 
a visual attention task (and in direct response to the task stimuli) interact to impact 
attentional scope. Using a novel adaptation of the flanker task, this study also specifically 
tested if disgust has a unique biasing effect on attention as compared to sadness or 
happiness. In accordance with predictions derived from the cognitive malleability 
perspective, I expected that integral disgust would interact with currently accessible 
cognitive processing styles to influence perceptual tasks, and that disgust would have a 
similar effect as sadness (vs. happiness). If no attentional bias emerged for emotional 
images, I hypothesized that the standard flanker task attention effect would emerge, such 
that those individuals feeling happy and primed locally, or feeling disgust or sadness and 
primed globally would have smaller reaction time differences between compatible and 
incompatible trials. In contrast, I hypothesized that those individuals feeling happy and 
primed globally, or feeling disgust or sadness and primed locally would have slower 
reaction times on incompatible trials relative to compatible trials.  
The current study is also designed to test an alternative prediction. That is, given 
that disgust is an intense and highly specific emotion, it is possible that in situations in 
which disgust is clearly integral to the task at hand, it may serve to create a local 
attentional bias regardless of whether a global or local processing style is primed. If so, 
this would place the first limiting condition on the cognitive malleability hypothesis. On 
the other hand, the emotional flanker task, however, also allows me to test for attentional 
biases for emotional stimuli more generally (even for happy and sad stimuli), especially 
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because participants simultaneously experience the affective reactions to the stimuli 
tested. If emotional images are distracting, it is possible that certain emotional images 
(e.g., disgust) are more distracting than others. But it is also possible that the visual 
attention to emotional images can be enhanced or diminished by cognitive processing 
style, and is also dependent on the emotional cue that is provided by the affective 
reactions to the images themselves. Due to a dearth of previous research on this matter, I 
did not have firm hypotheses about which emotional images might produce bias, other 
than disgust, as evidence exists that it might draw attention (Carretié, et al., 2011). Thus, 
in addition to the analysis to compare all incompatible and compatible trials, I also 
examined reaction time differences between compatible and incompatible trials with 
emotional central images, and compare those to the reaction time differences between 
incompatible and compatible trials with neutral central images. 
Emotional Flanker Pilot Task Study 
A modified, emotional flanker task was created using the images selected by a 
pretest described in Appendix B. In addition to this pretest, I piloted the emotional 
flanker task to ensure that affect was influenced by the task itself, and also to examine 
what influence control (in which global and local processing styles are equally primed) or 
default (no processing style prime) processing styles and affect conditions would have on 
reaction times for incompatible and compatible trials. Following this pilot test, I describe 
the main study, which was designed to test the full set of hypotheses. 
Method 
Participants, Procedure, and Design 
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One hundred twelve participants (70.5% female) completed the pilot study. 
Participants completed a task which primed global and local processing styles equally or 
no processing prime, and then completed three blocks of 96 trials each of an emotional 
flanker task. After completing the emotional flanker task, they then answered various 
questions about their affective state, for both “now” and “during the task”, before 
answering a short demographics questionnaire. Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of six conditions in a 2 (equally primed vs. control processing prime) x 3 (happy vs. 
sad vs. disgust flanker task) between subjects design. Those who had low accuracy on the 
processing prime task were excluded from the analysis, (n = 10), as were those who 
scored lower than 90% accuracy on the emotional flanker task (n = 7), leaving 95 
participants’ responses for analysis. The processing prime task exclusions were equally 
distributed across emotional conditions (F < 1.2), and neither the processing prime 
condition (equally primed vs. no prime) nor the emotional condition influenced the 
accuracy score on the flanker task (all Fs < 0.6). 
Manipulations and Measures 
Cognitive processing prime. Half of the participants completed a map task used 
to equally prime global and local processing styles (Isbell, et al., 2013; adapted from 
Förster, Liberman, & Kuschel, 2008). In this task, participants are presented with a series 
of state maps (Figure 4a), and are instructed to focus on both the cities listed within the 
state (local information) and the shape of the states (global information). They then 
answer questions about either the global or local information about the map that they just 
viewed, such that sometimes they are asked information about the cities on the map (local 
information, e.g., “Was Independence a city on the map?”, yes/no), whereas other times 
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they are asked about the state shape (global information; Figure 4b). This task has been 
used successfully in our previous research to induce a mixed processing style, where 
neither a local or global processing style is dominant (Isbell, Lair, et al., under review). 
The other half of the participants completed no cognitive priming task prior to the 
emotional flanker task. 
Emotional flanker task and affect manipulation. Similar to Study 1, 
participants completed a task in which they identified a central image in a row of images. 
Rather than responding to a letter display as in Study 1, participants instead saw neutral 
and emotional pictures (happy, sad, disgusting) as the central images or the flanking 
images (see Figure 5 for example images). Only two images were used for each block of 
trials: one neutral image, and one emotional image that matched participants’ affect 
condition (happy, sad, or disgust). Thus, the affect manipulation occurred by participants 
viewing the emotional images displayed during the emotional flanker task. Participants 
completed three blocks of 96 randomly presented trials each (with interstimulus interval 
= 200 milliseconds). Given that a new emotional and a new neutral image was used for 
each block, participants completed seven practice trials for each block to orient 
participants to the new images. Trials also varied as a function of flanker spacing, with 
approximately 2 millimeters separating images in the near trials, and approximately 6 
millimeters separating the images in the far trials. Aside from using pictures as the 
stimuli in the flanker task, this task used an identical flanker presentation procedure as 
the one described in Study 1. 
Trial exclusions for this flanker task also needed to be modified, as the standard 
1,000 millisecond cut-off (used in Study 1) resulted in a large subset of the trials being 
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excluded from analysis (over 5% of total trials, as compared to 0.47% of total trials in 
Study 1). This is likely because letters, compared to images, are fairly easy to identify. A 
new cut-off point of 1,500 milliseconds produced a trial exclusion rate similar to Study 1, 
at .29%. Likewise, 4.8% of total trials were also excluded for incorrect responses (an 
exclusion rate that was consistent with Study 1). 
Affect Manipulation Check 
Similar to Study 1, participants next indicated how they felt during the task for 
various emotion items (identical to Study 1) on a 7-point response scale (1-Not at all, 4- 
Moderately, 7-Extremely). Responses were averaged together to create composite 
emotion scores: happy, cheerful, and amused (Cronbach’s α = .672); sad, depressed, and 
upset, (Cronbach’s α  = .804); disgusted, queasy, sickened, and grossed out; Cronbach’s α  
= .900); tense and anxious (Cronbach’s α  = .809), and angry was used as a single item 
measure. 
Results and Discussion 
Affect Manipulation Check 
The emotional flanker condition influenced during the task emotion responses, as 
revealed by a mixed design, F(4,178) = 2.70, p = .032,ηp2 = .057. These ratings were 
generally in the right direction, such that those in happy condition were more happy (M = 
2.23, SD = 1.04) than sad (M = 1.36, SD = .68; t(28) = 4.12, p < .001, Cohen’s d =.8411), 
or disgusted (M = 1.27, SD = 1.04; t(28) = 4.94, p < .001, Cohen’s d =.811). Participants 
in the sad condition, however, reported significantly more happiness during the task (M = 
2.46, SD = 1.02) compared to sadness (M = 1.82, SD = 1.10; t(30) = -2.84, p = .008, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!Within-subjects simple effects calculated according to Morris and DeShon (2002)!
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Cohen’s d =-.502), but they did report feeling more sadness than disgust (M = 1.50, SD = 
.94; t(30) = 3.19, p = .003, Cohen’s d =.359). A similar pattern emerged for those in the 
disgust condition, such that they felt more happiness during the task (M = 2.48, SD = 
1.15) than disgust (M = 1.94, SD = 1.09 t(34) = -2.49, p = .018, Cohen’s d =-.424), but 
they did report feeling more disgust than sadness (M = 1.45, SD = .64; t(34) = 2.98, p = 
.005, Cohen’s d =.652). Participants reported feeling equally low on anger and anxiety 
during the task, Fs < 2. None of the affective responses varied as a function of the 
processing prime condition, all Fs < 1. Given that affect was only measured after the task 
was over, it is likely that during that task the stimuli produced a slightly larger effect than 
the one reflected here. Further, affect is often experienced at the implicit level, and the 
results from both the image pretest (see Appendix B) and the emotional flanker pilot 
study, taken together, suggest that the selected stimuli produce a sufficient affect 
manipulation. 
Emotional Flanker Reaction Times 
 Reaction times did not vary as a function of block, nor did they vary as a function 
of flanker image spacing (near vs. far), all Fs < 1.2, and these factors were removed from 
the analysis. Average trial reaction times were analyzed in a 2 (incompatible vs. 
compatible trial type) x 2 (emotional vs. neutral central image) x 2 (equally primed vs. no 
prime) x 3 (happy vs. sad vs. disgust) mixed ANOVA. As expected, the cognitive 
processing task that equally primed global and local styles was not significantly different 
from a no prime condition, all Fs < 1, so a subsequent analysis was conducted with the 
processing prime factor removed for ease of interpretation. The final analysis compared 
average trial reaction times in mixed ANOVA comparing trial type (incompatible vs. 
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compatible), central image type (emotional vs. neutral), and affect (happy vs. sad vs. 
disgust). The analysis revealed a significant main effect for trial type, F(1,92) = 78.08, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .459, a significant main effect for central image type, F(1,92) = 19.15, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .172, a two-way interaction between central image type and trial type, F(1,92) 
= 19.09, p < .001, ηp2 = .172, and finally a significant 3-way interaction between trial 
type, central image type, and affect condition, F(2,92) = 3.98, p = .022, ηp2 = .080.  
Unpacking this interaction (shown in Figure 6, see Table 2 for Ms and SDs) 
reveals that all participants identified compatible trials relatively faster than incompatible 
trials (happy: F(1,28) = 10.26, p = .003, ηp2 = .268; sad: F(1,30) = 25.19, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.456, disgust: F(1,34) = 57.58, p < .001, ηp2 = .629). For participants in the happy 
condition, despite faster identifications for trials with emotional (vs. neutral) central 
images, F(1,28) = 11.54, p = .002, ηp2 = .292, their reaction time differences between 
incompatible and compatible trials did not vary as a function of central image type- 
meaning they identified compatible (vs. incompatible) trials faster, regardless of whether 
the central image was neutral or emotional, F(1,28) = .399, p =. 533. This suggests that 
for happy stimuli, there might be an attentional boost for identifying happy stimuli in 
general, but no simultaneous attentional bias that detracts from identifying neutral images 
with happy flankers.  
For participants in the sad condition, they also had faster identifications for trials 
with emotional (vs. neutral) central images, F(1,30) = 5.50, p = .026, ηp2 = .155, but their 
reaction time differences between incompatible and compatible trials did vary as a 
function of central image type, F(1,30) = 7.58, p = .010, ηp2 = .202. The observed 
reaction times indicate that participants in the sad condition took longer to identify 
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incompatible trials with a neutral central image compared to trials with a sad central 
image, but took nearly equal time to identify compatible trials (whether they were all 
neutral or sad stimuli). This result suggests that when sad images serve as flankers around 
a neutral image, there is an attentional cost to identifying the neutral image.  
In contrast, for participants in the disgust condition, they did not have faster 
identifications for emotional (vs. neutral) central images, F(1,34) = 3.78, p = .060, ηp2 = 
.101, but their reaction times for differences between incompatible and compatible trials 
varied as a function of central image type, F(1,34) = 16.70, p < .001, ηp2 = .329. Reaction 
times indicate that this attentional cost for negative stimuli is even more pronounced in 
the disgust condition, suggesting that although sad and disgusting images both produce 
an attentional cost when trying to identify neutral images, disgust images are somewhat 
more distracting from neutral stimuli than are sad images. Further, disgusting flanker 
images are even distracting when the central image is also the same disgusting image (as 
shown in Table 2 and Figure 6). These findings suggest that sad and disgusting stimuli 
produce an attentional distraction when identifying neutral images, and that happy images 
provide an attentional boost when identifying happy images.   
Main Study 2 
 Although the emotional flanker pilot study confirmed that in a modified, integral 
affect flanker task, an attentional bias exists for disgusting and sad stimuli (away from 
neutral stimuli), whereas an attentional boost exists for happy stimuli, the main Study 2 
examined these effects under global and local priming conditions. Therefore, Study 2 
tested for evidence of cognitive malleability for attentional influences of emotional 
stimuli. I hypothesized that the global processing prime would produce effects similar to 
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those found in the emotional flanker pilot study, that is, the happy condition would 
produce an attentional boost for happy stimuli, whereas sad and disgust conditions would 
produce an attentional bias when identifying neutral stimuli in incompatible trials. I 
hypothesized that these effects would reverse under local priming conditions, such that 
happiness would now produce an attentional bias against identifying neutral stimuli in 
incompatible trials, but that sad and disgust would boost attention when emotional 
images are identified. 
 Study 2 also included the attentional scope Ebbinghaus illusion task used in Study 
1, I hypothesized that Study 2 could produce the same effect as shown marginally in 
Study 1, but because it is a neutral visual task, which included no emotional stimuli, I 
considered that the implicit affective manipulation might be insufficient to reproduce the 
effect found in Study 1. 
Method 
Participants, Design, and Procedure 
 A total of 207 participants from the psychology participant pool were recruited for 
the study and received one research credit as compensation to apply toward extra credit in 
their psychology course. All participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions 
in a 2 (global vs. local processing prime) x 3 (disgust vs. happy vs. sad) experimental 
design. Participants completed either the local or global Navon letter identification task to 
prime processing style, identical to the one used in Study 1. Participants then completed a 
modified flanker task in which they were asked to identify the central image in a display 
of emotionally evocative or neutral images. After this task, participants completed the 
Ebbinghuas illusion task, identical to the one used in Study 1. Finally, participants 
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completed an affective manipulation check and answered a short demographic 
questionnaire.  
Participants were excluded for below 80% accuracy on the Navon task (n = 17), 
and for below 90% accuracy on the emotional flanker task (n = 4). A multi-way 
frequency revealed that these exclusions had no significant relationship to the conditions 
or their interactions,χ2(8) = 1.89, p = .984. The remaining 186 participants (86% female) 
reported an average age of 19.65 years, (SD = 1.72) and the participants are 74.7% 
Caucasian, 2.7% African-American, 14.5% Asian, 3.8% Hispanic, 3.2% of mixed race, 
0.5% of another race, and an additional 0.5% of participants chose not to report their 
race.  
Manipulations and Materials 
Cognitive processing prime. As in Study 1, global and local processing styles 
were primed using a letter identification task (Navon, 1977). 
Photographic stimuli. These images were also used in the emotional flanker pilot 
study (described earlier). Images were chosen from the International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS) and were pretested to ensure that they evoked the target emotions (see 
Appendix B). These images consisted of disgusting, happy, sad, and neutral pictures (see 
Appendix B and Table 9). These images were used to integrally induce mood during the 
emotional flanker task (described below). 
Attentional Scope Measures 
Emotional flanker task and affect manipulation. The emotional flanker task 
tested in the pilot study was used in this experiment. Trial exclusions followed the same 
standard, such that those trials over 1,500 milliseconds were excluded (.39% of total 
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trials). Likewise, 3.7% of total trials were also excluded for incorrect responses. The 
overall trial exclusion rate was consistent with the rate reported for Study 1, and the 
emotional flanker pilot study. 
Ebbinghaus illusion measure. After the emotional flanker task, participants then 
completed the identical Ebbinghaus Illusion task that was used in Study 1. Independent 
coders rated participant responses about their knowledge of the illusion (Kappa = .821, p 
< .001.), and I excluded 32 participants for having knowledge about the illusion. 
Affect Manipulation Check   
Participants next indicated how they felt during the task for a variety of emotion 
items (identical to Study 1 and the emotional flanker pilot study) on a 7-point response 
scale (1-Not at all, 4- Moderately, 7-Extremely). Responses were averaged together to 
create composite emotion scores: happy, cheerful, and amused (Cronbach’s α  = .726); 
sad, depressed, and upset, (Cronbach’s α  = .794); disgusted, queasy, sickened, and 
grossed out; Cronbach’s α  = .902); tense and anxious (Cronbach’s α  = .832). The item 
assessing anger was used as a single item measure. 
Finally, participants completed a short demographics questionnaire that asked 
them to report their age, gender, and race. 
Results 
Affect Manipulation Check 
The affect manipulation was generally successful, with a 3 (happy, sad, and 
disgust affective ratings) x 2 (global vs. local prime) x 3 (happy vs. disgust vs. sad affect 
conditions) mixed ANOVA revealing an interaction between affect ratings and affect 
condition, F(4,360) = 5.99, p < .001, ηp2 = .062. These ratings are similar to those 
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reported in the emotional flanker pilot study, such that those in happy condition were 
more happy (M = 2.63, SD = 1.28) than sad (M = 1.43, SD = .76; t(65) = 6.88, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d =.870), or disgusted (M = 1.25, SD = .56; t(65) = 8.31, p < .001, Cohen’s d 
=1.161). Participants in the sad condition, however, reported significantly more 
happiness (M = 2.49, SD = 1.08) during the task compared to sadness (M = 1.81, SD = 
.98; t(58) = 3.70, p < .001, Cohen’s d =.488), but they did report feeling more sadness 
than disgust (M = 1.35, SD = .63; t(65) = 4.13, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .529). A similar 
pattern emerged for those in the disgust condition, such that they felt more happiness (M 
= 2.68, SD = 1.15) than disgust during the task (M = 1.90, SD = 1.23; t(60) = 4.21, p < 
.001, Cohen’s d =.507), but they felt more disgust than sadness (M = 1.40, SD = .80; t(60) 
= 3.48, p = .001, Cohen’s d = .456). Participants reported feeling equally low on anger 
and anxiety during the task (Fs < 1.2). 
Importantly, Bonferroni corrected, post-hoc simple effects reveal that those in the 
sad condition reported feeling significantly more sadness than those in the happy 
condition (MDiff = .38, SE = .15, p = .043), and the disgust condition (MDiff = .41, SE = 
.16, p = .029). Likewise, those in the disgust condition felt more disgust than those in the 
happy condition (MDiff = .64, SE = .15, p < .001), and sad condition (MDiff = .55, SE = .15, 
p = .002). Those in the happy condition reported equal levels of happiness to those in the 
disgust and sad conditions (omnibus F < 1, no post-hoc tests performed). These results 
are consistent with the affective responses from the emotional flanker pilot study. 
Visual Attention  
First, I conducted an analysis that compared reaction times on all three blocks of 
the emotional flanker task for block (1 vs. 2 vs. 3), flanker spacing (near vs. far), trial 
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type (incompatible vs. compatible trials), central image type (emotional vs. neutral), 
processing prime (global vs. local) and affect (happy vs. sad vs. disgust) in a mixed 
ANOVA. As expected, reaction times on trials did not vary as a function of block or 
flanker spacing (all relevant Fs < 1), so these factors were removed for a subsequent 
analysis.  
To determine if affect and initial processing styles influence attention to 
emotional or neutral stimuli, I used the same analytical approach from the emotional 
flanker pilot study, described earlier. I compared reaction times for incompatible and 
compatible trials that had a neutral central image (and therefore the incompatible trial had 
emotional distracting flankers) to reaction times for incompatible and compatible trials 
that had an emotional central image (and therefore the incompatible trial had neutral 
distracting flankers). A mixed ANOVA comparing affect (happy vs. sad vs. disgust), trial 
type (incompatible vs. compatible), central image (emotional vs. neutral) and initial 
processing prime (global vs. local) revealed there was a 4-way interaction between trial 
type, central image type, affect, and processing prime, F(2,180) = 3.54, p = .031, ηp2 = 
.038 (see Table 3a for means and Table 3b for mean differences). When global 
processing was primed, the disgust condition produced the typical, expected effect, such 
that disgusting central images were identified more quickly when surrounded by neutral 
flankers (Figure 7a), but neutral central images were identified more slowly when 
surrounded by disgusting flankers (Figure 7b). This suggests that disgusting stimuli draw 
attention, which aids performance when identifying a disgusting image, but hurts 
performance when identifying a neutral image.  
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In contrast, the happy condition shows a reversed pattern, such that trials with a 
happy central image were identified more quickly when surrounded by other happy 
images (Figure 7a), and trials with neutral central images were also identified more 
quickly when surrounded by happy flankers (Figure 7b). This suggests that, regardless of 
whether the central image was neutral or happy, happy stimuli flankers increased 
identification of the central image. In contrast to the disgust condition, there was no 
increase in performance on trials in which happy images were surrounded by neutral 
flankers, which suggests that happy stimuli does not draw attention away from neutral 
images. The results from the global priming condition support previous research in 
attention to emotional stimuli, and suggest that disgusting stimuli draw attention from 
neutral cognitive tasks in a way that happy stimuli do not. 
Notably, these “typical” effects found under global priming conditions, reversed 
under local priming conditions. When local processing styles were primed, incompatible 
trials in which disgusting stimuli surrounded a neutral central image were more quickly 
identified than trials with all neutral images (Figure 7b), whereas incompatible and 
compatible trials with an emotional central image were identified equally quickly (Figure 
7). This suggests that under local priming conditions, disgusting stimuli surrounding a 
neutral central image are not distracting, but rather aid performance, just as happy stimuli 
aids performance on these trials under global priming conditions. Likewise, we also find 
a reversed pattern of results for the happy condition under local priming conditions, such 
that incompatible and compatible trials with a neutral central image are identified equally 
quickly (Figure 7b), but the incompatible trial of a happy central image surrounded by 
neutral flankers is now identified more quickly than the compatible happy image trial 
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(Figure 7a). This suggests that under local priming, happy stimuli surrounding a neutral 
central image are not helpful, but rather lessen performance, just as disgusting stimuli 
lessened performance on these trials under global priming conditions.   
The sad condition did not produce any interpretable effects, as the sad condition 
differences were of a smaller magnitude than happy or disgust, and the results mimic the 
disgust condition for the neutral central image flanker trials, but mimic the happy 
condition for the emotional central image flanker trials.   
Surprisingly, no overall flanker effect was found, such that incompatible trials did 
not generally take longer to identify than compatible trials (F < 1), nor did the differences 
between these trial types vary only as a function of processing prime or affect condition 
(all Fs < 1.8). Additionally, analysis for the Ebbinghuas illusion task failed to replicate 
results from Study 1, with no main effects or interaction emerging for processing prime 
and affect condition, all Fs < 2.09. These results, taken together, suggest no evidence for 
attentional scope differences between conditions, but they do suggest that affect directs 
initial processing styles to influence attention to emotional and neutral stimuli. 
Discussion 
These results suggest that, although processing style and integral affect did not 
interact to influence general attentional scope, the attentional preferences for emotional or 
neutral stimuli (and subsequent biases or boosts) were dependent on the initial processing 
style. I found support for the cognitive malleability hypothesis, such that participants 
under global priming conditions showed the typical effects on attention, with disgusting 
stimuli as flankers distracting from neutral and disgusting central images, and happy 
stimuli enhancing attention for both types of central images. In contrast, this effect 
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reversed under local priming conditions, such that attention for neutral central images 
was enhanced for trials with disgusting flankers, but was depressed in trials with happy 
flankers. These results are subtly different than the results that emerged for the emotional 
flanker pilot study, which importantly demonstrates what occurs when global or local 
processing styles are equally dominant. In this way, for happy and disgust conditions, 
global priming in Study 2 seems to enhance the default effects found in the emotional 
flanker pilot study, and local priming then reversed these globally primed effects. 
Overall, the results of Study 2 suggest that attention researchers interested in 
understanding affective influences on attention need to consider initial processing styles, 
as attention to emotional stimuli is dependent on the type of emotion and the initial 
processing style.   
Studies 1 and 2 were conducted to determine whether disgust and initial 
processing styles influence basic cognition, specifically visual attention. After 
demonstrating that disgust interacts with initial processing styles to influence attention to 
emotional and neutral stimuli in Study 2, I now turn to Studies 3 and 4, which were 
conducted to determine whether disgust interacts with initial processing styles to 
influence higher-level cognition, specifically social and moral impression formation. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
STUDY 3 
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The goal of Study 3 was to determine whether the relationship between cognitive 
processing and disgust is consistent with the cognitive malleability approach in more 
typical social contexts. To examine this, I used methods that have been successful at 
demonstrating cognitive malleability effects in previous research, namely an impression 
formation task in which global trait information is provided (i.e., extrovert vs. introvert), 
along with a series of behaviors that are both consistent and inconsistent with this global 
information (see Hunsinger, et al., 2013; Isbell, 2004). Consistent with this previous 
research, I hypothesized that if participants processed the information in a global manner, 
they would categorize and evaluate the target individual based on the initial global trait 
information that was provided (an introvert or extrovert). In contrast, if participants 
processed the information in a more local manner, I expected that they would analyze the 
contradictory behaviors that the target performed and rely on this behavioral information 
more heavily than the global trait information. I first ran this study in the laboratory, 
examining the influence of affect (happy, sad, and disgusted states), global target trait 
information (introvert or extrovert), and information processing prime (global or local) on 
impressions of the target (Study 3A), but the results failed to replicate any previous 
findings (even for happy and sad, see Appendix C for Study 3A method and results).  
Due to not replicating the typical effects, I considered that it was possible that 
participants at UMass were simply not reacting to the vignette as they had in previous 
years.  Upon speaking to our research assistants, they suggested that the target’s name 
(i.e., Carol) was not as popular for their age demographic, and that the name led them to 
picture someone much older than our target (who was described as 32 years old in the 
vignettes). Further, nearly equal numbers of men and women participated in the previous 
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published studies, whereas our sample consisted of 80.9% female participants. For this 
reason, I conducted a second study (Study 3B) using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk workers 
as participants (which tend to be more evenly split in gender), and I also changed the 
name of the target from Carol to Jennifer. Due to limited financial resources, I compared 
only happiness and disgust, which are the focus of the primary research questions of this 
dissertation. 
 I hypothesized that disgust would lead individuals to reject whatever cognitive 
processing style is currently accessible, such that when global processing is dominant, 
local processing would result, and vice versa. In contrast, I predicted that happiness 
should lead individuals to maintain their currently accessible processing style. I expected 
that those individuals feeling happy and globally primed or those feeling disgust and 
locally primed should rely more on the global trait information and less on the individual 
behaviors as a basis for their target judgments, compared to those individuals feeling 
happy and locally primed or those feeling disgust and globally primed. Reliance on 
global trait information should lead participants to judge the target (Jennifer) as relatively 
more introverted than extroverted (when she is portrayed as an introverted librarian) and 
relatively more extroverted than introverted (when she is portrayed as an extroverted 
sales representative). I predicted that those focusing on local, behavioral information 
would rate the target to be equally introverted and extroverted, regardless of whether she 
was described as an introverted librarian or extroverted sales representative. I also 
predicted that favorability judgments for the target would follow the same pattern for 
extroversion ratings (as previous studies showed that participants tended to prefer the 
extroverted sales representative over the introverted librarian). Thus, I predicted that 
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when participants judge the target as highly extroverted, they will rate her more favorably 
than when they judge the target as highly introverted. 
Furthermore, I expected that participants relying on global trait information would 
report using less information to form their impression of the target compared to those 
relying on local information. Lastly, I predicted that participants relying on global trait 
information would also report that their impression was easier to form and more clear 
(because of their reliance on the global stereotype) than those relying on local, behavioral 
information (due to the conflicting behavioral information present in the vignette). 
Method 
Participants, Design, and Procedure 
 Six hundred one participants were recruited through Amazon’s online Mechanical 
Turk community and completed the study in exchange for $1.00. All participants were 
randomly assigned to one of 8 conditions in a processing prime (global vs. local) x affect 
(happy vs. disgust) x global trait information (introvert vs. extrovert) between-subjects 
factorial design. Participants first completed a map task that primed either global or local 
processing styles (as used in the emotional flanker pilot study), after which they wrote a 
story about a recent life event in which they felt happy or physically disgusted (as used in 
Study 1). They then read a vignette about the target (Jennifer), which presented global 
trait information about her (i.e., that she is an introverted librarian vs. extroverted sales 
representative) as well as local behavioral information (that was identical in each 
vignette). After reading about the target, they then reported their overall evaluation of the 
target (favorability), as well as trait ratings of the target (introversion vs. extroversion). 
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Finally, participants completed an affect manipulation check and a brief demographics 
questionnaire.  
To ensure the quality of the responses (given that this experiment was conducted 
online), I excluded participants who were in the bottom 5% of total time spent taking 
survey (<10 minutes, n = 27) , as well as those who were 2.5 standard deviations (SDs) 
above the mean in time spent taking the survey (>30 minutes, n = 15). I also excluded 
those who answered less than 5 correct on the map task processing prime manipulation (n 
= 16) and those who could not recall the target’s occupation (n = 13). A multi-way 
frequency analysis including all conditions revealed there were no significant differences 
in these 71 exclusions (11.8% of total sample) across conditions,χ2(10) = 4.57, p = .918. 
Of the remaining 530 remaining participants (58.4% female), the average age is 37.69 
years (SD = 12.87), and 82.3% are Caucasian, 3.8% are African-American, 4.9% are 
Asian, 5.8% are Hispanic, 1.1% are mixed race, 1.5% are Pacific Islander/Native 
American, 0.2% are another race or ethnicity, and 0.2% of participants chose not to report 
their race. Participant education level was fairly high as 15.1% earned a post-
baccalaureate degree, 38.3% earned a bachelor’s degree, 10.8% earned an associate’s 
degree, 25.7% attended some college, 9.2% earned a high school degree or GED, and 
0.9% attended some high school.  
Manipulations 
Processing prime. Information processing styles were primed using the same 
map task as described in the emotional flanker pilot study, but this time participants were 
instructed to focus on either the shape of the state (global prime) or the cities in the state 
(local prime). After a practice trial, participants viewed 7 maps, each of which was 
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followed by a question asking either about the shape of the state or about the cities within 
the state (procedure adapted from Förster, et al., 2008; used successfully in an online 
setting, Isbell, Rovenpor, et al., under review; see Figure 4). 
Affect manipulation. To manipulate affect, participants wrote about a recent life 
event in which they felt happy or physically disgusted (identical to the task used in 
Studies 1A and 1B, see Appendix A; Bless et al., 2001; Schnall, et al., 2008). Two 
independent coders rated the content of the stories, and agreed that over 90% of 
participants wrote about the target emotion in their stories. The coder agreement for the 
happiness content of the stories was quite high (Kappa = .970, p < .001), and the 
agreement for the physically disgusting content of the stories was also adequate (Kappa = 
.760, p < .001). 
Global trait information. Participants read a vignette describing an unknown 
person named Jennifer (see Appendix D). One version of the vignette described the daily 
life of an introverted librarian and the other version described the daily life of an 
extroverted salesperson.  The detailed behaviors that the target performed are identical, as 
both vignettes contained equal numbers of introverted and extroverted behaviors. This 
vignette and adaptations of it have been successful in showing affect-induced cognitive 
processing style effects in previous research (Hunsinger et al., 2012; Isbell, 2004). 
General Evaluations of the Target 
Feeling thermometer rating. After reading the vignette, participants rated their 
feelings toward Jennifer using a feeling thermometer on which they could choose a 
number between 0 to 100 to capture their impression. On this measure, ratings between 0 
and 49 meant that they felt unfavorable toward Jennifer, whereas those from 51 to 100 
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meant that they felt favorable toward Jennifer. A rating of 50 meant that they felt neutral 
toward Jennifer.  
Overall favorability. Participants also reported the extent to which they felt 
favorably toward Jennifer, how positively they felt toward her, and how likable they 
found her to be on three separate scales, which ranged from -5 (very 
unfavorable/negative/unlikable) to +5 (very favorable/positive/likable). These three items 
were averaged together to create an overall favorability score (Cronbach’s α = .913).  
Target Trait Judgments 
Social thermometer rating. Participants rated how much they felt Jennifer is 
introverted or extroverted on a social thermometer scale, where ratings between 0 and 49 
indicate that Jennifer is introverted and shy, and ratings between 51 and 100 indicate that 
Jennifer is extroverted and sociable. Ratings of 50 indicate perceptions of Jennifer as 
equally introverted and extroverted. 
Trait ratings. Participants next rated the extent to which they thought Jennifer 
exhibited extroverted traits (talkative, self-confident, extroverted, sociable, outgoing; 
Cronbach’s α  = .879) and introverted traits (withdrawn, shy, introverted, a loner, and 
quiet; Cronbach’s α  = .854) on an 11-point scale (from 0-Not at all, 5-Somewhat, 10-
Extremely).  
Impression Formation Process 
Amount of information used for impression formation. Next, participants 
reported how much of the information they considered when forming their impression of 
Jennifer (1- Very Little Information, 2- Only about Half of the information, 3- Most of the 
information, 4- Almost all of the information).  
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Impression clarity. Participants also rated how difficult it was to form an 
impression of Jennifer on an 11-point scale, (0-Not at all difficult, to 10- Very difficult, 
reverse scored for composite), and how clear of an impression they were able to form (0-
Not at all clear, to 10- Very clear). These two items were averaged together to create an 
impression clarity score (Cronbach’s α  = .80). 
Affect Manipulation Check 
Participants reported the extent to which they felt particular emotions (happy, 
disgusted, sad, angry, anxious, cheerful, sickened, tense, and upset) when they were 
writing their story on an 11-point scale (0- Not at all, 10- Extremely). Happy and cheerful 
were averaged together to create a happiness composite (Cronbach’s α  = .950), disgusted 
and sickened were combined to create a disgust composite (Cronbach’s α  = .958), sad 
and upset were combined to create a sadness composite (Cronbach’s α  = .902), and tense 
and anxious were combined to create an anxiety composite (Cronbach’s α  = .843). Anger 
remained a single item affect measure. 
Results 
For presentation clarity, when discussing the results from Study 3 (and also from 
Study 4) I will sometimes refer to those “processing globally” (global prime + happy and 
local prime + disgust conditions) and those “processing locally” (local prime + happy and 
global prime + disgust conditions). Given that the cognitive malleability account only 
argues for inhibition or promotion of already active processing styles, this shorthand 
wording simply groups participants together by the predicted manner in which I expected 
participants in these particular conditions to respond. This wording is neither meant to 
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imply that there is additivity of these effects, nor that the results described definitively 
infer that either global or local processing occurred. 
Affect Manipulation Check 
 A repeated measure ANOVA comparing happy and disgusted composite 
emotions revealed that the affect manipulation was successful, F(1,465) = 554.94, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .516. Participants in the happy condition reported feeling more happy (M = 
7.21, SD = 2.49) than disgusted (M = 0.29, SD = .97; t(253) = 38.79, p < .001, Cohen’s d 
=3.660) and those in the disgust condition reported feeling more disgust (M = 5.13, SD = 
3.64) than happiness (M = 2.54, SD = 2.76; t(274) = 7.18, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .802). 
Those in the happy condition also reported significantly more happiness than anger or 
anxiety (both simple effects ps < .001), likewise those in the disgust condition reported 
feeling more disgust than anger or anxiety (both simple effects ps < .01). 
General Evaluations of the Target  
 Feeling thermometer rating. Consistent with the cognitive malleability 
approach, and my hypotheses, the results demonstrate that affect and information 
processing primes interact to influence general evaluations of Jennifer. For the feeling 
thermometer rating2, a significant three-way interaction emerged, F(1,379) = 7.71, p = 
.006, ηp2 = .020. As shown in Table 4 and Figure 8, when Jennifer was described as an 
extroverted sales representative, those processing globally (global + happy and local + 
disgust) rated Jennifer more favorably than those processing locally (local + happy and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!2!Note:!Due!to!the!online!survey!presentation!of!a!gray!response!box!on!a!gray!background,!27%!of!participants!had!trouble!seeing!the!box!and!failed!to!enter!a!response!for!the!feeling!thermometer.!I!had!intended!to!standardize!all!favorability!judgments!and!create!a!composite!favorability!rating,!but!given!that!27%!of!participants!did!not!respond!to!the!feeling!thermometer!item,!I!had!concerns!about!the!interpretability!of!this!composite!measure.!!
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global + disgust; F(1,188) = 6.40, p = .012, ηp2 = .033). This pattern reversed when 
Jennifer was described as an introverted librarian, such that those processing globally 
(global + happy and local + disgust) rated Jennifer less favorably than those processing 
locally (local + happy and global + disgust; F(1,191) = 1.78, p = .184). No other 
significant main effects or interactions emerged (all ps > .29). 
 Overall favorability. The overall favorability score (which included favorability, 
likability, and positivity judgments) showed a similar pattern of results, F(1,522) = 5.46, 
p = .020, ηp2 = .010. As shown in Table 5 and Figure 9, when Jennifer was an 
extroverted sales representative, those processing globally (global + happy and local + 
disgust) rated Jennifer more favorably than those processing locally (local + happy and 
global + disgust; F(1,257) = 4.55, p = .034, ηp2 = .017). This pattern reversed when 
Jennifer was an introverted librarian, such that those processing globally (global + happy 
and local + disgust) rated Jennifer less favorably than those processing locally (local + 
happy and global + disgust; F(1,265) = 1.26, p = .263). No other significant main effects 
or interactions emerged (all ps > .19). Both the feeling thermometer and the overall 
favorability ratings produced results that support the cognitive malleability account. The 
similarity of these results was expected, as the feeling thermometer and overall 
favorability ratings were highly correlated, Pearson’s r(387) = .829, p < .001. 
Target Trait Judgments 
 Social thermometer rating. Contrary to expectations, affect, processing prime, 
and stereotype information did not interact to influence participants’ social thermometer 
ratings; however, a main effect emerged for stereotype information, revealing that 
participants rated the sales representative (M = 63.22, SD = 16.41) to be more extroverted 
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than the librarian (M = 51.63, SD = 15.57; F(1,516) = 68.09, p < .001, ηp2 = .117). 
Additionally, a main effect of affect emerged with those feeling disgusted rating Jennifer 
as more extroverted (M = 59.28, SD = 16.97) than those feeling happy (M = 55.29, SD = 
16.82; F(1,516) = 7.82 p = .005, ηp2 = .015). No other interactions or main effects 
emerged, all ps > .065. As expected, the social thermometer rating was positively 
correlated with trait ratings of extroversion, Pearson’s r(524) = .671, p < .001, and 
negatively correlated with trait ratings of introversion, Pearson’s r(524) = -.641, p < .001. 
 Trait ratings. Consistent with the findings just reported, a mixed analysis of 
participants’ ratings of the target on the introverted and extroverted traits as a function of 
affect, processing prime, and stereotype information, failed to reveal the predicted 
interaction, F(1,522) = 0, p = .984. Participants perceived Jennifer to be more extroverted 
(M = 5.94, SD = 1.81) than introverted (M = 5.04, SD = 1.88, F(1,522) = 51.72, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .090); however, this main effect was qualified by three two-way interactions. First, 
not surprisingly, an interaction between the trait ratings and stereotype information 
emerged, revealing that participants rated the librarian to be more introverted (M = 5.73, 
SD = 1.70) than extroverted (M = 5.23, SD = 1.64) and the sales representative to be more 
extroverted (M = 6.66, SD = 1.68) than introverted (M = 4.33, SD = 1.80; F(1,522) = 
123.12, p < .001, ηp2 = .191). This finding essentially confirms that the stereotypic, 
global trait information was successfully manipulated.  
A second, unpredicted interaction emerged between trait ratings and information 
processing prime, F(1,522) = 5.97, p = .015, ηp2 = .011, revealing that locally primed 
participants judged the target to be more extroverted (M = 6.08, SD = 1.82) than 
introverted (M = 4.85, SD = 1.89), whereas globally primed participants rated the target 
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similarly on both extroversion (M = 5.80, SD = 1.78) and introversion (M = 5.23, SD = 
1.85). Finally, the third, unpredicted two-way interaction emerged between trait ratings 
and affect, F(1,522) = 4.61, p = .032, ηp2 = .009, revealing that those in the happy 
condition rated the target to be only slightly more extroverted (M = 5.80, SD = 1.83) than 
introverted (M = 5.21, SD = 1.88), whereas those in the disgust condition rated her to be 
significantly more extroverted (M = 6.06, SD = 1.78) than introverted (M = 4.89, SD = 
1.87). No other significant within-participant effects emerged3, all ps > .36. It is unclear 
why these two unpredicted interactions emerged and, given the absence of a higher-order 
interaction involving all of the manipulated variables, the findings are difficult to 
interpret; however, these findings do not lend support to the cognitive malleability 
hypothesis. 
Impression Formation Process 
Amount of information used for impression formation. Participants reported 
differences in how much information they used when forming their impression. A 
between-subjects ANOVA as a function of processing prime, affect, and global trait 
information factors revealed a 2-way interaction between processing prime and affect 
condition, F(1,522) = 4.11, p = .043, ηp2 = .008. These differences occurred in the 
expected direction, such that those primed globally and in the happy condition reported 
using relatively less information when forming their impression of Jennifer (M = 3.66, 
SD = .55), compared to those in the disgust condition (M = 3.77, SD = .45; t(269) = 1.84, 
p = .066). In contrast, those locally primed and in the happy condition used relatively !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!3!The only other significant effect in this analysis was a between-subjects interaction 
between processing prime and affect, F(1,522) = 5.24, p = .023, ηp2= .010. Functionally, 
this is an average between the introvert and extrovert trait ratings, which is not 
interpretable.!
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more information (M = 3.78, SD = .43) than those in the disgust condition (M = 3.72, SD 
= .46; t(257) = 1.012, p = .312).  
Impression clarity. As expected, participant ratings of impression clarity also 
reveal the predicted pattern of results. Participants’ composite impression clarity ratings 
were analyzed as a function of processing prime (global vs. local), affect (happy vs. 
disgust) and stereotype information (librarian vs. sales representative). As expected, this 
analysis revealed a three-way interaction between these variables, F(1,520) = 5.79, p = 
.016, ηp2 = .011. As shown in Table 6 and Figure 10, those who processed globally 
(global + happy and local + disgust) reported greater ease and clarity in forming their 
impression of Jennifer when she was an extroverted sales representative compared to 
when she was an introverted librarian. Those who processed locally (local + happy and 
global + disgust) reported no differences in impression clarity, regardless of whether she 
was an extroverted sales representative or an introverted librarian. These results provide 
support for the cognitive malleability approach. 
Discussion 
The results of Study 3 suggest that disgust and happiness do confer relatively 
opposite types of information about currently active processing styles when forming an 
impression of a target individual. I showed that target favorability judgments were 
influenced by an interaction between affect, primed cognitive processing styles, and 
global stereotype information. I demonstrated that disgust does influence the currently 
active processing style, namely that those processing globally (participants in global + 
happy and local + disgust conditions) perceived the target more favorably when portrayed 
as an extroverted sales representative, but those processing locally (participants in local + 
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happy and global + disgust conditions) judged the target more favorably when portrayed 
as an introverted librarian. I had hypothesized that these favorability judgments would 
follow ratings of extroversion, as previous research had shown that the target in the story 
was more liked when she was perceived as more extroverted, but this finding did not 
emerge in this study, nor were they strongly correlated (extroversion with feeling 
thermometer, Pearson’s r(387) = -.208, p < .001; extroversion with overall favorability: 
Pearson’s r(530) = .159, p < .001). 
One explanation for these results is that these differences in favorability are due to 
the fluency behind the impression formation, or also known as the ease with which 
participants formed their impressions. Importantly, the vignettes provided global 
information about Jennifer (extroverted sales representative vs. introverted librarian) and 
then proceeded to describe Jennifer’s behavior in equally introverted and extroverted 
ways. These behaviors were not ambiguous, but were a balanced mix of introverted and 
extroverted behaviors. The people who were focusing on the details (those in the happy 
and local or disgust and global conditions) were likely confused by her contradictory 
actions. For instance, at some times in the story Jennifer was outgoing (i.e., in school), 
but then at other times in the story she was shy (i.e., in the bar with Greg). In contrast, 
those focusing on a general impression of Jennifer, and relying more on the global trait 
information (those in the happy and global or disgust and local conditions) were less 
likely to focus on these inconsistencies in her behavior. My results support this notion, as 
the analysis on the amount of information considered when forming the impression show 
that global processors (participants in global + happy and local + disgust conditions) 
relied on relatively less information than local processors (participants in local + happy 
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and global + disgust conditions). An interaction was also found on how easily and clearly 
they were able to form an impression of Jennifer, which show the same pattern as the 
favorability judgments. Therefore, the relative fluency or disfluency created by the 
interaction between affect and initial processing style likely bled over into their overall 
favorability judgment of Jennifer (as it is likely that people who are perceived as highly 
erratic in their behavior are often not perceived as highly favorable). 
I did not find the expected pattern of interaction for the trait rating comparisons of 
introversion and extroversion. Notably, even those in the happy condition did not 
replicate the previous trait rating comparisons found in previous work. This suggests to 
me that it is possible that my manipulations were too subtle to influence these trait 
judgments, which were measured after the favorability ratings. 
 Overall, Study 3B produced nearly all of the expected effects, and happiness and 
disgust interacted with initial processing styles in the predicted manner, which provides 
support for the cognitive malleability account in a higher-level cognitive task with low 
disgust relevance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
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STUDY 4 
 The purpose of this study was to examine if affect and cognitive processing styles 
interact in a way consistent with the malleability approach in high disgust relevant 
contexts (e.g., moral judgments). Similar to Study 3, I manipulated global trait 
information about a target individual, so that I could determine whether participants 
relied on global or local information when forming an impression of the target individual. 
In this study, participants received global categorical information that was morally 
relevant (membership in a moral or immoral group) as well as a series of morally 
ambiguous behaviors that the target performed. As in Study 3, the information was varied 
in this way to allow me to identify under what conditions participants rely on the global 
categorical information (i.e., by processing information in a more global manner) versus 
the local behavioral information (i.e., by processing information in a more local manner). 
Given that cognitive processing styles have not previously been examined in moral 
judgment contexts, it was an open question as to whether the effects that have been 
identified in general social impression formation contexts would generalize to a more 
specific and emotionally charged context, (i.e., moral judgments). For instance, it is 
possible that when people make moral judgments about others, they might attempt to be 
as objective as possible. If this is the case, people might avoid using categorical 
information when morally judging others, and prefer judging a person based upon their 
actions, instead.  
For this reason, I also considered the possibility that information processing styles 
(dependent on initial processing prime and affect) may influence the extent to which 
individuals incorporate a person’s actions into an overall judgment of that person. In 
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other words, it is possible that in moral judgments a categorical or configural thinking 
style might promote a black and white view of morality (e.g., if a person’s actions are 
bad, they are also a bad person). In contrast, an elemental or detailed thinking style might 
promote a more nuanced, grayscale view of morality (e.g., if a person’s actions are bad, 
they are not necessarily also a bad person). That is, I expected that those processing 
globally (global + happy and local + disgust conditions) would not differentiate between 
Jack’s actions and Jack, as a person, whereas those processing locally (local + happy and 
global + disgust conditions) would be more likely to make this differentiation between a 
person and their actions. Very recent research showing that third-person construal level 
(similar to abstract thinking) produces harsher moral judgments (e.g., Libby, et al., 2009), 
which supports my hypothesis that moral judgments would be harsher when affect and 
information processing primes interact to produce more reliance on categories (i.e., 
process information in more global manner). 
In order to manipulate morally-relevant global trait information, participants 
needed to learn moral stereotypes that could be applied to an individual. To avoid 
confounds associated with real-life moral groups (e.g., criminals, volunteers at a soup 
kitchen), this study had participants learn about fictional groups of people that differed in 
their moral character. Therefore, participants first completed a group stereotype training 
session to learn stereotypes about these fictional groups (pilot test described below), 
before beginning the experimental manipulations. In the group stereotype training 
session, participants learned about group stereotypes and were also trained to identify 
members of each type of novel group. After a short distractor task, participants completed 
processing style and emotional manipulations, and then read a vignette about an 
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individual from either the fictitious moral or immoral group. Participants next answered 
questions about their impression and reported judgments of the target individual. This 
experimental design required extensive pretesting of stimulus materials and tasks prior to 
the full Study 4 description, and the pretests for the impression formation vignette 
(Appendix E) and group names (Appendix F) are included as appendices. The group 
stereotype training task was piloted before the main Study 4 to ensure that participants 
adequately learned the group stereotypes, and is described below. 
Group Stereotype Pilot Study 
 
 This pilot study was conducted to establish that participants would be sufficiently 
aware of the moral group stereotypes to be used in the main study, to select the final 
prototypical member descriptions for use in the training portion of the experiment, and to 
assess the emotional impact of the group stereotype training and distractor tasks to be 
used in Study 4. The first goal of this pretest was to determine if participants implicitly 
learned that one group was moral (the Vassers), one group was immoral (the Haplins) 
and one group was sporty (the Watkins), as compared to explicitly reading information 
about the desired qualities of group members. In this pretest, half of the participants were 
only given information about prototypical group members, whereas the other half of 
participants were given additional information about the group itself (e.g., what values 
the group stands for). One reason I wanted to compare these two types of information, is 
because for the main study, I wanted to know that participants would be able to implicitly 
learn the different group stereotypes from the individual members descriptions alone, and 
without an explicit description of what values the groups stand for. The second goal of 
the pretest was to evaluate the perceived membership typicality of each prototypical 
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group member described, so that I could eliminate the least typical member description 
from the moral and immoral groups in an effort to strengthen the cohesion of the group 
stereotypes for the main study. The last goal of this pretest was to establish the emotional 
impact of the group stereotype training and distractor tasks, to ensure that they would not 
unduly influence subsequent tasks in the main Study 4. 
Method 
Participants, Procedure, and Design 
 Participants were recruited from psychology courses at UMass Amherst in 
exchange for extra credit in their courses (32 total, 78.12% female). The average age of 
participants is 20.13 years (SD = 1.64). The sample consists of 56.3% Caucasian 
participants, 3.1% African-American participants, 28.1% Asian participants, 6.3% 
Hispanic participants, and 6.3% mixed race participants. First, participants read 
information about the different groups and some of their members. After familiarizing 
themselves with the three different groups, participants then completed an identification 
task, in which they read a short information blurb about an individual and then selected 
the group to which they thought that individual belonged. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of two experimental manipulations that varied the amount of information 
provided about the different groups (simple vs. elaborate). 
Manipulations and Tasks 
Informational manipulation. For each group description, participants were 
presented with basic information and a group logo (provided to help participants to 
distinguish groups from one another, see Figure 11). Initial instructions were as follows: 
For the first part of this experiment we are interested in understanding how 
people form impressions about different groups of people, and how they 
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go about identifying group members. For this reason, we would like you to 
read some information about three different fictional groups of people. 
These groups are somewhat like fraternities or sororities, such that people 
want to join a group to be with people similar to them in some way. After 
you familiarize yourself with some typical members of each group, we 
will then provide you with descriptions of some individuals and ask you to 
select what group you think they belong to. For now, please read the 
information provided on the following screens about the individuals in 
these different group and try to form an impression of what people in this 
group are typically like.  
  
On the next screen, participants were then given general information about a group, 
which read: “The following individuals are all members of a group called the 
Haplins/Vassers/Watkins. They are a tight-knit, community-based group, and meet up 
once a month, or more, for events. For each person in the group, a brief snapshot of his 
her daily experience is provided.”   
In the elaborate information condition, another sentence was added about each 
group between the first and second sentences. For the immoral Haplins group the 
sentence read, “This group prides itself on having members that are ambitious, are always 
striving for success, and tend to believe that the end results justify the means used to get 
there.”  For the moral Vassers group, the sentence read, “This group prides itself on 
having members that work hard, are always striving for their lives to have a greater 
impact in the world, and tend to believe that the way people go about achieving a goal, is 
just as important as the goal itself.” For the control and sporty Watkins group, the 
sentence read, “This group prides itself on having members that are dedicated, are always 
striving for a better individual or team performance, and put a high priority on personal 
fitness.” 
Group stereotype task. Participants then read five prototypical member 
descriptions of the Haplins (immoral group) and the Vassers (moral group), and four 
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prototypical member descriptions about the Watkins (the sporty control group). The 
members were presented as a group, such that all members of the same group were 
presented before another group was presented to the participants. Within this blocked 
presentation order, the presentation order of the groups and the presentation order of the 
members within the groups were randomized. All of the vignettes were between 250 and 
270 words in length, and are presented in Appendix G. 
Identification task. After learning the novel stereotypes about the three different 
groups, participants were then given 26 short identification blurbs and were asked to 
identify the group to which that individual belonged. For example, if presented with, “I 
was at this festival downtown and there was a man walking along, counting his money. 
He had a lot of cash in his hands and dropped a five-dollar bill. I picked it up and 
returned it to him,” as the short identification blurb, they would then select the group to 
which that person belonged. In this case, the described individual belonged to the 
Vassers, or the moral group. Participants were given feedback about their answers, and if 
incorrect, were told the group to which that person belonged. In all, participants were 
randomly presented with 26 identification blurbs (see Appendix H for full list). This task 
was adapted from a previously used implicit stereotype categorization procedure 
(Stroessner, Haines, Sherman, & Kantrowitz, 2010). 
Measures 
Group-based moral judgments. Participants answered three questions about the 
Vassers and Haplins groups to assess their moral judgments about those groups, which 
included whether they thought the group was moral or immoral, morally right or morally 
wrong, and good or bad, (all on an 11-point scale, from -5- Very immoral/morally 
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wrong/bad, +5- Very moral/morally right/good, Vassers Cronbach’s α = .95, Haplins 
Cronbach’s α = .97). 
Prototypical member ratings. Then, participants rated each prototypical member 
of the groups that were described in the group stereotype task. They were given the 
identical version of the description they read about the prototypical individual (but 
presented in a smaller font), and then were asked “When considering ____ as a person, 
how moral or immoral does s/he seem?” (11-point scale, from -5- Very Immoral to 5- 
Very Moral). After this item, participants were then asked, “When considering _____ as a 
member of the Vassers/Haplins/Watkins, to what extent do you think s/he fits in with the 
group?” (11-point scale, 0- Not at all to 10- Very Much). 
Coloring Distraction Task. Participants then completed a 4-minute coloring 
distraction task (to be used in Study 4). The following cover story was given to 
participants:  
We are interested in your visual preferences, specifically the colors and 
shapes you choose to use. To assess your color and shape preferences, we 
would like you to take the next 4 minutes to draw on the piece of paper 
provided on the desk. The screen will automatically advance to the next 
part of the experiment after 4 minutes, and a countdown clock is provided 
so that you can be aware of how much time is left in the task. 
 
Participants were given 10 crayons of varying colors and a blank piece of paper upon 
which to draw. 
Affect Manipulation Check. In order to assess the emotional impact of the group 
stereotype, identification, and coloring tasks, participants’ affect was measured directly 
after the coloring task. They were asked to consider how they were feeling “at this 
moment” and to respond to a series of items, such as “To what extent do you feel 
happy?” on a 7-point scale (1-Not at all, 4-Moderately, 7- Extremely). Participants were 
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asked to what extent they felt happy, sad, disgusted, angry, certain of their beliefs, upset, 
anxious, confident, tense, grossed out, queasy, observant, bored, tired, calm, confused, 
sickened, distracted, afraid, thoughtful, and amused. The first three items (happy, sad, 
and disgusted) were randomly presented as the first three questions, and the remaining 
items were then randomly presented. Composite measures were created by averaging 
items for key emotions relevant to this study: happy and amused (Cronbach’s α  = .780), 
sad and upset (Cronbach’s α  = .857), disgusted, queasy, sickened, and grossed out 
(Cronbach’s α  = .760), and anxious, tense, and afraid (Cronbach’s α  = .748). Finally, 
participants answered basic demographics questions (age, race, and gender) and one 
question which asked about the difficulty of the identification task they completed earlier 
in the experimental session, (1-Not at all Difficult, 7-Very Difficult). 
Results 
Group-Based Moral Judgment Manipulation Check 
I analyzed the group-based moral judgments that participants reported for the 
moral and immoral groups, in a mixed design with information condition and the 
expected main effect emerged, such that participants judged the Haplins as less moral (M 
= -2.93, SD = 2.63) than the Vassers (M = 4.48, SD = .88; F(1,28) = 207.02, p < .001, ηp2 
= .881). Importantly, these judgments did not differ as a function of whether participants 
received simple or elaborate information about the groups, and no other interactions or 
main effects were significant (all Fs < 1). 
Identification Task 
 To determine if simple or elaborate information about the groups led to greater 
accuracy on the identification task, I conducted an analysis comparing accuracy on the 
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task across information conditions (simple vs. elaborate). The informational condition did 
not influence participant accuracy, t(1,26) = -.55, p = .585. On average, participants 
correctly identified 23.86 blurbs (out of 26 total), with the elaborate group information 
condition scoring slightly (but not significantly) higher in accuracy (M = 24.20 out of 26, 
SD = 2.33) than the simple group information condition (M = 23.46 out of 26, SD = 
4.54). Furthermore, the participants did not find the identification task very difficult (M = 
2.78, SD = 1.60), nor did their difficulty ratings vary as a function of informational 
condition, F(1,30) = -1.22, p = .230. This finding, taken together with the result reported 
above (for group-based moral judgments) suggest that participants were able to 
sufficiently learn about the different group stereotypes, regardless of whether they were 
presented with additional information about the group’s values. 
Prototypical Member Judgments 
 To determine which prototypical member description should be eliminated from 
the group (for the main study), I analyzed participants’ moral and fit judgments for each 
prototypical member. Participants judged the prototypical group members as 
appropriately moral or immoral, depending on the group to which the prototypical 
member belonged, and they also judged all members as highly typical of their group. All 
means for these judgments were above 8 (out of 11) for fit with group. The prototypical 
member with the lowest fit ratings for the Vassers (Patrick: M = 10.30, SD = 1.88) and 
the Haplins (Nick: M = 8.17, SD = 2.18) were excluded from the group stereotype task in 
the main study. 
Affect Manipulation Check  
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Finally, to determine if the group stereotype, identification, or distractor tasks had 
a detrimental effect on affect, a repeated measures analysis comparing affective responses 
revealed that the tasks did not have a significant influence on participants’ affective state. 
A repeated measure ANOVA compared how participants reported feeling for four 
composite affect measures (happy, sad, disgusted, and anxious) after the group 
stereotype, identification, and distraction tasks. Participants reported feeling significantly 
more happy than sad, disgusted, or anxious, F(3,93) = 63.70, p < .001, ηp2 = .67, but 
these positive feelings were moderate, (MHappy = 4.48, SD = 1.13; MSad = 1.82, SD = 1.05; 
MDisg = 1.36, SD = 0.64; MAnx = 2.07, SD = 1.19). Notably, such findings are consistent 
with what is typically obtained when measuring baseline affect in the laboratory. 
Discussion 
 This pretest was designed to test the materials and procedures for individuals to 
learn the novel group stereotypes to be used in the main study. The results confirm that 
my group stereotype training procedure is successful in producing moral and immoral 
group stereotypes. Furthermore, the high accuracy rate for the identification task 
indicates that group stereotype learning took place regardless of whether simple or 
elaborate information was provided about the groups. Additionally, the simple group 
information condition was not rated as any more difficult than the elaborate group 
information condition. The individual judgments of the prototypical group members also 
confirmed that all members in the groups matched the target moral group stereotype. 
Likewise, participants also judged these prototypical members as having a high fit with 
their group, suggesting a high level of group cohesion. Last, participants’ affective 
responses indicated that if the group stereotype training, identification, and distraction 
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tasks influenced mood at all, they only produced moderately positive affective responses. 
Thus, combining these tasks prior to the key affect and processing style manipulations of 
the main study is not likely to adversely influence the overall study goals.  
Main Study 4 
 The primary goal of this study is to examine if affect and cognitive processing 
styles interact to influence moral judgments in impression formation contexts. The moral 
judgment context is one that previous research suggests is highly disgust-relevant, and 
therefore I was most interested in examining the cognitive malleability account in this 
stringent context. Initially, this experiment included happy, sad, and disgusting affective 
conditions. I selected a sad video that had been used successfully to induce sad affective 
reactions in previous studies (One True Thing, Isbell et al., 2013), but I failed to consider 
that it depicts a daughter who is being investigated for helping her mother end her own 
life when her terminal cancer becomes too difficult to manage- content that was 
unintentionally morally charged. When I analyzed the data, the sad condition only served 
to add noise to the analysis, and after reviewing the clip more carefully, I decided to 
eliminate this condition because of this potential confound (for the full study description 
and analyses including the sad condition see Appendix H). Given that the primary goal of 
this research is to investigate whether disgust serves to direct momentarily active 
cognitive processing styles in a highly relevant context, the exclusion of the sad condition 
does not unduly limit the study findings or my ability to test my main hypothesis. This 
exclusion, however, does eliminate the secondary goal of including a different negative 
emotion for the purpose of comparison to the disgust conditions.  
Method 
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Participants, Procedure, and Design 
 Participants (n = 196) were recruited from psychology courses at UMass Amherst 
and took part in this study in exchange for course extra credit points. Participants first 
completed the group stereotype training (described above in the pilot study) by reading 
about the group information and then completing the identification task. Next, they then 
completed a distractor task where they colored for four minutes to equalize their mood 
and allow their cognitive baseline to settle after the group stereotype training. After this 
distractor, participants were primed with an either global or local processing style 
through the map task (identical to the one used in Study 3B) and then watched a video 
clip that induced either happiness or disgust. After these processing prime and affect 
manipulations, participants read a story about the target individual (Jack), where global 
trait information was provided (through Jack’s membership in either the moral group or 
immoral group) as well as local behavioral information (which consisted of morally 
ambiguous behaviors). Next, participants answered questions about the impression that 
they formed of the target, including moral evaluations and general evaluations (e.g, 
favorability). Finally, participants answered an affect manipulation check questionnaire 
and a short demographics questionnaire. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 8 
conditions in an affect (happy vs. disgust) by processing prime (global vs. local) by 
global trait information (moral vs. immoral stereotype) between-subjects factorial design.  
Forty-seven participants were excluded from the analysis because they failed 
manipulation checks. Eighteen participants were excluded for scoring less than 85% 
correct on the processing style map task manipulation. I also followed existing protocols 
for excluding participants with non-standard responses to affective manipulations (e.g., 
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Bower, Monteiro, & Gilligan, 1978; Schnall, et al., 2008; Storbeck & Clore, 2005), and 
22 participants who were more than three boxplot lengths away from the average 
affective responses to the videos (and therefore considered statistical outliers) were 
excluded from the analysis. Finally, 17 participants were also excluded because they had 
participated in the pretest of the Jack vignette (and I had no a priori method of preventing 
their subsequent participation in this study). A multi-way frequency analysis showed no 
relationship between the experimental conditions and exclusions from the analysis (all ps 
> .05). Of the remaining 149 participants (76.5% female), the average age is 19.94 years 
(SD = 1.72), and 79.9% are Caucasian, 2% are African-American, 10.7% are Asian, 4.0% 
are Hispanic, 2.7% are of mixed race, and 0.7% did not report their race.  
Tasks and Manipulations 
Group stereotype training. Participants followed the same instructions as those 
used in the pilot study described above, and then read vignettes describing four 
prototypical members from the moral group (the Vassers), the immoral group (the 
Haplins), and the control sporty group (the Watkins). The groups were presented as 
blocks, but their presentation order and the presentation order of the individuals within 
groups were both randomized. 
Identification task. Next, participants completed the same identification task 
from the pilot study, where they read 26 short identification blurbs, chose what group the 
individual belonged to, and then received feedback about their performance on each item.   
Distractor task. Participants then completed a coloring-based distraction task 
(also used in the pilot study), in which they were given 10 crayons of varying colors and 
a blank piece of paper upon which to draw. This task was designed to provide time to 
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allow the group stereotype information settle, and also to restore the participant’s 
affective and cognitive baseline prior to completing the main experimental manipulations 
and tasks. 
Processing style manipulation. To experimentally manipulating information 
processing styles, participants were then randomly assigned to complete either the global 
or local map task used in Study 3B (adapted from Förster, et al., 2008, see Figure 4). 
Affect manipulation. After the processing prime manipulation, participants 
watched one of two video clips to induce happiness (a scene from The Simpsons; Isbell, 
McCabe, et al., 2013) or disgust (a scene from Train Spotting used in Schnall et al., 
2008).   
Impression formation vignette and global trait information. Participants then 
read a story about an individual, named Jack. Global information was provided about 
Jack through his group membership, which was both verbally and visually described 
(using a small logo for the group, see Figure 11). Jack was initially introduced as a 
member of either the Vassars (moral group) or the Haplins (immoral group) and then a 
story was presented about Jack in which he engaged in a series of morally ambiguous 
behaviors (local behavioral information, see Appendix J) with the following instructions: 
“Please read all of the information below and form an impression of the character (Jack) 
in the story. After doing so, you will be asked some questions about the impression that 
you formed of Jack.”  
Moral Impression Formations 
Person-based judgments. After reading the story about Jack, participants 
answered three questions to assess their moral judgments about “Jack”, as a person, 
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which included whether they thought he was moral or immoral, morally right or morally 
wrong, and good or bad, (-5- Very immoral/morally wrong/bad to +50 Very 
moral/morally right/good, Cronbach’s α  = .904). 
Action-based judgments. After these items, they then answered three questions 
of a similar nature, but which assessed whether Jack’s actions were moral or immoral, 
morally right or morally wrong, and good or bad (on the same scale, Cronbach’s α  = 
.930). 
Moral thermometer ratings. Participants also assessed jack on a “Moral 
Thermometer”, where scores between 0 and 49 indicate that Jack is an immoral person, 
or someone who usually does the wrong thing and scores between 51 and 100 indicate 
that Jack is a moral person, or someone who usually does the right thing. 
Target Favorability Ratings 
Then, identical to the procedure in Study 3B, participants rated Jack on the feeling 
thermometer. Next, participants answered the overall favorability items used in Study 3B 
(judging how favorable, likable, positive Jack was). After standardizing these four items, 
I averaged them to create a composite favorability score (Cronbach’s α = .937). 
Target Trait Ratings 
Participants rated the extent to which Jack exhibited positive (average of friendly, 
sincere, trustworthy, warm, generous, honest, helpful, and conscientious; Cronbach’s α = 
.893) or negative personality traits (average of deceitful, mean, hostile, cruel, cold, 
arrogant, calculating, thoughtless, and selfish; Cronbach’s α = .832) on an 11-point scale 
(from 0-Not at all, 5-Somewhat, 10-Extremely). These traits were similar to those used 
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for Study 3B, but instead included moral traits, as opposed to sociability traits (which 
were the focus of Study 3B). 
Impression Formation Process 
Amount of information used for impression formation. Also identical to Study 
3B procedure, participants next answered a question asking how much information they 
considered when forming their impression. 
Impression clarity. Then participants answered two questions (also from Study 
3B) about the clarity and ease with which they formed their impression (Cronbach’s α = 
.617). 
Manipulation Checks 
Global trait information manipulation check. Participants were then asked two 
items about Jack’s group membership, the first was a free-response answer where they 
were asked to name the group that Jack belonged to, and the following item was the same 
question, but with multiple-choice answers of the group names. Recall was very high, 
with 95.7% (n = 220) of the final sample remembering Jack’s group membership (close 
alternative spellings of group names in the free response were coded as correct).   
Affect manipulation check. Next, participants were asked to indicate the extent 
to which they felt a variety of emotions while they were watching the video (i.e., sad, 
happy, disgusted, angry, certain of their beliefs, upset, anxious, confident, tense, grossed 
out, tense, queasy, observant, bored, tired, calm, confused, sickened, distracted, afraid, 
thoughtless, amused). Participants reported their responses on a 7-point scale (from 1-Not 
at all, to 7-Very Much). Responses for emotion items were averaged together to create 
composite emotion scores: happy and amused (Cronbach’s α = .829); sad and upset 
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(Cronbach’s α = .828); disgusted, sickened, queasy, and grossed out (Cronbach’s α = 
.963); and tense, anxious, and afraid (Cronbach’s α = .793). 
Group-based moral judgments manipulation check. Participants then 
answered three questions each about the Vassers, Haplins, and Watkins groups to assess 
their moral judgments about those groups. These three items were identical to those used 
in the group stereotype pilot study (described earlier), and composite items were created 
from all three judgments for each group (Vassers: Cronbach’s α = .937, Haplins: 
Cronbach’s α = .976, Watkins: Cronbach’s α = .941). 
Finally, participants completed a basic demographics questionnaire, which asked 
them to report their age, race, and gender.  
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
Affect manipulation. Participants in the happy video condition reported feeling 
significantly more happiness than those in the disgust condition, as revealed by a 2 
(happy score v. disgust score) x 2 (happy video v. disgust video) x 2 (global v. local) x 2 
(moral vs. immoral group stereotype) mixed ANOVA. An interaction between reported 
affect and the affect condition shows that the videos were successful at manipulating 
affect, F(1,141) = 583.90, p < .001, ηp2 = .805. Those in the happy condition reported 
significantly more happiness (M = 4.49, SD = 1.60) than disgust (M = 1.47, SD = 0.61; 
t(71) = 13.65, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.69), or sadness (M = 1.60, SD = 0.81; t(71) = 
12.45, p < .001, Cohen’s d =1.377 .Likewise, those in the disgust condition reported 
significantly more disgust (M = 5.79, SD = 1.15) than happiness (M = 1.82, SD = 1.00; 
t(76) = 20.68, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.37) and sadness (M = 2.32, SD = 1.27; t(76) = 
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21.68, p < .001, Cohen’s d =1.926. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests reveal that those 
in the disgust condition did report feeling slightly more anger, sadness, and anxiety than 
those in the happy condition, (all ps < .019). Those in both the happy and disgust 
conditions reported feeling significantly more of the target emotion than anger, sadness, 
or anxiety (all ps < .001). 
Group-based moral judgments manipulation check. The group stereotype 
training was successful. A significant main effect of group type revealed responses in the 
expected direction, F(2,282) = 295.46, p < .001, ηp2 = .677. Participants viewed the 
moral group as more moral (M = 9.72, SD = 2.18) than the immoral group (M = 3.29, SD 
= 2.25; t(148) = 19.85, p < .001, Cohen’s d =1.630) and the control group (M = 7.27, SD 
= 1.62; t(148) = 10.71, p < .001, Cohen’s d =.885). They also viewed the immoral group 
as more immoral than the control group, t(148) = -16.41, p < .001, Cohen’s d =-1.358. 
Moral Judgments 
 Action- versus person-based judgments. I compared participants’ judgments of 
the target “as a person” to their judgments of the target’s actions. Person-based judgments 
and action-based moral judgments differed overall, with participants judging the target’s 
actions slightly more severely (M = -.76, SD = 1.33) than Jack as a person (M = -.41 SD = 
1.56), F(1,141) = 23.66, p < .001, ηp2 = .144. Aside from this main effect, differences 
between person-based and action-based judgments varied as a function of processing 
style and emotional manipulation, F(1,141) = 7.35, p = .008, ηp2 = .050. As shown in 
Figure 12, these results support the cognitive malleability account, as those processing 
globally (global + happy and local + disgust conditions) were more likely to incorporate 
the target’s actions into their overall impression of him as a person (see Table 7). In 
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contrast, those processing locally (local + happy and global + disgust conditions) were 
more likely to judge the target and their actions differently, particularly by judging the 
person less severely than the person’s actions. Notably, participants in the disgust 
condition were not significantly more punitive in their judgments of the target or his 
actions when compared to those in the happy condition (within-subjects interaction: 
F(1,141) = 1.76, p = .187; between-subjects main effect: F(1,141) = .171, p = .680). 
Unexpectedly, the group membership information did not influence the degree to which 
the actions were incorporated into the person-based moral judgment (all relevant Fs < 
1.94). 
 Moral thermometer ratings. Analyzing participant’s ratings of Jack on the 
moral thermometer revealed a significant main effect in the expected direction for Jack’s 
membership in either a moral group (M = 49.67, SD = 14.04) or an immoral group (M = 
44.42, SD = 15.42), F(1,141) = 5.65, p = .019, ηp2 = .039. Moral thermometer ratings of 
Jack also varied as a function of processing prime, emotional manipulation, and group 
stereotype information, F(1,141) = 5.03, p = .026, ηp2 = .034. As shown in Table 8 and 
Figure 13, this result supports the cognitive malleability account. Those processing 
globally (global + happy and local + disgust conditions) relied more on Jack’s group 
membership information when forming their moral impression of him, as compared to 
those processing locally (local + happy and global + disgust conditions). The moral 
thermometer ratings were highly correlated with participants’ person-based moral 
judgments (Pearson’s r(149) = .780, p < .001), as well as the action-based moral 
judgments (Pearson’s r(149) = .729, p < .001). 
Target Favorability Ratings 
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 Participants’ favorability ratings of Jack also varied as a function of affect and 
processing style, F(1,149) = 5.07, p = .026, ηp2 = .035. Favorability followed the same 
pattern as the person-based moral judgments of Jack. Specifically, participants feeling 
happy and globally primed (M = -.18, SD = .79), and those feeling disgusted and locally 
primed (M = -.12, SD = .92) rated Jack less favorably than those feeling happy and 
locally primed (M = .15, SD = .81), or those feeling disgusted and globally primed (M = 
.13, SD = 1.10). As shown in Figure 14, these results support the cognitive malleability 
account. No other effects were significant, all ps > .066. 
Target Trait Judgments  
 Analyzing participants’ target trait ratings on the positive and negative personality 
traits, only Jack’s group membership influenced their relative judgments, F(1,141) = 
6.45, p = .012, ηp2 = .044. Specifically, when Jack was a member of the immoral group, 
participants’ mean endorsement of negative traits was higher (M = 4.29, SD = 1.59) than 
their mean endorsement of positive traits (M = 3.57, SD = 1.54, t(72) = -2.28, p = .026, 
Cohen’s d = -.267). This essentially demonstrates that the immoral group membership 
information successfully manipulated beliefs about whether the target was a positive 
(good) or a negative (bad) person. A different pattern emerged when Jack was a member 
of the moral group, such that participants equally endorsed positive traits (M = 4.23, SD = 
1.32) and negative traits (M = 3.99, SD = 1.38,; t(75) = .94, p = .35).  
Impression Formation Process 
Jack’s group membership significantly influenced the amount of information 
participants used in forming their impressions, F(1,141) = 3.93, p = .049, ηp2 = .027, such 
that participants reported using slightly more information when forming an impression 
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when Jack was a member of the moral group (M = 3.37, SD = .54), as compared to when 
Jack was a member of immoral group (M = 3.16, SD = .78). No other main effects or 
interactions emerged, (all Fs < 2.4). Additionally, when analyzing participant’s reports of 
impression clarity, no significant effects emerged (all Fs < 1.02). 
Discussion 
 The results suggest that information processing styles influence moral 
impressions through the incorporation of the actions into the overall moral judgment of 
the person, such that those processing globally (global + happy and local + disgust 
conditions) tend to equate people with their actions, whereas those processing locally 
(local + happy and global + disgust conditions) are more likely to differentiate between a 
person’s actions and their personality. Further, both the disgust and happy affect 
manipulations served to direct the momentarily dominant (primed) processing style to 
influence these judgments, providing support for the cognitive malleability account. One 
explanation for this finding, is that perhaps processing in a more global manner promotes 
categorical thinking about morality, and therefore participants processing globally use 
more “black and white” criteria for moral judgment: if Jack’s actions are bad, Jack, 
himself, is also judged to be bad. Local processing, in contrast, supports a more nuanced, 
less categorical view of morality, whereby participants could think that Jack’s actions 
were morally wrong, but could separate their judgments of his actions from their 
judgment of Jack, as a person. 
Interestingly, the group stereotype only seemed to interact with processing primes 
and affect conditions for the moral thermometer ratings, and not judgments of Jack (as a 
person) or his actions. It is possible that the moral thermometer rating captured a wider 
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moral impression of Jack than did the items asking participants to morally judge Jack or 
his actions, which could account for this discrepancy.  
Additionally, cognitive processing styles and affect interacted similarly to 
influence favorability judgments of Jack. It is unclear from this experimental design, 
however, if these effects occurred independent of one another, if moral judgments 
influenced favorability judgments, or vice versa. The high correlation between the moral 
thermometer and the feeling thermometer (r[149] = .782, p < .001) suggests that even 
though participants were instructed to rate Jack on different constructs (social vs. moral) 
the thermometer ratings perhaps captured the same overall impression of Jack. The high 
agreement between these two items provides support for the notion that social and moral 
impression formation mechanisms work similarly to one another, and that cognitive 
processing styles are one potential theoretical mechanism to examine how people form 
moral judgments of others, especially when considering their actions. 
 Finally, previous research has shown that disgust creates more punitive moral 
judgments of ambiguous behavior (Schnall et al., 2008), and this effect was only partially 
replicated– but not for a global processing style, which is usually considered the default 
style (Bruner, 1957). In the current study, however, it is when participants are primed 
with a local processing style that I found the typical effect emerge, such that people 
feeling disgusted were more likely to judge a person harshly as compared to those feeling 
happiness. These results suggest that moral judgments and related decision-making tasks 
might induce local processing as a natural default style. For instance, processing style 
researchers argue that tasks in which people are motivated to process information in a 
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detailed manner, especially decisions for which they feel accountable, are more likely to 
naturally induce a local processing style (Bodenhausen, Kramer, et al., 1994). 
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CHAPTER 6 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This dissertation had three primary research goals. The first goal was to extend 
understanding of the cognitive malleability approach by examining whether affect 
(specifically disgust) and initial processing styles interact to influence moral judgments 
and attention to emotional stimuli. The second goal of this research was to examine 
whether disgust influences cognition in basic cognitive tasks (i.e., visual attentional) and 
higher-level cognitive tasks (i.e., impression formation). The third goal of this work was 
to determine if disgust influences cognition in both low relevance contexts (neutral 
stimuli, social judgments) and high relevance contexts (emotional stimuli, moral 
judgments).  
Specific Contributions of this Dissertation 
Visual attention. This dissertation provides some of the first evidence to suggest 
that both positive and negative emotional stimuli can either boost or bias visual attention. 
What few studies exist that examine disgust and its influence on attention have suggested 
that disgusting stimuli is more distracting than fearful stimuli when completing neutral 
cognitive tasks (Carretié, et al., 2011), and that disgust slows attention when attending to 
non-disgusting stimuli (Krusemark & Li, 2011). Likewise, only a few researchers have 
examined attentional biases for positive stimuli, but this research has generally focused 
on individual differences, and found that optimistic people process happy stimuli faster 
than pessimistic individuals (Segerstrom, 2001). Therefore, my research not only 
provides new evidence in the emotional stimuli attentional domain, but it also introduces 
the information processing context as an important moderator of how different discrete 
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emotional stimuli influence attention to either emotional or neutral stimuli. Thus, my 
research calls into question the notion that negatively valenced affective stimuli always 
distracts attention during neutral tasks, and prompts other investigators to consider initial 
processing styles when drawing conclusions about affective influences on attention. 
Social impression formation. My dissertation also establishes that disgust can 
influence cognition in a low disgust relevant task (i.e., social impression formation). The 
social cognition literature has many examples of how affect influences cognitive 
processes, and early research on this topic examined how general affective states (e.g., 
positive and negative moods) impacted cognition. Given that discrete emotions often 
have eliciting causes, and often are more consciously experienced, the affect-as-
information approach suggests that people are more likely to correct for information 
provided by a discrete emotion when making judgments or decisions, as opposed to 
information provided by a diffuse mood state (which does not usually have a specific, 
eliciting cause). Importantly, this informational correction generally only occurs when 
people consciously consider their emotional state. In the last few decades, social 
cognitive researchers have investigated how discrete emotional states influence cognition, 
and have found that even strongly felt emotions can influence cognition (see Isbell & 
Lair, 2013 for a review). However, to date, few studies have considered how disgust 
influences cognition, with most of the research on disgust examining its direct influence 
on judgments (i.e., what people think, not how people think). Additionally, most of the 
research on disgust has been conducted in highly disgust relevant domains (ones in which 
disgust is not likely to be corrected for, e.g., moral judgment). Thus, this dissertation 
provides one of the first steps to understanding how disgust influences cognition, by 
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demonstrating that disgust’s influence on cognition can also generalize to low relevance 
tasks (just as other intensely felt emotions also generally influence cognition). 
Moral Impression Formation. This dissertation also contributes to the moral 
cognition literature, as it establishes that cognitive processing styles influence moral 
judgments. In the last decade, there has been a surge in moral cognition research, and by 
extension, moral social cognitive research. Little research, to date, has considered the role 
of information processing styles in moral judgments. Instead, much of the research in 
moral cognition has revolved around differences in utilitarian and deontological 
judgment, and has therefore examined individual differences or situations that might 
promote these particular styles of thinking (e.g., Bartels, 2008; Moore, Clark, & Kane, 
2008). Only recently have researchers begun to examine the role of construal level 
(distance, point-of-view, abstraction) in moral judgments, and this research has generally 
found that abstract thinking leads to more punitive judgments (Agerström & Björklund, 
2009; Eyal, et al., 2008; Libby, et al., 2009). Likewise, research has recently shown that 
affective experiences are important drivers of moral judgments (e.g., Mendez, Anders, & 
Shapira, 2005; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006), and that disgust tends to produce harsher 
moral judgments (e.g., Wheatley & Haidt, 2005; Schnall, et al., 2008). Therefore, the 
results of Study 4 contribute to the moral cognition field by providing evidence that 
global and local cognitive processing styles influence moral judgment. Further, I also 
provide evidence that affective influences on moral judgments (a topic of great interest in 
the moral literature) are dependent on the initially active cognitive processing style, 
which is a finding that prompts researchers in the moral cognition field to consider initial 
cognitive processing styles within the moral context.  
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Additionally, my research on disgust and moral judgment also clarifies the current 
thinking regarding disgust’s influence on moral judgments, particularly the notion that 
feeling physically disgusted always leads to a harsher moral judgment. The results of 
Study 4 contradict this view, as the results demonstrate that both happiness and physical 
disgust can lead to harsher moral judgments, but that these harsher judgments are 
dependent on affect and one’s currently active processing style. As my dissertation 
provides evidence on this matter for judgments of morally ambiguous behaviors, future 
research should consider whether affect and initial processing styles influence judgments 
for different types of moral violations (e.g., purity). 
Dissertation Goals 
Primary research goals. Taken together, these studies fulfill my primary 
research goals, as they demonstrate support for the cognitive malleability approach in two 
domains that have not been previously examined: attentional bias for emotional stimuli, 
and moral judgments. My second goal for the dissertation was also fulfilled, as my 
dissertation shows that disgust influences cognition in basic cognitive tasks (Study 2) as 
well as higher-level cognitive tasks (Studies 3 & 4). Further, in regards to my third 
research goal, my dissertation demonstrates that disgust interacts with initial cognitive 
processing styles in domains where disgust is of low relevance (social judgments), as 
well as in areas where disgust is of high relevance (moral judgments, disgusting stimuli). 
My research demonstrates that disgust acts as a stop signal on one’s currently active 
processing style. 
Disgust versus sadness. A secondary goal of this dissertation was to determine if 
disgust produced unique cognitive effects from other negative emotions. Given that prior 
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research that explored the cognitive malleability approach compared happiness and 
sadness, I designed this dissertation to compare disgust to both happiness and sadness. 
Unfortunately, the only study in which sadness served as a reliable comparison for 
disgust was in Study 2, where sadness sometimes acted similarly to happiness, and other 
times acted similarly to disgust– which does not provide enough evidence for a 
conclusive understanding of how disgust might be similar to or different from sadness. 
Study 1 did not produce any interpretable effects, so comparing disgust and sadness in 
this study was precluded by null results. Study 3 (due to financial constraints) and Study 
4 (due to the unintentional moral confound of video clip) also required elimination of the 
sadness condition.  
Therefore, future research should consider how disgust might be similar to or 
different from other negative stimuli, particularly sadness and fear, because fear 
represents more of a threat-based emotion as compared to sadness (Olatunji & Sawchuk, 
2005; Russell, 1980). These two emotional comparisons to disgust could help separate 
valence from threat, and determine whether valence, threat, or both, provide the 
information that is conferred on initial processing styles in the cognitive malleability 
approach. Furthermore, comparing different types of disgust (e.g., moral, visceral, or 
contamination) will also shed much light on the type of informational cue that disgust 
might confer on initial processing styles. Finally, not only does this dissertation begin to 
fill the gap in the social cognitive literature regarding this topic, but it also opens the door 
to future research that might investigate if people who are predisposed to feel disgust 
(i.e., those with high disgust sensitivity, Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009) are differentially 
impacted in a wide array of social-cognitive contexts. 
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Conclusions 
For decades, negative affect was generally known to narrow cognitive focus, 
whereas positive affect was generally known to broaden cognitive focus. Over the years, 
however, more exceptions to these general rules have emerged and researchers began the 
tiresome process of attempting to fit findings into existing theoretical frameworks that 
simply did not adequately describe the influence of affect on cognition. Although 
emotional theories have become more nuanced in recent history, there is still a glaring 
hole in this body of work, namely, systematic manipulations of cognitive processing 
styles. Relying on default processing styles is no longer sufficient when attempting to 
explain how emotion interacts with cognition, as this only sheds light on one half of the 
interactive process. Cognitive processing is extremely flexible, and often changes due to 
daily tasks and demands, which means that much of what we learn about emotion in 
experiments needs to reflect this cognitive landscape. This dissertation helps extend the 
cognitive malleability approach by showing that even a strongly felt emotion (e.g., 
disgust) interacts with cognition in a malleable way. The results from Studies 2, 3, and 4, 
taken together, support and extend the cognitive malleability account by demonstrating 
that affect interacts with initial processing styles for attention to emotional stimuli, 
impression formation, and moral judgments. Further, this set of studies provides 
important, novel contributions to the visual attention, social cognition, and morality 
domains, and also provides a comprehensive foundation upon which to build future 
investigations of the important emotion of disgust. 
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Table 1. Descriptive means and standard deviations for affective ratings across 
conditions. 
Study 1A 
 Happy Sad Disgust Anger Fear 
 M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) 
Happy 4.55(1.29)sdaf23 1.55(.80)hdaf23 1.21(.68)hsaf23 1.36(.78)hsdf23 1.89(1.05)hsda23 
Sad 1.57(.56)sdaf1 4.60(1.38)hdaf1 2.54(1.48)hsaf13 3.88(1.93)hsdf13 3.39(1.43)hsda1 
Disgust 1.76(1.00)sdaf1 4.03(1.43)haf1 3.94(1.37)haf12 4.88(1.98)hsdf12 3.46(1.36)hsda1 
Study 1B 
 Happy Sad Disgust Anger Fear 
 M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) 
Happy 4.60(1.29)sdaf23 1.71(.88)hda23 1.21(.52)hsf23 1.15(.51)hsf23 1.74(.92)hda23 
Sad 1.62(.71)saf1 4.60(1.18)hdaf13 1.98(1.34)saf13 3.60(2.10)hsdf1 3.01(1.39)hsda1 
Disgust 1.99(.91)sdaf1 3.91(1.43)hf12 4.05(1.23)hf12 4.21(1.95)hf1 3.11(1.35)hsda1 
Note. Letters indicate significant paired-sample, simple-effects comparisons within 
conditions (all comparisons within the same row; h = happy, s = sad, d = disgust, a = 
anger, f = fear). Numbers indicate significant independent sample, simple-effects 
comparisons between conditions (all comparisons within the same column; 1 = 
comparisons to happy, 2 = comparisons to sad, 3 = comparisons to disgust). 
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Table 2. Reaction times in milliseconds as a function of central image type, affect 
condition, and trial compatibility. 
Emotional Central Image 
 Incompatible Trial Compatible Trial 
 M SD M SD 
Happy 276.08 64.36 267.41 61.73 
Sad 270.92 71.30 265.08 72.48 
Disgust 285.45 64.35 280.86 68.87 
Neutral Central Image 
 Incompatible Trial Compatible Trial 
 M SD M SD 
Happy 293.04 63.98 280.60 63.66 
Sad 288.63 60.03 267.03 62.63 
Disgust 309.26 66.88 275.27 72.85 
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Table 3a. Reaction times in milliseconds as a function of central image type, affect 
condition, processing prime, and trial compatibility. 
Emotional Central Image 
 Global Prime Local Prime 
 Incompatible Compatible Incompatible Compatible 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Happy 285.36 84.80 276.87 62.52 296.04 78.06 305.20 88.86 
Sad 308.81 59.27 303.79 54.44 290.07 59.17 289.22 57.89 
Disgust 286.15 70.55 292.50 65.16 297.34 61.75 295.90 60.52 
Neutral Central Image 
 Global Prime Local Prime 
 Incompatible Compatible Incompatible Compatible 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Happy 281.71 75.22 287.87 91.77 294.13 73.27 293.35 67.47 
Sad 306.98 56.36 304.58 53.50 291.46 60.86 293.47 61.47 
Disgust 296.06 73.38 291.43 64.41 294.77 55.68 301.49 58.66 
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Table 3b. Reaction times differences in milliseconds (incompatible – compatible) as a 
function of central image type, affect condition, and processing prime. 
Emotional Central Image 
 
Global Prime Local Prime 
 
M SD M SD 
Happy  8.50 47.59 -9.16 29.08 
Sad 5.02 20.49 0.85 18.35 
Disgust -6.35 22.17 1.44 22.19 
Neutral Central Image 
 
Global Prime Local Prime 
 
M SD M SD 
Happy -6.15 45.52 0.78 24.45 
Sad 2.40 24.48 -2.01 25.65 
Disgust 4.63 31.03 -6.72 34.55 
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Table 4. Feeling thermometer ratings as a function of processing style, affect 
manipulation, and social stereotype. 
Extroverted Sales Representative 
 Global Prime Local Prime 
 M SD M SD 
Happy Story 73.22 13.84 63.70 17.71 
Disgust Story 67.27 16.75 70.12 19.12 
Introverted Librarian 
 Global Prime Local Prime 
 M SD M SD 
Happy Story 67.20 15.29 69.98 13.70 
Disgust Story 69.60 15.35 66.57 15.82 
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Table 5. Overall favorability ratings as a function of processing style, affect 
manipulation, and social stereotype. 
Extroverted Sales Representative 
 Global Prime Local Prime 
 M SD M SD 
Happy Story 2.57 1.45 1.83 2.15 
Disgust Story 1.74 1.98 2.02 2.07 
Introverted Librarian 
 Global Prime Local Prime 
 M SD M SD 
Happy Story 1.91 1.68 2.34 1.59 
Disgust Story 2.12 1.91 2.06 1.87 
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Table 6. Overall clarity and ease of impression formation as a function of processing 
style, affect manipulation, and social stereotype. 
Extroverted Sales Representative 
 Global Prime Local Prime 
 M SD M SD 
Happy Story 5.63 3.36 4.98 3.41 
Disgust Story 5.34 3.42 6.16 3.78 
Introverted Librarian 
 Global Prime Local Prime 
 M SD M SD 
Happy Story 4.51 3.55 5.25 3.53 
Disgust Story 5.36 3.53 4.62 3.45 
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Table 7. Within-subjects person-based and action-based moral judgments as a function of 
processing style and emotional manipulation. 
Global Processing Prime 
 Person Judgments Action Judgments 
 M SD M SD 
Happy Video -.75 1.29 -.82 .95 
Disgust Video -.25 1.73 -.82 1.60 
     
Local Processing Prime 
 Person Judgments Action Judgments 
 M SD M SD 
Happy Video -.03 1.57 -.48 1.33 
Disgust Video -.66 1.56 -.92 1.36 
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Table 8. Moral thermometer ratings as a function of processing style, affect, and moral 
group membership. 
Moral Group Jack 
 Global Prime Local Prime 
 M SD M SD 
Happy Video 53.95 12.51 48.33 14.68 
Disgust Video 48.31 14.91 48.10 14.24 
Immoral Jack 
 Global Prime Local Prime 
 M SD M SD 
Happy Video 36.79 12.27 49.00 11.07 
Disgust Video 47.00 19.30 42.95 14.97 
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Figure 1.  Navon (1977) task stimuli, here a global letter F, with local letters H. 
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(a) Ebbinghaus Illusion figures shown to participants in Studies 1 and 2 
 
(b) Answer options presented to participants on the following screen. 
 
Figure 2. Stimuli used for the Ebbinghaus Illusion task to measure attentional scope. 
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Figure 3. Participants’ estimates of the relative sizes of the central circles in the 
Ebbinghaus illusion figures as a function of affect condition and processing prime 
(reverse scaled, excluding the disgust condition (error bars are +/- 1 SE). 
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(a) Example of state presentation image: 
 
(b) Global question “Which is the correct state shape?” answer options: 
 
Figure 4. Example stimuli from cognitive processing map task prime, adapted from 
Förster, Liberman, and Kuschel, 2008.  
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(a) Compatible Trial (with example emotional central image) 
          
(b) Compatible Trial (with example neutral central image) 
           
(c) Incompatible Trial (with example emotional central image) 
         
(d) Incompatible Flanker (with example neutral central image) 
          
Figure 5. Emotional Flanker example trials by compatibility and central image type 
(images from IAPS). 
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(a) Emotional Central Image 
 
(b) Neutral Central Image 
 
Figure 6. Emotional Flanker Pilot Study reaction time as a function of trial type, affect 
condition, and central image type (error bars are +/- 1 SE). 
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(a) Central emotional image trials (incompatible: NNENN, compatible: EEEEE) 
 
(b) Central neutral image trials (incompatible: EENEE, compatible: NNNNN) 
 
Figure 7. Reaction time difference scores in milliseconds (incompatible– compatible) as 
a function of processing prime, affect, and central image type (error bars are +/- 1 SE).   
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(a) Extroverted Sales Representative 
 
(b) Introverted Librarian 
 
 
Figure 8. Feeling thermometer ratings as a function of processing style, emotional 
manipulation, and social stereotype (error bars are +/- 1 SE). 
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(a) Extroverted Sales Representative 
 
(b) Introverted Librarian 
 
 
Figure 9. Overall favorability as a function of processing style, emotional manipulation, 
and social stereotype (error bars are +/- 1 SE). 
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(a) Extroverted Sales Representative 
 
(b) Introverted Librarian 
 
Figure 10. Overall clarity and ease of impression as a function of processing style, affect 
manipulation, and social stereotype (error bars are +/- 1 SE). 
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(a) Moral Group Logo 
 
(b) Immoral Group Logo 
 
(c) Control/Sporty Group 
 
Figure 11. The logos presented with each group description and Jack vignette. 
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Figure 12. Person-based and action-based moral judgments as a function of processing 
style and affect (error bars are +/- 1 SE). 
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Figure 13. Moral thermometer ratings as a function of processing style, affect, and group 
stereotype information (error bars are +/- 1 SE). 
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Figure 14. Target favorability ratings of Jack as a function of processing prime and affect 
(error bars are +/- 1 SE). 
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Appendix A 
LIFE EVENT INVENTORY TASK INSTRUCTIONS 
The following prompt was used in Study 1 and Study 3B: 
Please think about the last few months.  What made you really feel 
happy/sad/physically disgusted recently and continues to make you feel 
happy/sad/physically disgusted even when you think about it today?  Please take time 
to imagine what this event was like that made you really feel happy/sad/physically 
disgusted and try to relive it again in your mind’s eye.  Then describe what made you 
feel happy/sad/physically disgusted as vividly and in as much detail as you can. 
 
The following questions may help you with this task: What were you feeling?  
What made you feel that way?  What was important for you?  What lead up to that 
feeling?  Did that event set off some chain of thoughts or fantasies that enhanced your 
feelings?  What were they?  
 
Please describe the event as vividly and in as much detail as you can. You’ll be 
asked to reflect more on your story later in the experiment.   
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Appendix B 
STUDY 2 IMAGE SELECTION PRETEST 
To create a flanker task that would integrally induce affect, emotional images 
were pretested for eliciting the appropriate emotions. Participants were asked to rate a 
series of different images on how well each image elicited a target emotion. From these 
ratings, three images were selected for each target emotion (happy, sad, disgust, and 
neutral). 
Method 
Participants and Design 
 After completing Study 1A, participants completed a map task that equally 
primed global and local processing styles (procedure described in the emotional flanker 
pilot study). Then participants watched a short neutral video clip about the U.S. Postal 
system (to equalize mood after Study 1A). After these tasks, participants completed the 
image pretest. A total of 178 participants (80.3% female) from the psychology participant 
pool were recruited and received one research credit as compensation to be used as extra 
credit in their psychology course. The age of the participants is 19.87 years (SD = 1.38) 
and the sample is 75.3% Caucasian, 5.6% African-American, 12.9% Asian, 2.2% 
Hispanic, 1.7% mixed race, 0.6% of another race. An additional 1.7% of the participants 
chose not to report their race. Participants were randomly assigned to rate half of the 
image set, and to either a set image presentation order or a randomized image 
presentation order. 
Materials and Measures 
Photographic stimuli. Twenty-eight images (seven for each target emotion: 
happy, sad, disgusting, and neutral) from the International Affective Picture System 
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(IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) were selected for pretesting. The IAPS set of 
images includes approximately 700 images, all of which are rated for how pleasant and 
arousing they are on a 1 (highly unpleasant/low arousal) to 8 (highly pleasant/high 
arousal) scale by a large dataset (N > 10,000). The images at the extremes of the arousal 
scale are quite graphic in the content, with extremely unpleasant, high arousal images 
being quite violent, frightening, disgusting, and overall distressing. Likewise, those at the 
other end, the extremely pleasant, high arousal images tend to be pornographic in nature. 
For these reasons, the overall pleasantness and arousal ratings for the 28 images I 
selected for the pretest were numerically closer to the middle of these arousal and 
pleasantness scales, even though they varied in terms of pleasantness according to 
whether the image evoked happiness, sadness, disgust, or a relatively neutral affect. 
Image Ratings. Participants rated each image on three dimensions. First, they 
were asked to rate how pleasant or unpleasant the image was on a -5 (very unpleasant) to 
a +5 (very pleasant) scale. Then, on the next screen they rated the extent to which that 
image made them feel the target emotion (happy, sad, disgust, or unemotional) on a 0 
(Not at all) to 10 (Very Much) scale. Last, they were asked to rate the extent to which that 
image was “visually interesting, or eye-catching” on a 0 (Not at all Interesting) to 10 
(Very Interesting) scale. For each of these ratings, the image remained in the upper 
central portion of the screen for their reference.  
Results and Discussion 
 Participant responses for the pleasantness, target emotion evocation, and visual 
interest ratings did not differ as a function of presentation order (randomized vs. set), all 
ts < 1. Therefore, this condition was removed from the analysis and descriptive statistics 
were examined for all images. First, I ranked the images by participants’ reports of target 
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emotion evocation rating, as this was the variable of greatest importance to the pretest 
(i.e., whether or not the image evoked the intended emotion). Given that these images 
would be used in the emotional flanker task, the five highest-rated images for the target 
emotion evocation ratings were then compared for their levels of arousal and visual 
interestingness, in order to create consistency across the different emotional flanker block 
presentations. Table 9 shows the results of the final 12 images that were selected for use 
in the emotional flanker task. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 !118!
Table 9. Mean ratings for image pretest taken from the IAPS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image Target Emotion Pleasantness Visual Interest 
Happy  M SD M SD M SD 
Block 1 Puppies 8.54 1.75 4.15 1.08 5.59 2.20 
Block 2 Girls giggling 8.50 1.65 4.11 1.32 6.25 2.25 
Block 3 
Older people 
biking 
8.06 2.20 3.66 1.83 6.50 2.40 
Disgust 
Block 1 Flies on pie 8.75 2.21 -3.26 2.54 4.64 3.13 
Block 2 Dirty toilet 7.80 2.87 -4.28 1.79 3.81 2.87 
Block 3 
Cockroaches on 
Pizza 
7.13 2.84 -3.16 1.81 3.66 3.30 
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Table 9. Continued 
 Image Target Emotion Pleasantness Visual Interest 
Sad  M SD M SD M SD 
Block 1  Boy crying 7.12 2.61 -2.90 2.02 5.79 2.89 
Block 2 
Parents at 
cemetary 
6.52 2.73 -2.53 2.05 5.53 2.35 
Block 3 Girl crying 6.48 2.75 -2.66 1.93 5.33 2.72 
Neutral 
Block 1 A Building 7.44 2.97 0.05 1.28 6.74 2.27 
Block 2 Bus profile 7.34 3.01 0.24 1.11 5.01 2.68 
Block 3 Card dealer 6.76 3.11 0.12 1.61 3.48 2.83 
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Appendix C 
STUDY 3A 
Method 
Participants, Design, and Procedure 
 A total of 296 participants from the psychology participant pool were recruited for 
the study and received 1 research credit as compensation to be applied to psychology 
courses for extra credit. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 12 conditions in a 
2 (global v. local processing prime) x 3 (happy, sad, disgust) x 2 (introverted librarian v. 
extroverted sales representative) experimental design. 
 Participants first completed a cognitive processing priming manipulation that 
induced either global or local cognitive processing. They then watched videos that elicit 
disgust, happiness, or sadness. Next, participants read a vignette that describes a global 
trait that is later contradicted by detailed information- the purpose of which is to be able 
to determine what information the participants focused on (the global information or the 
detailed, local information). Participants then answered questions about the impression 
they formed, including favorability ratings, trait assessments of the individual they read 
about, and how clearly and easily they were able to form their impression. Then they 
answered questions about their emotional reactions. This emotional assessment will 
include both how they are feeling at that moment, as well as how they felt when they 
were watching the video. The reason these questions are not completed directly after 
watching the video is due to the possibility of correction effects that have been found 
when participants merely report their current mood (Macfarland, White, & Newth, 2003). 
Finally, participants will complete a demographics questionnaire and then will be 
debriefed, granted their research credit, and dismissed.   
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I excluded 29 participants, including those who were statistical outliers in their 
responses to the video clips (n = 15). I also excluded those who answered less than 85% 
correct on the Navon priming task (n = 12), and those who could not recall Carol’s job (n 
= 2).  A multi-way frequency analysis revealed there were no significant differences in 
these 29 exclusions (10% of total sample) across conditions, χ2(18) = 8.73, p = .966. Of 
the 267 remaining participants (80.9% female), the average age is 20.15 years (SD = 
1.65), and the sample is 85.4% Caucasian, 2.6% African-American, 10.1% Asian, .4% 
Hispanic, 1.1% Mixed race, and 0.4% of participants chose not to report their race.  
Tasks and Measures 
Processing prime. Global and local processing styles were primed using the same 
letter identification task as in Study 1 and in the main Study 2 (Navon, 1977; procedure 
from Förster, Liberman, & Kuschel, 2008). Participants’ total accuracy score (out of 80) 
were used to determine those who were sufficiently primed (in this case the cut-off was 
85%). Those trials in which the participant took longer than 1000 ms to respond were 
dropped from the accuracy count. 
Affect manipulation. Participants watched one of three video clips selected to 
induce happiness (a scene from The Simpsons, Isbell, McCabe, et al., 2013), sadness (a 
scene from One True Thing, Isbell , McCabe, et al., 2013), or disgust, (a scene from 
Train Spotting, Schnall, et al., 2008).   
Global trait information. The identical procedure (as described in Study 3B) 
was used to manipulate global trait information about the target, portraying the target as 
either an introverted librarian or extroverted sales representative. The only difference 
from Study 3B, is that the target was named Carol instead of Jennifer. 
General Evaluations of the Target 
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Feeling thermometer rating. Participants rated the target on a feeling 
thermometer using the identical procedure from Study 3B. 
Overall favorability. Identical to Study 3B, participants also judged how 
favorable, likable, and positive they perceived the target to be, which were averaged 
together for an overall favorability score (Cronbach’s α = .913). 
Target Trait Judgments 
Social thermometer rating. Participants rated Carol’s extroversion and 
introversion using the social thermometer scale (using the same procedure described in 
Study 3B). 
Trait ratings. Next, participants rated the extent to which Carol embodied 
particular personality traits on an 11-point scale (from 0-Not at all, 5-Somewhat, 10-
Extremely). Extroverted traits were averaged together (talkative, self-confident, 
extroverted, sociable, outgoing; Cronbach’s α = .863), as were introverted traits 
(withdrawn, shy, introverted, a loner, and quiet; Cronbach’s α = .740).  
Impression Formation Process 
Amount of information used for impression formation. Identical to Study 3B, 
participants reported how much of the information they considered when forming their 
impression of Jennifer (1- Very Little Information, 2- Only about Half of the information, 
3- Most of the information, 4- Almost all of the information).  
Impression clarity. Participants next rated how difficult it was to form an 
impression of Jennifer on an 11-point scale, (0-Not at all difficult, to 10- Very difficult, 
reverse scored for composite), and how clear of an impression they were able to form (0-
Not at all clear, to 10- Very clear). These two items were averaged together to create an 
impression clarity score (Cronbach’s α = .752). 
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Affect Manipulation Check 
 Similar to the Study 3B procedure, participants then reported to what extent they 
felt various emotions while they were watching the video. Responses were averaged 
together to create emotion composite scores: happy and cheerful (Cronbach’s α = .839), 
sad and upset (Cronbach’s α = .751), disgusted, sickened, queasy, and grossed out 
(Cronbach’s α = .792). Anger was analyzed as a single-item measure. 
Results 
Affect Manipulation Check 
 A repeated measure ANOVA comparing happy, sad, and disgusted composite 
emotions revealed that the affect manipulation was successful, F(4,510) = 335.55, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .725. Participants in the happy condition reported more happiness (M = 4.49, 
SD = 1.39) than disgust (M = 1.66, SD = .95), and sadness (M = 1.71, SD = .97; F(2,186) 
= 184.90, p < .001, ηp2 = .665). Those in the sad condition reported more sadness (M = 
5.13, SD = 1.29) than happiness (M = 1.51, SD = .71), and disgust (M = 2.04, SD = 1.11; 
F(2,172) = 326.32, p < .001, ηp2 = .791). Finally, those in the disgust condition reported 
more disgust (M = 5.85, SD = 1.34) than happiness (M = 2.01, SD = 1.15), and sadness 
(M = 2.69, SD = 1.23; F(2,170) = 207.52, p < .001, ηp2 = .709). No other interactions or 
main effects emerged for the processing prime or the global trait stereotype information 
(all Fs < 1). 
General Evaluations of the Target 
 Feeling thermometer rating.  The expected three-way interaction between 
affect, processing prime, and stereotype failed to emerge for feeling thermometer ratings; 
however two unexpected two-way interactions emerged.  First, an interaction between 
processing prime and stereotype information emerged, F(1,255) = 4.50, p = .035, ηp2 = 
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.017.  This interaction reveals that those who were globally primed rated the target 
equally favorable regardless of whether she was described as an extroverted sales 
representative or an introverted librarian (MExt = 67.73, SD = 16.35 v. MInt = 69.12, SD = 
16.44) whereas those who were locally primed evaluated Carol more favorably when she 
was described as an extroverted sales representative then an introverted librarian (MExt = 
72.56, SD = 12.75 v. MInt = 65.89, SD = 15.90).  A second interaction between affect and 
stereotype information, F(2,255) = 3.24, p = .041, ηp2 = .025 reveals that happy and sad 
participants rated Carol equally regardless of stereotype information (Happy: MExt = 
66.85, SD = 18.15 v. MInt = 67.62, SD = 15.92; Sad: MExt = 69.94, SD = 11.91 v. MInt = 
70.23, SD = 14.82), whereas those in the disgust condition rated Carol more favorably 
when she was described as an extroverted sales representative than when she was 
described as an introverted librarian (MExt = 74.18, SD = 12.77 v. MInt = 64.64, SD = 
17.52). 
 Overall favorability.  As with the feeling thermometer ratings, I did not find the 
expected results for the favorability composite item.  There was a 2-way interaction 
between affect condition and stereotype information, F(2,255) = 3.50, p = .032, ηp2 = 
.027, with those in the happy and sad condition finding the introvert more favorable than 
the extrovert (Happy: MExt = 5.86, SD = 2.43 v. MInt = 6.49, SD = 2.05; Sad: MExt = 6.25, 
SD = 2.17 v. MInt = 6.87, SD = 2.03) and those in the disgust condition finding the 
extrovert more favorable than the introvert (MExt = 6.97.18, SD = 2.14 v. MInt = 6.04, SD 
= 2.30).  No other interactions or main effects emerged, (all Fs < 1.1). 
Target Trait Judgments 
Social thermometer rating.  Affect, processing prime, and stereotype 
information did not fully interact to influence participants’ social thermometer ratings, 
 !125!
but there was a main effect for stereotype information, F(2,255) = 37.74, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.129.  This was in the expected direction, such that participants rated the sales 
representative (M = 63.18, SD = 15.28) to be more extroverted than the librarian (M = 
51.91, SD = 15.27). No other effects emerged for the social thermometer item. 
Trait ratings.  A mixed ANOVA comparing ratings of introverted and 
extroverted traits found the same main effect of stereotype information, but no other 
effects or interaction emerged. The interaction between trait ratings and stereotype 
information was in the predicted direction, F(1,255) = 72.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .221, as 
participants rated the sales representative as more extroverted (M = 6.34, SD = 1.16) than 
introverted (M = 4.21, SD = 1.35), but the librarian was rated equally on extroverted (M = 
5.36, SD = 1.51) and introverted traits (M = 5.31, SD = 1.39). No other effects emerged 
for the trait ratings, (all Fs < 1.3). 
Amount of Information Used for Impression Formation and Impression Clarity 
 There was an overall effect of processing prime on the amount of information 
considered when making an impression, such that those in the local condition considered 
slightly less information  (M = 3.37, SD = .58) than those in the global condition (M = 
3.53, SD = .56; F(1,255) = 4.48, p = .035, ηp2 = .017). 
Participants generally found that it was easier to form an impression of the sales 
representative (M = 5.10, SD = 2.20) than the librarian (M = 4.40, SD = 2.08; F(1,255) = 
7.90, p = .005, ηp2 = .030). An interaction between processing prime and global trait 
stereotype information emerged, F(1,255) = 4.67, p = .032, ηp2 = .018, such that those in 
the global processing prime condition found Carol equally easy to form an impression of, 
(MExt = 4.85, SD = 1.99 v. MInt = 4.68, SD = 2.03), but those in the local condition found 
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it easier to form an impression of the sales representative (MExt = 5.38, SD = 2.40) than 
the librarian (MInt = 4.13, SD = 2.11). 
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Appendix D 
STUDY 3 VIGNETTE 
The following vignette was used to establish global traits and local behavioral 
information for Jennifer in Study 3B (formerly Carol in Study 3A). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
NAME: Jennifer 
 
AGE: 32 
 
OCCUPATION: full time librarian/sales representative 
 
INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM A CLOSE FRIEND: 
 
“Jennifer is a shy, introverted person who likes quiet time and leads an orderly life,  
so she finds her job as a librarian to be very satisfying.” 
 
“Jennifer is a sociable, extroverted person who likes meeting people, so she finds her 
job as a sales representative to be very satisfying.” 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Jennifer woke up, turned the alarm clock off, and crawled out of bed.  After 
dressing quickly, she got ready to leave.  This morning, Jennifer had a doctor’s 
appointment before going to work.  The mist had gathered on her new Toyota and she 
stopped just long enough to clean the windshield before starting off.  While waiting to see 
the doctor, she kept a conversation going with another patient by talking animatedly 
about how much she enjoyed running and other sports.  She had a real knack for 
controlling conversations. 
 After working at her librarian/sales representative job, Jennifer got ready to jog.  
She loved to run and seemed enthusiastic and cheerful even when the weather wasn’t 
exactly ideal.  She gave the impression of having unlimited energy.  Jennifer usually kept 
a busy schedule going from activity to activity and somehow she managed to remain 
friendly and outgoing despite her long day at work.  During her run, Jennifer didn’t 
hesitate to speak to strangers, having a self-assured manner with every new face. 
 Two days later, Jennifer and a friend went to Happy Hour at a local bar. She 
spotted Greg, a guy she really liked a lot and was interested in dating. Jennifer froze and 
tried to remain unnoticed, avoiding interaction with other guys as well.  Today, Greg 
tried to engage Jennifer in conversation.  Jennifer appeared bashful and hesitant, but did 
begin to complain about how hard her job as a librarian had become.  Amidst the noise of 
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the band, the crowds of people and her talkative friend, Jennifer’s soft voice was hardly 
even heard.  Later that evening, Jennifer ran into Greg and some associates on the street 
in front of her office. She remained reserved and discreet about her personal life. When 
Greg asked her for a date, Jennifer looked to the ground and seemed self-conscious.  She 
walked away, angry with herself for not taking Greg up on his offer. 
 Jennifer’s course schedule was heavy even though she was going to school part 
time.  This week, she had entered a debate that was a prelude to her campaign for a 
position on the local school board.  During the debate, Jennifer was forceful with her 
opinions, out-shouted her opponent, and cheered loudly along with the members of her 
team when they seemed to win a point.  The local politicians considered that Jennifer’s 
campaign would be a success because she was ambitious and seemed confident in her 
opinions.  It was never really clear how these local races would turn out.  Jennifer took a 
few hours off from her job as a librarian/sales representative to attend classes three times 
a week.  As opposed to classes requiring group work and interaction with other students, 
Jennifer preferred classes that allowed her to work alone.  During classes she felt 
inhibited and tried to think through a question completely before she would dare ask it.  
This week, she was particularly upset because she was not selected to be a research 
assistant for a project in which she was interested.  Because Jennifer avoided him, the 
professor did not know she was interested in the project.  Jennifer could have used both 
the experience and the money from the assistantship. 
 That weekend, Jennifer went to the park and daydreamed for hours.  Sitting by 
herself among the other people in the park- mothers and their screaming, happy kids- 
Jennifer appeared to be deep in thought, withdrawn from the activity around her.  Two 
friends walked by late in the day, and that night they all went to the Brentwood 
neighborhood block party.  Jennifer was very entertaining that night and danced for much 
of the night. 
 The next morning, the alarm clock went off an hour early, at 7:00. Jennifer turned 
over in a groggy state of half-sleep, half-waking consciousness, then curled up to try to 
recover the pleasant state of drowsy unconscious.  Jennifer was not better at falling back 
to sleep than the rest of us, so she got out of bed, took a shower, and prepared to start 
another week at her job as a librarian/sales representative. 
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Appendix E 
STUDY 4 VIGNETTE PRETEST 
A pretest was conducted to establish that the vignette to be used in Study 4 would 
provide a description of Jack that was morally ambiguous. These vignettes followed the 
same format as the Carol vignette in Study 3 and described a typical day in Jack’s life. 
Three subtly different versions of the vignette were given to participants, with the goal of 
selecting the most morally ambiguous, or neutral description of Jack for use in Study 4. 
The first goal of this pretest was to determine if any of these descriptions of Jack 
conveyed an overall immoral judgment (as this could prevent any manipulation of a 
moral group membership from having an effect on judgments of Jack). A second goal of 
the pretest was that I wanted participants to have a movable impression of Jack (which 
could be influenced by Jack’s group membership in a moral or immoral group) so I did 
not want participants to have extremely high confidence or clarity for their impressions of 
Jack. 
Method 
Participants, Procedure, and Design 
 Participants were recruited from a social psychology lecture class (266 total, 73% 
female). Participants were given a sheet of paper with one of the three vignettes 
(randomly presented) on the front side of the page, and with the questions about Jack on 
the back. Participants were randomly assigned one of three vignettes, in a one-way, 
between-subjects factorial design. 
Materials 
 Participants read one of three different vignettes about Jack (see Appendix I), 
with the following instructions: “Please read all of the information below and form an 
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impression of the character (Jack) in the story. After doing so, you will be asked some 
questions about the impression that you formed of Jack.” On the back of the page, they 
were asked questions about Jack.  
Measures 
Moral Impression Formations 
Person-based judgments. After reading the story about Jack, participants 
answered three questions to assess their moral judgments about “Jack”, as a person, 
which included whether they thought he was moral or immoral, morally right or morally 
wrong, and good or bad, (-5- Very immoral/morally wrong/bad to +5- Very 
moral/morally right/good, Cronbach’s α = .855).  
Action-based judgments. After these items, they then answered three questions 
of a similar nature, but which assessed whether Jack’s actions were moral or immoral, 
morally right or morally wrong, and good or bad (on the same scale, Cronbach’s α = 
.934).  
Feeling Thermometer Rating 
Next, participants rated Jack on a feeling thermometer, identical to the one used in 
Studies 3 and 4.  
Impression Formation Confidence 
Participants then answered two questions about the impression that they formed 
(Cronbach’s α = .821), one asking how clear of an impression they were able to form (0- 
Not at all clear to 6- Very clear), and how confident they were about their impression of 
Jack (0- Not at all confident to 6- Very confident).  
The last item asked participants to report their gender. 
Results 
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Moral Impression Formations 
 Descriptive Confirmation of Morally Neutral Depiction of Jack. First, I 
compared the moral judgments of Jack, as a person, across the different three vignettes, 
which confirmed participants rated Jack as morally neutral in all three of the vignettes 
(with average responses ranging from 0.75 to 1.5). This narrow range of responses 
demonstrates that all three vignettes depicted Jack as relatively neutral, but also slightly 
positive. Similarly, when I examined the judgments of Jack’s actions, the average 
responses fell close to the scale midpoint (with average responses ranging from -0.35 to 
0.56). 
Person-based moral judgments. Next, I conducted a one-way, three-level 
ANOVA comparing the moral judgments of Jack across the three different vignettes. 
When judging how moral Jack was, as a person, a significant main-effect emerged, 
F(2,262) = 6.62, p = .002, ηp2 = .048. Bonferroni post-hoc tests revealed that participants 
rated Vignettes 1 and 2 similarly to one another (M1 = 1.40, SD = 1.39 vs. M2 = 1.50, SD 
= 1.49; ps > .05), but that participants viewed Jack in Vignette 3 as slightly more neutral 
(M3 = 0.75, SD = 1.60) than Jack as described in Vignette 1 (p = .012), and in Vignette 2 
(p = .003). 
 Action-based moral judgments. I conducted a one-way ANOVA for the action-
based moral judgments, and a significant main effect emerged, F(2,263) = 9.30, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .066. The same patterns of differences found in the previous analysis were repeated 
here, as Bonferroni post-hoc tests revealed that Vignettes 1 and 2 were viewed relatively 
similarly, (M1 = 0.54, SD = 1.67 vs. M2 = 0.56, SD = 1.62; ps > .05), whereas Jack’s 
actions in Vignette 3 (M3 = -0.35, SD = 1.51) were viewed as less moral than in Vignette 
1 (p = .001) and in Vignette 2 (p = .001). 
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Feeling thermometer rating 
A similar pattern of results emerged for ratings of Jack’s favorability from the 
feeling thermometer item, F(2,262) = 5.31, p = .006, ηp2 = .039. Bonferroni post-hoc 
tests revealed that Jack in Vignettes 1 and 2 were viewed relatively similarly, (M1 = 
61.55, SD = 16.13 vs. M2 = 63.78, SD = 17.12; ps > .05), whereas Jack in Vignette 3 (M3 
= 55.91, SD = 16.51) was viewed as slightly (but not significantly) less favorable than 
Jack in Vignette 1 (p = .075), but was viewed as significantly less favorable than Jack in 
Vignette 2 (p = .005). 
Impression Formation Confidence  
No significant differences between the vignettes emerged when analyzing 
participants’ judgments of confidence and clarity for their impressions of Jack, F(2,263) 
= 1.17, p = .31, meaning that all vignettes were equally clear (or unclear) in their 
description of Jack. 
Discussion 
 Participants viewed Jack from Vignettes 1 and 2 similarly across all of the 
dimensions (moral judgment, favorability, and impression clarity), and the mean 
responses for each of these ratings suggest that, as intended, participants judged Jack as 
fairly neutral, but slightly positive in both moral character and favorability. Participants 
viewed Jack from Vignette 3 somewhat more neutrally than in Vignettes 1 and 2, but 
when rating the morality of Jack’s actions, the average response for participants who read 
Vignette 3 fell into the negative range of responses (M = -0.35,SD = 1.51). The goals of 
the pretest were to eliminate any vignettes with outright immoral evaluations from being 
used in Study 4, so this finding precluded Vignette 3 from being considered as the final 
vignette. When comparing Vignettes 1 and 2, these vignettes were statistically similar 
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throughout all measures, but Vignette 1 was consistently rated more neutrally (i.e., the 
mean responses for all ratings were always slightly closer to the midpoint than for 
Vignette 2). For these reasons, I decided to use Vignette 1 in Study 4. 
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Appendix F 
STUDY 4 GROUP NAME PRETEST 
A small pretest was also conducted to choose names for the three groups that 
would be used in Study 4. One goal of this pretest was to avoid conveying any moral or 
immoral connotations with the group names. A second goal was to select names that 
would be distinct and memorable to participants. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 12 members (66% female) of the Affect and Cognition social 
psychology research lab at UMass Amherst. Participants took this survey through 
Qualtrics (an online survey distributor) and were aware of the study goals. 
Name Choices 
 Thirty-eight potential group names were created by the primary investigator and 
from soliciting suggestions from lab members in the weeks leading up to the pretest. The 
names were nonsense words: Charvens, Lenmens, Watkins, Sanders, Prumbles, Sedlies, 
Flepps, Thilps, Cotinks, Gathras, Desnets, Consons, Gaffords, Pojums, Perners, Kiers, 
Emples, Thouts, Fultons, Lobos, Bindles, Kooks, Phlobens, Mullors, Sunics, Rulnics, 
Wiltons, Abneys, Welches, Mindons, Larches, Vassers, Dubrays, Thaxters, Pliners, 
Haplins, Grixies, Murneys.  
Name Preferences 
 Group name preferences were measured by asking participant to select and rank 
their top ten group names. Overall preference for a particular group name was considered 
by using both the popularity and relative ranking of the name across participants. First, I 
sorted by total choice count, computed by summing how many people selected that name 
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to be part of their top ten choices. Due to the large number of group name choices, six 
group names tied for the highest total choices (with five votes each: Kiers, Charvens, 
Gaffords, Watkins, Vassers, and Haplins).  After excluding the list to these six choices, I 
then computed an average ranking score for each name, by summing the ranking 
preferences from all those who selected that name, and then dividing by the number of 
people who chose that name. The overall preference for each group name was then 
calculated as a ratio of these two scores (Average Preference = Total Ranking/Total 
Count). For example, if five people chose the Kiers, and those people ordered that group 
name as their first, third, fourth, sixth, and ninth choices, then the total ranking score for 
the Kiers name would be 23. For this example, the overall preference score for the Kiers 
group name would be 23 divided by 5, or 4.6.  
Results and Discussion 
Due to the large number of choices, no names gained a clear majority. Six name 
choices garnered 5 votes each (see Table 10) and their overall preference scores varied. 
The three names with the most vote counts and also the most prioritized average ranking, 
were selected for use in Study 4: the Haplins, the Vassers, and the Watkins.   
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Table 10.  Group name sorted by count, ranking, and average preference. 
 
Total Count Total Ranking  Average Preference 
Haplins 5 14 2.80 
Watkins 5 25 5.00 
Vassers 5 25 5.00 
Gaffords 5 27 5.40 
Charvens 5 28 5.60 
Kiers 5 32 6.40 
Fultons 4 11 2.75 
Wiltons 4 13 3.25 
Sunics 4 16 4.00 
Pliners 4 16 4.00 
Murnies 4 20 5.00 
Sanders 4 22 5.50 
Bindles 4 24 6.00 
Emples 4 28 7.00 
Thaxters 4 29 7.25 
Mindons 3 11 3.67 
Kooks 3 13 4.33 
Consons 3 17 5.67 
Sedlies 3 18 6.00 
Desnets 3 18 6.00 
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Table 10. Continued. 
 
Total Count Total Ranking  Average Preference 
Flepps 3 20 6.67 
Thilps 3 20 6.67 
Thouts 3 24 8.00 
Welches 3 24 8.00 
Prumbles 2 8 4.00 
Abneys 2 8 4.00 
Rulnics 2 10 5.00 
Larches 2 10 5.00 
Lenmens 2 11 5.50 
Mullors 1 1 1.00 
Dubrays 1 3 3.00 
Cotinks 1 4 4.00 
Grizies 1 4 4.00 
Phlobens 1 5 5.00 
Perners 1 10 10.00 
Gathras 0 0 0.00 
Pojums 0 0 0.00 
Lobos 0 0 0.00 
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Appendix G 
STUDY 4 PROTOTYPICAL GROUP MEMBER VIGNETTES 
Vignettes used in Study 4 to establish group stereotypes, which describe 
archetypal members. 
Moral Group Members (Vassers) 
1) Anna has been a member of the Vassers for 4 years.  
 
Waking up to her alarm, Anna rolled out of bed and started getting ready for the day. 
After grabbing some coffee, she drove to her local pharmacy, where she worked as a 
pharmacist. Today she was looking forward to training a new pharmacist, Jason, who was 
just out of pharmacy school and was looking for some hands on experience. Anna knew 
that some people might find her job boring, but she found that she really enjoyed it, and 
she particularly appreciated her colleagues. Everyone who worked with her took their job 
seriously, but they also seemed to know how to be friendly in the workplace.  
 
After a few hours of work, Anna and another colleague, Tim, took Jason out to lunch, as 
they could tell that he was overwhelmed with his first day. During lunch, Jason admitted 
he was somewhat worried about how quickly he needed to change focus throughout the 
morning, and didn’t know if he would be able to keep up. Anna and Tim tried their best 
to reassure him by saying that they also felt that way when just starting out, but that he 
would eventually get used to the hectic schedule. Later, after Anna got off work, she went 
to a nursing home where she volunteered for a few hours a week. She chatted with some 
patients for about an hour, before helping the nursing staff create an organizational layout 
for a new pharmaceutical storage area. That night, after returning home and eating dinner, 
she put some music on and began to relax from her busy day, and then went straight to 
sleep.  
 
2) Patrick has been a member of the Vassers for 8 years.  
 
Patrick woke up late, then ate a leisurely breakfast and read some news online. He 
worked as a 5th grade teacher, so he enjoyed the weekend, when he could sleep in.  Later 
that morning, he went outside to get some yard-work done. While he was mowing his 
grass, he listened to music and tried to make the chore more enjoyable. When he was 
finished, he realized that his neighbor’s yard could use mowing too. After knocking on 
her door and making sure it was okay with her, Patrick ended up mowing Martha’s lawn 
that afternoon too. She was retired and seemed to have some trouble getting around, and 
he could tell that she really appreciated it. After he finished mowing her lawn, Patrick 
went back inside and got cleaned up. 
 
That afternoon, he worked on a budget and a schedule for an upcoming class field trip to 
a nearby science museum. Patrick made certain that part of the budget was eating lunch 
in the museum’s cafeteria, because he knew that some students in his class wouldn’t have 
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lunch on the field trip otherwise. Then he emailed Paula, the other 5th grade teacher, to set 
up a meeting about sending the information out to all of the parents about the field trip. 
That night he met some friends to go bowling, they had joined a league that usually met 
on Thursday nights, but they liked to go and practice some weekends. After saying 
goodnight to his friends, he headed home and started getting ready for bed. He fell asleep 
quickly that night, because he was so exhausted.  
 
3) Julie has been a member of the Vassers for 11 years.  
 
Julie woke up early that day, and grabbed a quick bowl of cereal for breakfast before 
getting ready for the day. She worked at a non-profit agency that worked to improve adult 
literacy rates and was eager to head into work because they were finally reaching the end 
of an important outreach project. Julie and some colleagues had figured out that the 
agency needed to use TV, radio, and video internet ads to reach out to those adults in the 
community who couldn’t read. Last week, she and her team had finally finished the ads, 
and they had begun airing earlier that week. Julie was hoping that they would start to see 
more people coming to the reading center as a result. They had already started to see a 
small increase in people coming in over the last few days, so they were already busier 
than usual at the reading center. 
 
That day, Julie worked with a few different individuals, and she noticed that they were 
making good progress on their reading skills. She ended up staying late that day, so that 
he could make some calls to radio stations about when to air the ads in the next few 
weeks. Then, Julie went and met some friends, Tina and Emily, for dinner at a local 
sports bar. They ordered some wings and then watched the basketball game on TV. After 
the game was over, she went home and got ready for bed. She had some trouble falling 
asleep because of such an eventful day, but she eventually drifted off to sleep. 
 
4) Joe has been a member of the Vassers for 2 years.  
 
Joe got out of bed as soon as his alarm went off, and started getting ready for the day. He 
lived off-campus with a few other roommates, but he had a couple of classes that day so 
he packed his bag and went to grab breakfast on campus. After breakfast, Joe made his 
way to his first class, sat down and got out his notebook. The lecture was fairly 
interesting that day, and they even got to watch a video halfway through, so he felt like 
he was having a good start to his day. On his way to the next class, Joe saw a wallet 
someone had dropped on the sidewalk. Opening it up, he checked the ID and looked 
around to see if he could recognize the person nearby. Not seeing anyone familiar, he 
took a short detour to the student center to drop it off at the lost and found, before 
continuing on to his next class. Joe made it to class just as the lecture started and was able 
to grab a seat in the back of the room.   
 
After class, he met his friend, Brian, at a sandwich place and they made plans to work in 
the library after lunch. They walked back to campus and studied for a few hours, before 
Joe decided to head to the gym. After his workout, Joe texted his roommates to ask if 
they wanted Pizza for dinner. On his way home, he picked up the pizza and then he 
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relaxed with his friends by watching some TV. When he started getting tired, he 
showered and then went to bed. 
 
5) Eric has been a member of the Vassers for 6 years. 
 
Eric woke up early, got dressed, and then went to meet a friend, Drew, at a diner for 
breakfast. They both were volunteer firefighters, and Eric had organized the group to go 
build a house that weekend, as part of the habitat for humanity project. After breakfast, 
they met the rest of their group at the build site and started getting to work. After a few 
hours of working on building the wood frames for the house, Eric had arranged for pizzas 
to be delivered for lunch and everyone seemed to be having a good time as they took a 
break from the construction. That afternoon went by quickly, and they made good 
progress on the house, and Eric enjoyed installing the kitchen cabinets with a few others, 
before calling it a day.  As everyone started packing the tools away and cleaning up the 
build site, Drew asked if anyone was interested in going out for a drink later that night.  A 
few people said they were too tired, but Kathryn, Pete, and Jacqueline decided to join 
Drew and Eric out at the bar. 
 
That night, Eric arrived a little late to the bar. By that time, it was already clear that some 
of his friends were going to need help getting home later, so he offered to be the 
designated driver so that everyone else could relax and have a good time. Later that night, 
after dropping his other friends off at their places, he went home and went to sleep 
instantly, because he was tired after all the physical labor of the day. 
 
Immoral Group Members (Haplins) 
1) John has been a member of the Haplins for 5 years.  
 
After waking up and getting ready for the day, John headed to the office. He was excited 
to be at work that day, because he and a few other colleagues had all worked hard as a 
team to finish an advertising project, and they were planning to pitch their idea to their 
client. John would be in a good position for a promotion if the meeting with the client 
went well, so the night beforehand he had strategized how to take ownership over parts of 
the project so that he would stand out to his boss. He knew he would have to be careful in 
his approach, because he knew that another member of the project team, Martin, was also 
angling for this promotion. During the meeting, he decided to criticize some of Martin’s 
contributions and offered his own suggestions. The meeting seemed to go well, so after 
work he went out to celebrate with his coworkers. Normally his officemates were pretty 
friendly with him, but they all seemed distant that night, so he went home earlier than he 
thought he would. 
 
Once he got home, John’s mind drifted back over the events of the day. He mentally 
replayed the meeting with the client, and he felt confident that he had made it clear to his 
boss that he was the real reason for the success of the project. He was glad that 
everything with the client went so well and he thought about how he should approach his 
boss to discuss his promotion. After running through a few different ideas about how to 
handle the situation, he started to get tired and let himself drift off to sleep. 
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2) Sara has been a member of the Haplins for 7 years.  
 
Sara woke up early and went for a jog, before grabbing breakfast and driving into the 
office. She worked at a local law firm and planned to meet with a new potential client, a 
small business owner, who was being sued for failing to pay workers their overtime 
wages. After asking him a few questions about the situation, she was able to determine 
that there wasn’t any strong evidence that would implicate him and told him that she 
would be in touch about whether or not she would take the case. After lunch, Sara 
examined the financial documents the client had brought with him. Even though she 
knew that the business owner had set up an illegal pay schedule that was specifically 
designed to avoid overtime payment, she felt that she could produce a successful defense 
and felt good about taking the case.  
 
After calling the client to confirm their next meeting, she left the office and met her 
fiancé for dinner. They spoke for most of the dinner about their plans to look at potential 
wedding venues that weekend. When she excused herself to the ladies’ room, she was 
checking her makeup and noticed a pendant necklace on the floor. Sara thought the 
necklace looked cute, and she didn’t think it looked overly expensive, so she decided to 
take it home with her. When she got home from dinner, she sat at her couch and wrote a 
few legal briefs that needed to be filed the next day. Exhausted from her long day, she got 
into bed and fell asleep as soon as her head hit the pillow. 
 
3) Mike has been a member of the Haplins for 10 years. 
 
Mike took his time waking up that morning, because it was a Saturday, and he didn’t 
have to go in and teach high school students all day. He did have some grading to do, 
however, because his eleventh-grade class had turned in their 8-page essays that week. In 
all, he had about 40 papers to grade that weekend. It was nearing the end of the year, and 
he was exhausted from all the work he had been doing lately. After glancing at the pile of 
papers, Mike decided to go out and run some errands first.  
 
Once he was back from the grocery store, he finally took a look at the student papers. He 
knew his students had worked hard on their papers and deserved quality feedback on 
them, but his heart just wasn’t in it. Instead, Mike found himself going through the papers 
and making a few comments on each paper, and then giving students grades based on 
their previous assignment grades and their class participation. He took particular pleasure 
in grading a really annoying student’s, paper fairly low. Mike knew it wasn’t the best 
way to grade papers, but he had plans with his family the next day and didn’t have the 
time to grade each paper in-depth. When he finished entering the scores into his grade 
book, he called his friend, Matt, and invited him out for a few drinks. When he returned 
home that night, Mike remembered that he had promised to make potato salad for his 
family’s barbecue, so he set his alarm for earlier the next morning. 
 
4) Meredith has been a member of the Haplins for 3 years. 
 
Meredith woke up and made herself her usual breakfast of toast and yogurt, before 
getting ready for her classes. After parking in the commuter lot, she arrived early for her 
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first class of the day and sat near the back of the classroom, then she studied the flash 
cards she made last night. There was an exam that day, and she wasn’t feeling confident 
that she would be able to do well. She always felt like she knew the material but couldn’t 
remember it all for the tests in this class. 
 
As the professor passed out the exams, she put her notebook and flashcards away, and 
slid her bag under her desk. Toward the end of the exam, Meredith realized that she was 
completely stumped on the some of the questions, and couldn’t even really make a guess 
at some of the answers. She was sitting too far away from other people to even make a 
glance at their exams, but then she noticed that her notebook was open to a page of notes 
in her backpack, and that she actually had some of the answers that she needed. She filled 
in the rest of the answers for her test, and then passed it in. After the test, she headed to a 
café for a Frappuccino, and then went to her next class. That night, when Meredith got 
home, she thought back to the test she took that day while she made dinner, and hoped 
that she got a passing grade. She settled on the couch with some of her roommates for a 
movie, before heading to bed.  
 
5) Nick has been a member of the Haplins for 6 years. 
 
That morning, Nick woke up quickly, got dressed for the day, and then grabbed a drive-
thru breakfast sandwich before heading into work. He worked at a bank, as a mortgage 
lender and he usually met with about three to four clients a day. Some days were slower 
than others, but today he was fairly busy. Everything went smoothly for the first two 
clients of the day, but he eventually had to turn a client down for a mortgage right before 
lunch. Nick swung by Jim’s office before lunch, and they both headed out to a burrito 
place down the street. After they got their food, Nick and Jim talked about the new guy at 
work, Darrell. He was kind of a nerdy guy, who seemed to be obsessed with no one 
touching the things on his desk. Nick suggested that they get him to loosen up by playing 
a prank on him and Jim thought it sounded good, and so they decided to brainstorm a few 
different ideas. 
 
When they got back from the office, Nick saw another client, and then went to the break 
room to grab a snack. Later that afternoon, Jim came to Nick’s office to let him know that 
Darrell had gone home already, so they went into his office and moved some of his stuff 
around. It wasn’t the best prank, but Nick wanted to see how Darrell reacted to a mild 
prank before upping the ante. Nick then went home, made himself dinner, and finally 
watched some TV before heading to bed. 
 
Control Group Members (Watkins) 
 
1) Greg has been a member of the Watkins for 6 years.  
 
Greg woke up to his alarm, and then got out of bed quickly. Before breakfast, he went for 
his daily run, and when he got back he made his usual high protein smoothie. After 
showing and getting dressed, he headed in to open up the nutrition store that he owned. 
That day they were conducting a store inventory, so he had asked Natalie and Ben to 
come in for some overtime hours so that they could help out. As they worked through the 
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items in the front of the store, Greg was pretty pleased that his predictions for what items 
would sell during the month were fairly close to the actual numbers. After finishing up 
the inventory late that afternoon, he decided to call it a day a bit early and headed to the 
gym. 
 
Greg was a weight lifter and he had a few friends, Rob and Jake, that would show up at 
the same gym and they all would spot each other while lifting. He was planning on going 
to a competition later that month, so he was trying to carefully increase the weight he 
could lift. Greg was cautious because he was overcoming a knee injury from his time 
playing football in college and he didn’t want to overdo it. Rob used to be a personal 
trainer, so he was great for knowing how much weight to add at a time. After a good day 
at the gym, Greg grabbed a burrito on the way home. Once he got home, he watched a bit 
of TV and then went right to bed. 
 
2) Jenna has been a member of the Watkins for 5 years. 
 
After sleeping in, Jenna got out of bed feeling refreshed. She usually woke up to an 
alarm, but she had been feeling under the weather lately and didn’t want it to turn into a 
full-blown cold, so she figured she could use the extra sleep. After making an omelet for 
breakfast, she sat down to complete the newspaper crossword of the day.  It was Jenna’s 
day off of work, so she had minimal plans for the day other than doing some laundry and 
other household chores.  As she put some clothes into the wash, she decided that she was 
feeling well enough that day to go to her yoga class. After changing into her yoga outfit 
and grabbing her mat, she walked to the downtown yoga studio, where she did yoga at 
least once a day, if not more. 
 
As she settled into the session, Jenna began feeling more centered and relaxed.  She let 
her mind sink down and started focusing on the movements and her breathing. At the end 
of the session, she was really glad that she decided to come after all because she was 
feeling much better. Before heading home, Jenna caught up with a friend, Claire, whom 
she hadn’t seen in a few weeks, and made plans to grab dinner with her the next night.  
She was looking forward to hearing all about Claire’s vacation to Fiji. When Jenna 
arrived home, she put the laundry in the wash, and then did a bit of cleaning up around 
her apartment. That night, she got into bed with a book, and read until she fell asleep. 
 
3) Matt has been a member of the Watkins for 9 years. 
 
Getting out of bed, Matt first did his usual morning workout- 30 pushups and 50 sit-ups, 
before grabbing some oatmeal for breakfast.  After getting dressed, he headed into the 
university where he worked as the head soccer coach. His team had a game coming up 
later that week, so he wanted to make these next few practices really count. The team 
they were playing against was having a strong season, with only one loss, so his team 
really needed to be playing at their best to win. The opposing team was particularly 
strong at defense, so he wanted to make sure that these next few practices were going to 
help the offense on his team.  That morning he worked up a few plays that might work 
against the other team and decided to run them by the assistant coach, Jerry, after lunch. 
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He took a quick lunch break down the street, and then when he got back he went into 
Jerry’s office to go over the new plays.  Jerry thought they were decent, but he had a few 
ideas in mind to make them more effective, so they worked together on them for the rest 
of the day, until practice time for the team. The team did a great job putting the plays into 
practice, and Matt felt good about their prospects in the upcoming game. That night, after 
making himself dinner, Matt watched the video of the practice from that day, so that he 
could deliver his feedback to his players for the next practice. After finishing his video 
feedback, Matt went to bed. 
 
4) Leslie has been a member of the Watkins for 3 years. 
 
Leslie woke up early, before her alarm could go off. She was excited to get the day 
started, because she was starting her new job as a personal trainer. She had worked as a 
personal trainer for the year before, but she had just been hired at the nice, new gym in 
town that had state-of-the-art facilities.  After having breakfast and getting ready for the 
day, she headed into the gym and first met with the manager, Tom.  Leslie filled out all 
her paper work, and then Tom showed her to the trainer’s lounge. She had her own space 
where she could meet with clients and discuss their personal routines, in addition to the 
large open area where trainers could relax and get to know each other between clients. 
She was eager to get to work, and familiarize herself with the layout of the gym and all of 
the equipment. 
 
After lunch, Leslie went on a tour of the gym with Tessa, who showed her around and 
then had Leslie watch one of her training sessions. Leslie was really looking forward to 
having her own clients, and was happy that it seemed like she would be able to start 
meeting clients by the end of that week. Leslie grabbed dinner at a restaurant in town 
with her friend, Rachel, and they talked all about her first day at the gym. After driving 
home, Leslie got into bed, but she had trouble falling asleep because she was excited to 
be back at work the next day.  
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Appendix H 
STUDY 4 IDENTIFICATION BLURBS 
The moral and immoral identification blurbs were taken from previous research 
(Knutson, et al., 2013, supplemental materials). The control (sporty) identification 
vignettes were created for this study. 
Instructions to Participants 
 
Now that you have read about these three groups, we would like to see if 
you can identify what group people are in based on reading a short 
example of their behavior. Last semester, we had participants write stories 
about life events, and then we took those stories and shortened them to 
describe one event for each person. We are interested in seeing if you can 
correctly identify what group, the Vassers, Haplins, or Watkins, to which 
these people belong. You will be given 30 short examples in all, once you 
have read the short event, please pick what group you think the person 
belongs to. After you make your choice, you will be told whether or not 
you were correct. Please try to get as many identifications correct as you 
can. When you are ready to begin, please press the continue button below. 
 
Moral Group Identification Blurbs 
 
1) "I was riding my bike and passed a Ford truck with the keys in the door. So I went into 
the apartment building facing that street and asked the man inside if he had a Ford truck. 
He did and he went outside to get the keys out of the car door." 
 
2) "I knew a couple and their child through one of those "save-a-child" foundations. The 
family decided to move to California and I knew they were going to have a really hard 
time finding work. So I sold a bracelet that I had and sent them the money." 
 
3) "Just a few weeks ago I got a call from my friend's niece. She was living in my town 
and having some financial difficulties. I told her that she could come live with me for one 
week just until she got her act together." 
 
4) "I was running across the street one time, years ago, and a little old woman fell. She 
was carrying groceries and she slipped. I helped her get her bearings back and picked up 
the groceries." 
 
5) ”I used to ride the bus everyday to work. One day I noticed a pregnant woman who did 
not have a seat. So I took her by the arm and helped her find a seat." 
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6) "I was at this festival downtown and there was a man walking along, counting his 
money. He had a lot of cash in his hands and dropped a five-dollar bill. I picked it up and 
returned it to him." 
 
7) "I bought a pair of shoes and the lady was busy, so she charged me the wrong price for 
the shoes. I didn't want to cheat her so asked her if she was sure that this was the right 
price for the shoes. It was the wrong price and she corrected the price and thanked me." 
 
8) "My neighbor had a dog for 14 years and one day the dog disappeared. I went around 
putting up signs throughout the neighborhood, but when my friend found his dog, it was 
sick and needed to be put to sleep. I stayed up all night with him as he cried." 
 
9) "A friend of mine decided to move to the city where I lived. My friend didn't know 
anyone in the city. So, I went to pick her up at the airport and drove her around the city 
throughout the next week so she could become familiar with the city." 
 
10) “While I was working as the manager of a bar, part of my job was to make deposits in 
the bank's night box. One night when I was depositing money, I found someone else's bag 
of money. Instead of keeping it, I deposited it for them." 
 
Immoral Group Identification Blurbs 
 
1) "I went to the movies a couple of months ago, to see a film. When that film was done, 
instead of leaving the theater, I just went into another of the theaters within the complex. 
I watched another movie without paying." 
 
2) "My husband thinks I shop too much. So now when I go shopping I put the items in 
the trunk of my car. I take the items out slowly over time, so my husband doesn't find 
out." 
 
3) "In high school my friends and I were big shoplifters. Our favorite thing to do after 
school was go to a local drugstore and load up on candy bars. We did it quite a few times 
and no one ever found out." 
 
4) "Once I was house-sitting and I took a bottle of perfume from under the sink. I think it 
belonged to a girl who didn't live there anymore. I didn't think anybody wanted it 
anymore because it was underneath the sink." 
 
5) "I took my sister's ring that was given to her by our father's aunt. I had never met our 
father's aunt but my sister spent some time with her. I took the ring because I didn't think 
that my sister deserved it." 
 
6) "I put a poster that I had on EBay. There was a man who bid on it and paid with a 
system that sent the money directly to me. He was kind of a jerk during the whole 
transaction, so I decided not to send the poster and just keep the money." 
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7) "I lied to a boss once. I said I delivered some paperwork for him that he needed 
delivered to complete this deal.  He had been unclear in his instructions to me and I just 
forgot to send it." 
 
8) "I remember when public transportation buses started charging a dollar per ride. My 
friends and I would tear the dollar into 4 pieces and fold it up so it looked like a dollar. I 
would use a dollar for four rides." 
 
9) "A little while ago I had to go to the RMV to get my drivers license renewed. They 
told me that I had to take a written test in which I had three attempts to pass. I failed the 
first two times, so I cheated on the final attempt and passed." 
 
10) "A few years ago I was staying with a friend who lived in a house of a very famous 
person. There were many autographed books in the house. I stole one of the books, which 
was autographed by a very famous celebrity." 
 
Control (Sporty) Group Identification Blurbs 
 
1) "I had a personal trainer a few years ago that wasn't really getting me to reach my 
exercise goals, so I ended up switching to a new person. Although I think that my first 
trainer was friendlier, I like the results that my new trainer gets me." 
 
2) "I am on the school swim team, and these past few weeks were really hard because we 
were reaching our season's peak distance. I love swimming, but I am looking forward to 
next week when we will begin to lessen the distance we swim each practice." 
 
3) "I work part-time at an office, and we don't really do anything together outside of 
work. I had found out about an office softball tournament in the area, and now we all get 
together a few times a month to play softball." 
 
4)"A couple of weeks ago, I went with a couple of friends to run a marathon. We had 
trained together for a few months, so it was really great to cross the finish line. We both 
hit our target time, so we think we will sign up for another one soon." 
 
5) "I really enjoy volleyball, but I got injured a year ago and can't play anymore. This 
year, I applied for a coaching job at the area high school, and I'm so glad I did. I wasn't 
sure what I was going to do after my injury, but I really like teaching the high schoolers 
how to play together as a team." 
 
6) "Last week I finally bought myself a new bike. I bike into work and I also like to take 
long bike rides on the weekend. I've always bought used bikes, so I was excited to get my 
first new bike for myself and pick out all the special features that I wanted for it." 
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Appendix I 
STUDY 4 METHOD AND RESULTS (INCLUDING SAD CONDITION) 
Method 
Participants and Design 
 Participants were recruited from psychology courses (292 total participants) and 
participated in exchange for course extra credit points. Participants first completed the 
group stereotype training (described in the group stereotype pilot study) by reading about 
the group information and then completing the identification task. Next, they then 
completed a distractor task where they colored for 4 minutes to repair their mood and 
allow their cognitive baseline to settle after the group stereotype training. After this 
distractor, participants were primed with an either global or local processing style 
through the map task (identical to the one used in Study 3B) and then watched a video 
clip that induced either happiness, sadness, or disgust. After these processing prime and 
affect manipulations, participants then read a story about the target individual (Jack), 
where global trait information was provided (through Jack’s membership in either the 
moral group or immoral group) as well as local behavioral information was provided 
(which were morally ambiguous behaviors). Next, participants answered questions about 
the impression that they formed of the target, including moral judgments and general 
evaluations (such as favorability). Finally, participants then answered an affective 
manipulation check questionnaire and a short demographics questionnaire. They were 
randomly assigned to one of 12 conditions in a 3 (happy v. sad v. disgust) x 2 (global v. 
local) x 2 (moral v. immoral stereotype) between-subjects factorial design.  
Some participants were excluded from the analysis because of failing 
manipulation checks. Twenty-three participants were excluded for scoring less than 85% 
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correct on the processing style manipulation. I also followed existing protocols for 
excluding participants with non-standard responses to affective manipulations (e.g., 
Bower, Monteiro, & Gilligan, 1978; Schnall, et al., 2008; Storbeck & Clore, 2005), and 
31 participants who were more than three boxplot lengths away from the average 
affective responses to the videos (and therefore considered statistical outliers) were 
excluded from the analysis. Finally, 20 participants were also excluded because they 
participated in the vignette pretest (and I had no a priori method of preventing their 
subsequent participation in this study). A multi-way frequency analysis showed no 
relationship between the experimental conditions and exclusions from the analysis, 
Pearson Chi-sqaure (12) = 2.03, p = .999. Of the remaining 230 participants (80.9% 
female), the average age is 20.01 years (SD = 1.78), and 75.2% are Caucasian, 3% are 
African-American, 13.9% are Asian, 2.6% are Hispanic, 3.5% are of mixed race, and 
1.7% chose not to report their race. 
Tasks and Manipulations 
Group stereotype training. Participants followed the same instructions as those 
used in the group stereotype pilot study described earlier, and then read vignettes 
describing 4 individuals from the moral group (the Vassers), the immoral group (the 
Haplins), and the control sporty group (the Watkins). The groups were presented as 
blocks, but their presentation order and the presentation order of the individuals within 
groups were both randomized. 
Identification Task. Next, participants completed the same identification task 
from the pilot study, where they read 26 short identification blurbs, chose what group the 
individual belonged to, and then received feedback about their performance on each item.   
 !150!
Distractor Task. Participants then completed a coloring-based distraction task 
(also used in the pilot study), in which they were given 10 crayons of varying colors and 
a blank piece of paper upon which to draw. This task served to help the group stereotype 
information settle, and also to restore the participant’s affective and cognitive baseline 
which could have depleted during the previous tasks. 
Processing Style Manipulation. Participants then completed the identical map 
task to the one that was used in Study 3B (adapted from Förster, et al., 2008, see Figure 
1). Participants in the local condition were instructed to focus on the cities within the 
state, whereas those in the global condition were instructed to focus on the shape of the 
state. 
Affect Manipulation. After the processing prime manipulation, participants 
watched one of two video clips to induce happiness (a clip from The Simpsons; Isbell, 
McCabe, Burns, & Lair, 2013), sadness (a scene from One True Thing, Isbell et al., 
2013), or disgust (a scene from Train Spotting used in Schnall et al., 2008).   
Impression Formation Vignette. Participants then read a story about an 
individual, named Jack, who engaged in a series of morally ambiguous behaviors (see 
Appendix J) with the following instructions: “Please read all of the information below 
and form an impression of the character (Jack) in the story. After doing so, you will be 
asked some questions about the impression that you formed of Jack.”  
Global Trait Information. In the beginning of the impression formation vignette, 
half of the participants were told that Jack was a member of the Haplins (immoral group) 
and the other half were told that Jack was a member of the Vassers. A small logo for the 
group was also included in the top right corner of the first page of the vignette so that 
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participants would be able to visually remember to what group Jack belonged (see Figure 
11). 
Moral Impression Formations 
Person-based judgments. Participants answered three questions to assess their 
moral judgments about “Jack”, as a person, which included whether they thought he was 
moral or immoral, morally right or morally wrong, and good or bad, (-5- Very 
immoral/morally wrong/bad to +50 Very moral/morally right/good, Cronbach’s α = 
.904).  
Action-based judgments. After these items, they then answered three questions 
of a similar nature, but which assessed whether Jack’s actions were moral or immoral, 
morally right or morally wrong, and good or bad (on the same scale, Cronbach’s α = 
.930).  
Moral thermometer ratings. They also assessed jack on a “Moral 
Thermometer”, where scores between 0 and 49 indicate that Jack is an immoral person, 
or someone who usually does the wrong thing and scores between 51 and 100 indicate 
that Jack is a moral person, or someone who usually does the right thing. 
Target Favorability Ratings 
Then, identical to the procedure in Study 3B, participants rated Jack on the feeling 
thermometer. Next, participants answered the overall favorability items used in Study 3B 
(judging how favorable, likable, positive Jack was). After standardizing these four items, 
I averaged them to create a composite favorability score (Cronbach’s α  = .935). 
Target Trait Ratings 
Participants rated the extent to which Jack exhibited good (average of friendly, 
sincere, trustworthy, warm, generous, honest, helpful, and conscientious; Cronbach’s α  = 
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.893) or bad personality traits (average of deceitful, mean, hostile, cruel, cold, arrogant, 
calculating, thoughtless, and selfish; Cronbach’s α  = .832) on a 11-point scale (from 0-
Not at all, 5-Somewhat, 10-Extremely). These traits were similar to those used for Study 
3B, but instead included moral traits, as opposed to sociability traits (which were the 
focus of Study 3B). 
Impression Formation Process 
Amount of information used for impression formation. Also identical to Study 
3B procedure, participants next answered a question asking how much information they 
considered when forming their impression. 
Impression clarity. Then participants answered two questions (also from Study 
3B) about the clarity and ease with which they formed their impression (Cronbach’s α = 
.617).  
Manipulation Checks 
Global trait stereotypic information manipulation check. Participants were 
then asked two items about Jack’s group membership, the first was a free-response 
answer where they were asked to name the group that Jack belonged to, and the following 
item was the same question, but with multiple-choice answers of the group names. Recall 
was very high, with 95.7% (n = 220) of the final sample remembering Jack’s group 
membership (close alternative spellings of group names in the free response were coded 
as correct).   
Affect manipulation check. Participants were asked to what extent they felt 
various emotions while they were watching the video (i.e., sad, happy, disgusted, angry, 
certain of their beliefs, upset, anxious, confident, tense, grossed out, tense, queasy, 
observant, bored, tired, calm, confused, sickened, distracted, afraid, thoughtless, amused) 
 !153!
on a 7-point scale (from 1-Not at all, to 7-Very Much). Responses were averaged together 
to create emotion composite scores: happy and amused (Cronbach’s α = .829), sad and 
upset (Cronbach’s α =.828), disgusted, sickened, queasy, and grossed out (Cronbach’s α 
= .963), and tense, anxious, and afraid  (Cronbach’s α = .793). Anger was analyzed as a 
one-item measure. 
Group-based moral judgments manipulation check. Participants then 
answered three questions each about the Vassers, Haplins, and Watkins groups to assess 
their moral judgments about those groups. These three items were identical to those used 
in the group stereotype training pilot study, and composite items were created from all 
three judgments for each group (Vassers: Cronbach’s α = .940, Haplins: Cronbach’s α = 
.972, Watkins: Cronbach’s α = .947). 
Participants then completed a basic demographics questionnaire, which asked 
them to report their age, gender, and race.  
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
Affect manipulation. Participants in the happy video condition reported feeling 
significantly more happiness than those in the disgust condition, as revealed by a 2 
(happy score v. disgust score) x 2 (happy video v. disgust video) x 2 (global v. local) x 2 
(moral vs. immoral group stereotype) mixed ANOVA. An expected 2-way interaction 
between reported affect and the affect condition shows that the videos were successful at 
manipulating affect, F(2,218) = 120.26, p < .001, ηp2 = .525. The pattern of results is in 
the expected direction, such that those in the happy condition reported significantly more 
happiness (M = 4.49, SD = 1.60) than disgust (M = 1.47, SD = 0.61; t(71) = 13.65, p < 
.001, Cohen’s d = 1.69), or sadness (M = 1.60, SD = 0.81; t(71) = 12.45, p < .001, 
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Cohen’s d =1.377. Likewise, those in the disgust condition reported significantly more 
disgust (M = 5.79, SD = 1.15) than happiness (M = 1.82, SD = 1.00; t(76) = 20.68, p < 
.001, Cohen’s d = 2.37) and sadness (M = 2.32, SD = 1.27; t(76) = 21.68, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d =1.926. Finally, those in the sad condition also reported feeling significantly 
more sadness (M = 5.35, SD = 1.36) than happiness (M = 1.36, SD = 0.55; t(71) = 13.65, 
p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.602) or disgust (M = 1.95, SD = 1.04; t(80) = 20.14, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = 2.270). 
Bonferonni-corrected post-hoc tests reveal that those in the disgust condition did 
report feeling slightly more anger, sadness, and anxiety than those in the happy condition, 
(all ps < .019). All participants, regardless of condition, reported feeling significantly 
more of their target emotion than anger or anxiety (all ps < .001). 
Group-based moral judgments manipulation check. The group stereotype 
training was successful. A significant main effect of group type revealed responses in the 
expected direction, F(2,436) = 382.19 p < .001, ηp2 = .637. Participants viewed the moral 
group as more moral (M = 9.54, SD = 2.33) than immoral group (M = 3.45, SD = 2.27; 
t(229) = 22.69, p < .001, Cohen’s d =1.495) and the control group (M = 7.36, SD = 1.68; 
t(229) = 11.38, p < .001, Cohen’s d =.757). They also viewed the immoral group as more 
immoral than the control group (t(229) = -19.22, p < .001, Cohen’s d = -1.278). 
Moral Judgments 
 Action- versus person-based judgments. I compared participants’ judgments of 
the target “as a person” to their judgments of the target’s actions. Person-based judgments 
and action-based moral judgments differed overall, with participants judging the target’s 
actions slightly more severely (M = -.85, SD = 1.36) than Jack as a person (M = -.45 SD = 
1.55; F(1,218) = 53.35, p < .001, ηp2 = .197). There was also an interaction between 
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person-based and action-based judgments and Jack’s group membership, F(1,218) = 4.50, 
p = .035, ηp2 = .020. This was in the expected direction, such that when Jack belonged to 
the immoral (vs. moral) group he was judged more severely for both person-based 
judgments (immoral group: M = -.73, SD = 1.59; moral group: M = -.17, SD = 1.45), and 
action-based judgments (immoral group: M = -1.04, SD = 1.44; moral group: M = -.66, 
SD = 1.25). Aside from these two effects, differences between person-based and action-
based judgments varied as a function of processing style and emotional manipulation, 
F(2,218) = 3.92, p = .021, ηp2 = .035. The results for the disgust and happy conditions 
support the cognitive malleability account, as those processing globally (global + happy 
and local + disgust conditions) were more likely to incorporate the target’s actions into 
their overall impression of him as a person (see Table 11). In contrast, those processing 
locally (local + happy and global + disgust conditions) were more likely to judge the 
target and their actions differently, particularly by judging the person less severely than 
the person’s actions. Those in the sad condition, however, always judged Jack’s actions 
more severely than Jack, as a person (see Table 11), regardless of processing prime. 
Notably, participants in the disgust condition were not significantly more punitive in their 
judgments of the target or his actions when compared to those in the happy condition 
(within-subjects interaction: F(1,141) = 1.76, p = .187; between-subjects main effect: 
F(1,141) = .171, p = .680).  
 Moral thermometer ratings. Analyzing participant’s ratings of Jack on a moral 
thermometer revealed a significant main effect in the expected direction for Jack’s 
membership in either a moral group (M = 48.94, SD = 14.87) or immoral group (M = 
43.37, SD = 15.10), F(1,218) = 8.30, p = .004, ηp2 = .037. Moral thermometer ratings of 
Jack also marginally varied as a function of processing prime, emotional manipulation, 
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and group stereotype information, F(2,218) = 2.58, p = .078. Again, the happy and 
disgust conditions support the cognitive malleability account, such that those processing 
globally (global + happy and local + disgust conditions) relied more on Jack’s group 
membership information when forming their moral impression of him, as compared to 
those processing locally (local + happy and global + disgust conditions). Those in the sad 
condition, however, relied on Jack’s group membership, and judged Jack in the immoral 
group (MGlobal = 42.05, SD = 10.60 vs. MLocal = 41.25, SD = 17.40) more harshly than 
Jack in the moral group (MGlobal = 48.53, SD = 13.72 vs. MLocal = 46.28, SD = 19.42), 
regardless of processing prime. 
Target Favorability Ratings 
 Favorability ratings only varied as a function of Jack’s group membership, 
F(2,218) = 8.20, p = .005, ηp2 = .036. Participants’ favorability ratings of Jack varied in 
the expected manner, such that when Jack belonged to the moral group he was viewed 
more favorably (M = .16, SD = .89), as compared to when Jack belonged to the immoral 
group (M = -.16, SD = .91). No other main effects or interactions were significant, all ps 
> .070. 
Target Trait Judgments  
 Analyzing participants’ target trait ratings on good and bad personality traits, only 
Jack’s group membership influenced the differences between these two judgments, 
F(1,218) = 11.63, p = .001, ηp2 = .051. These differences show that when Jack was in the 
immoral group, participants endorsed more bad traits for him (M = 4.29, SD = 1.56) than 
good traits (M = 3.53, SD = 1.49, t(72) = -3.22, p = .002, Cohen’s d = -.294). This 
essentially demonstrates that the immoral group membership information successfully 
manipulated beliefs about whether the target was a good or a bad person. A different 
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pattern emerged, however, when Jack was in the moral group, such that participants 
equally endorsed good traits (M = 4.21, SD = 1.47) and bad traits (M = 3.88, SD = 1.44,; 
t(116) = 1.42, p = .159).  
Impression Formation Process 
Jack’s group membership significantly influenced the amount of information used 
in forming participant’s impressions, F(1,218) = 6.81, p = .010, ηp2 = .030, such that 
participants reported using slightly more information when forming an impression of 
Jack when he belonged to the moral group (M = 3.37, SD = .55), as compared to when 
Jack belonged to the immoral group (M = 3.14, SD = .76). No other main effects or 
interactions emerged for the amount of information used in forming their impression, (all 
Fs < 1.18). In contrast, no differences emerged for the clarity of the participant’s 
impression (all Fs < 1.63). 
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Table 11. Within-subjects person-based and action-based moral judgments as a function 
of processing style and emotional manipulation. 
Global Processing Prime 
 Person Judgments Action Judgments 
 M SD M SD 
Happy Video -.75 1.29 -.82 .95 
Sad Video -.60 1.33 -1.03 1.27 
Disgust Video -.25 1.73 -.82 1.60 
     
Local Processing Prime 
 Person Judgments Action Judgments 
 M SD M SD 
Happy Video -.03 1.57 -.48 1.33 
Sad Video -.47 1.71 -1.04 1.49 
Disgust Video -.66 1.56 -.92 1.36 
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Appendix J 
VIGNETTES USED IN STUDY 4 VIGNETTE PRETEST 
Jack Pretest Vignette 1 (this version used in main Study 4) 
On Monday, Jack woke up early, dressed quickly and got ready to leave his 
house.  He went to a doctor’s appointment before going to work.  While Jack was waiting 
to see the doctor, he kept a conversation going with another patient by talking about the 
upcoming football game that weekend. On his way out of the doctor’s office, he noticed 
that someone had left their car lights on in the parking lot, but thought that it wasn’t any 
of his business, and continued on his way to work. 
 
After he arrived at his office, he worked diligently for the first hour or so, but he 
wasn’t really in the mood for work, so he took a break by playing solitaire and surfing the 
web. Before going for lunch, he figured he should really get some more work done, so he 
responded to some emails and tried his best to look busy. Right before lunch, he 
remembered that he had promised to look over Rob’s report on this month’s expenses, 
and managed to make some good edits before sending it back to him.  
 
In his rush to get to the doctor’s office that morning, Jack hadn’t had time to pack 
a lunch, so he invited Andrew, a colleague, for lunch at the diner down the street. Jack 
ordered his usual, the turkey and ham club, but the waitress accidentally brought him a 
turkey club. He was disappointed, even though he didn’t say anything to her about it. 
Andrew and he chatted about the upcoming softball tournament that their office 
participated in, but then their conversation switched to complaining about their boss. 
When the lunch check came, Jack tipped a little less than usual because the waitress had 
screwed up his order.   
 
When they got back to the office, Jack saw that people were heading over to the 
break room, and he remembered that today they were having a small birthday party for 
Kathryn, another co-worker. He grabbed the birthday card that he had brought for her off 
of his desk, and got to the break room just in time to sing the “Happy Birthday” song 
with everyone. He had just received the last piece of cake when Laura, another 
officemate, arrived to the party. He thought about offering to share with her, but 
remembered that she was a picky eater and probably didn’t want the cake anyway. After 
the party, he went back to his desk to try and get some more work done before the end of 
the day. By the time he left the office and made it to the highway, it was already rush 
hour. Jack decided to take a side road that he could speed on to make it home quicker.   
 
Once home, Jack went for a jog and took his regular route around his 
neighborhood.  He enjoyed running because he could lose himself in his thoughts and let 
the worries of his day fade away. After getting home and showering, he made himself 
dinner and sorted through his mail. After dinner, his brother called his cell phone, but 
Jack decided he didn’t feel like talking to him and let it go to voicemail.  
After a few household chores, he began to feel tired because of his early wake-up, 
and decided to wind down for the day by watching a movie. Unsatisfied with his own 
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dated movie collection, he was happy to find a download link for a movie that just came 
out in theaters, and settled in to watch. After the movie, he phoned a friend to talk about 
dinner plans for the next night and then Jack went to bed so that he would be well rested 
to start another day at work. 
 
Jack Pretest Vignette 2 
On Monday, Jack woke up early, dressed quickly and got ready to leave his 
house.  He went to a doctor’s appointment before going to work.  While Jack was waiting 
to see the doctor, he kept a conversation going with another patient by talking about the 
upcoming football game that weekend. On his way out of the doctor’s office, he noticed 
that someone had left their car lights on in the parking lot, but thought that it wasn’t any 
of his business, and continued on his way to work. 
 
After he arrived at his office, he worked diligently for the first hour or so, but he 
wasn’t really in the mood for work, so he took a break by playing solitaire and surfing the 
web. Before going for lunch, he figured he should really get some more work done, so he 
responded to some emails and tried his best to look busy. Right before lunch, he 
remembered that he had promised to look over Rob’s report on this month’s expenses, 
and managed to make some good edits before sending it back to him. 
 
In his rush to get to the doctor’s office that morning, Jack hadn’t had time to pack 
a lunch, so he invited Andrew, a colleague, for lunch at the diner down the street.  Jack 
was glad he was able to invite Andrew without Chris overhearing, because he didn’t 
really like Chris, who often tagged along uninvited. When they arrived at the diner, Jack 
ordered his usual, the turkey and ham club, and then he chatted with Andrew about the 
upcoming softball tournament that their office participated in. They spent the rest of the 
lunch complaining about their boss, before paying and heading back to the office. 
 
When they returned, Jack saw that people were heading over to the break room, 
and he remembered that today they were having a small birthday party for Kathryn, 
another co-worker. He had just received the last piece of cake when Laura, another 
officemate, arrived to the party. He thought about offering to share with her, but 
remembered that she was a picky eater and probably didn’t want the cake anyway. After 
the party, he went back to his desk to try and get some more work done before the end of 
the day. By the time he left the office and made it to the highway, it was already rush 
hour. Jack decided to take a side road that he could speed on to make it home quicker.   
 
Once home, Jack went for a jog and took his regular route around his 
neighborhood.  He enjoyed running because he could lose himself in his thoughts and let 
the worries of his day fade away. On the way back to his house, he said hello to his 
neighbor, Dan, who asked to borrow his ladder and he was happy to help. After getting 
home and showering, he made himself dinner and sorted through his mail. During dinner, 
he noticed the library book sitting on his kitchen table that he was supposed to return last 
Friday, but put it out of his mind because he didn’t need more things to do.  
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After a few household chores, he began to feel tired because of his early wake-up, 
and decided to wind down for the day by watching a movie. Unsatisfied with his own 
dated movie collection, he was happy to find a download link for a movie that just came 
out in theaters, and settled in to watch. After the movie, he phoned a friend to talk about 
dinner plans for the next night and then Jack went to bed so that he would be well rested 
to start another day at work. 
 
Jack Pretest Vignette 3 
On Monday, Jack woke up early, dressed quickly and got ready to leave his 
house.  He went to a doctor’s appointment before going to work.  While Jack was waiting 
to see the doctor, he kept a conversation going with another patient by talking about the 
upcoming football game that weekend. On his way out of the doctor’s office, he noticed 
that someone had left their car lights on in the parking lot, but thought that it wasn’t any 
of his business, and continued on his way to work. 
 
After he arrived at his office, he worked diligently for the first hour or so, but he 
wasn’t really in the mood for work, so he took a break by playing solitaire and surfing the 
web. Before going for lunch, he figured he should really get some more work done, so he 
responded to some emails and tried his best to look busy. Right before lunch, he 
remembered that he had promised to look over Rob’s report on this month’s expenses, 
and managed to make some good edits before sending it back to him. 
 
In his rush to get to the doctor’s office that morning, Jack hadn’t had time to pack 
a lunch, so he decided to invite Andrew, a colleague, for lunch at the diner down the 
street. On his way to Andrew’s office, he heard Rebecca and Will talking in hushed 
voices. The conversation sounded personal, like they had started dating or something, so 
he listened for a minute or two before moving along to Andrew’s office. When they 
arrived at the diner, Jack ordered his usual, the turkey and ham club, and then he chatted 
with Andrew about the upcoming softball tournament that their office participated in. 
They spent the rest of the lunch complaining about their boss before paying and going 
back to the office. 
 
When they returned, Jack saw that people were heading over to the break room, 
and he remembered that today they were having a small birthday party for Kathryn, 
another co-worker. As he began eating some cake, he realized that he hadn’t contributed 
any money to the office party fund that month, but figured nobody noticed and he was 
fine to eat the cake anyway. After the party, he went back to his desk to try and get some 
more work done before the end of the day. By the time he left the office and made it to 
the highway, it was already rush hour. Jack decided to take a side road that he could 
speed on to make it home quicker.  Once home, Jack went for a jog and took his regular 
route around his neighborhood.  He enjoyed running because he could lose himself in his 
thoughts and let the worries of his day fade away. After getting home and showering, he 
made himself dinner and sorted through his mail. After dinner, his brother called his cell 
phone, but Jack decided he didn’t feel like talking to him and let it go to voicemail. 
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After a few household chores, he began to feel tired because of his early wake-up, 
and decided to wind down for the day by watching a movie. Unsatisfied with his own 
dated movie collection, he was happy to find a download link for a movie that just came 
out in theaters, and settled in to watch. After the movie, he phoned a friend to talk about 
dinner plans for the next night, whom he was taking out to dinner to celebrate his 
promotion at work. Then, Jack went to bed so that he would be well rested to start 
another day at work. 
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